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Abstract 
The main hypothesis of this dissertation is that there has been a shift of focus in the his-
tory of economic thought: from normative questions, in particular the issue of justice, to 
the problem of efficiency; that is, optimisation in the sense of maximisation and mini-
misation under constraints. 
This thesis pursues a relativistic approach, since it sees the nature of the economic sci-
ence and the economic theory itself as culturally and historically embedded. Therefore, 
this analysis follows on the one hand a historical approach and on the other hand, it con-
stitutes a methodological exploration, scrutinising the nature of economic science. So 
far, a comprehensive analysis of the shift from justice to efficiency is lacking in eco-
nomics. Therefore, this dissertation fills a gap in the fields of economic methodology 
and the history of economic thought. 
There are two main sections: The first section (chapters 3-4) deals with the concept of 
efficiency. In this context, chapter 3 discusses the historical development towards a fo-
cus on efficiency. Besides identifying this trend in the economic literature, several influ-
ences and reasons for it are discussed: especially the imitation of the methods of the 
natural sciences by economists, and the emergence of modern modes of production, for 
example in the course of the separation of household and firm. Chapter 4 analyses the 
concept of efficiency. It juxtaposes the three main aspects of efficiency to the three main 
functions of an economic system, namely: technical efficiency vs. ‘how’ to produce, 
distributive efficiency vs. ‘for whom’ to produce, and the efficiency of the output mix 
vs. ‘what to produce’. Subsequently, I discuss the role of the concept of efficiency in 
market economies and centrally planned economies. 
In the section on justice, I begin with the reconstruction of the history of the concept of 
justice in chapter 5. Then, chapter 6 identifies several reasons for the disappearance of 
justice from the focus of economists. Again, the changing methodology of economics 
towards an adaption of methods from the natural sciences is of major significance. This 
phenomenon is closely connected to an emphasis on the scarcity postulate. 
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One might object that it is the utility functions of individuals that changed over time, 
rather than the individuals’ tendency towards pursuing an optimum. This counterargu-
ment is addressed in chapter 2, in which I justify the relativistic approach underlying my 
dissertation. 
As a result, I could identify the assumed shift of focus in the economic literature and put 
forth a range of reasons for this particular development, especially the imitation of the 
natural sciences and the stress on the scarcity postulate. I argue that the sole focus on 
efficiency constitutes an impoverishment of economics. This effect is even intensified 
by the ‘outsourcing’ of parts of economics into neighbouring disciplines, such as his-
torical sciences, sociology, and political sciences. The ability of economics to make de-
cisive contributions to complex real life problems is thereby impaired. In addition to the 
increasing use of mathematical, statistical, and econometric methods in economics, I 
argue for a new emphasis on the interpretive-, historical method, and on philosophical, 
and ethical approaches to economics. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die Kernthese der Arbeit lautet, dass sich im Zuge der Geschichte des ökonomischen 
Denkens eine Fokus-Verlagerung von einem Schwerpunkt auf normative Fragestellun-
gen, insbesondere der Frage der Gerechtigkeit, hin zu einem Schwerpunkt auf Effizienz 
vollzogen hat. 
Dabei verfolgt die Arbeit einen relativistischen Ansatz, indem sie das Wesen der öko-
nomischen Wissenschaft und auch die ökonomische Theorie selbst jeweils als in den 
kulturellen und zeitgeschichtlichen Kontext eingebettet versteht. Einerseits handelt es 
sich daher um eine theoriegeschichtliche Arbeit, andererseits wird aus methodologischer 
Sicht das Wesen der Volkswirtschaftslehre kritisch hinterfragt. Bislang existiert in der 
ökonomischen Literatur keine umfassende Analyse der Schwerpunktverlagerung von 
Gerechtigkeitsfragen zu Problemen der Effizienz. Somit füllt diese Arbeit eine Lücke 
sowohl in der methodologischen Diskussion, als auch in der Untersuchung der Ge-
schichte des ökonomischen Denkens. 
Die Dissertation ist in zwei Hauptabschnitte unterteilt. Im ersten Hauptabschnitt (Kapi-
tel 3-4) wird das Konzept der Effizienz behandelt. Dabei betrachtet Kapitel 3 die histo-
rische Hinwendung zu Problemen der Optimierung im Sinne einer Maximierung oder 
Minimierung unter Nebenbedingungen. Hier wird eine Reihe von Gründen für diese 
Entwicklung aufgedeckt, insbesondere die Imitation der Naturwissenschaften durch die 
Ökonomik und zudem die Herausbildung moderner Produktionsverhältnisse durch bei-
spielsweise die Trennung von Haushalt und Betrieb. Kapitel 4 analysiert den Effizienz-
begriff näher und zieht eine Verbindung zwischen den drei Hauptaspekten der Effizienz 
und den drei Hauptfunktionen eines Wirtschaftssystems: technische Effizienz vs. die 
Frage, „wie“ zu produzieren ist, distributive Effizienz vs. die Frage, „für wen“ produ-
ziert werden soll und die Effizienz des Output-Mix vs. die Frage, „was“ produziert wird. 
Im Anschluss wird die Rolle der Effizienz in Marktwirtschaften ihrer Rolle in zentral-
verwalteten Systemen gegenübergestellt. 
Im Abschnitt zur Gerechtigkeit (Kapitel 5-6) wird zunächst in Kapitel 5 die historische 
Entwicklung des Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes nachgezeichnet, um in Kapitel 6 Gründe zu 
präsentieren, die das Verschwinden der Gerechtigkeitsfrage aus dem ökonomischen 
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Blickfeld erklären können. Erneut ist dabei der Wandel der Methodologie hin zu quasi-
naturwissenschaftlichen Herangehensweisen von großer Bedeutung, wie die damit ein-
her gehende Fokussierung auf den Grundtatbestand der Knappheit. 
Dem Einwand, im Laufe der Geschichte habe sich lediglich die Nutzenfunktion der In-
dividuen gewandelt und von einer zunehmenden Tendenz zur Optimierung könne daher 
nicht die Rede sein, wird eingangs in Kapitel 2 entgegengetreten. Hier wird ein relati-
vistischer Ansatz für das weitere Vorgehen in der vorliegenden Dissertation begründet. 
Als Ergebnis der Arbeit konnte die vermutete Schwerpunktverlagerung im ökonomi-
schen Denken in der Literatur nachgewiesen werden. Zudem sind eine Reihe von Grün-
den für diese Entwicklung aufgedeckt worden, insbesondere die genannte Orientierung 
der Ökonomik an den Naturwissenschaften und der allgegenwärtige Bezug zum Knapp-
heitsproblem. In dieser Entwicklung wird eine Verarmung der ökonomischen Wissen-
schaft gesehen, zumal sie mit einer Auslagerung verschiedener Teilbereiche in Nachbar-
disziplinen einhergeht, wie beispielsweise in die Geschichtswissenschaften, die 
Soziologie und die Politologie. Die Aussagefähigkeit der Ökonomik zu komplexen Fra-
gestellungen ist dadurch gefährdet. Neben die ausgeprägte quantitative Analyse sollten 
wieder vermehrt qualitative Verfahren treten, wie die verstehende, historische Methode 
und philosophisch-ethische Betrachtungsweisen. 
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Preface 
This doctoral thesis is part of the research project Genese von Normen in der ökono-
mischen Wissenschaft
1
 in the context of the cluster of excellence Normative Orders in 
Frankfurt am Main. Originally my research topic was Normative Implikationen der All-
gemeinen Gleichgewichtstheorie
2
. Right from the start it became clear that one central 
part of general equilibrium theory and modern economics in general is maximisation 
and minimisation; that is, optimisation, under certain constraints. Is this simply an im-
portant part of the methodology of economics and as such value neutral or does the fo-
cus on efficiency itself convey normative implications? Furthermore, why and when did 
the economists’ interest in optimisation originate? 
Motivated by these questions, I wrote several research articles which constitute chapters 
2-6 of this dissertation. In order to be able to present my ideas at several different con-
ferences, the individual papers – and consequently the chapters of this thesis – are each 
self-contained, nevertheless they are all held together by a common thread. 
I am very grateful to a number of people and institutions for their help in making this 
dissertation a successful project. First of all I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. 
Dr. Volker Caspari, my supervisor, for his guidance, encouragement, inspiration, and 
patience during my research. Also, I am no less indebted to Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Bertram 
Schefold, whose knowledge on the history of economic thought was like an inexhausti-
ble gold-mine for my work. 
Moreover, this thesis would not have become what it is, without the support of my col-
leagues at the Goethe University Frankfurt: Sebastian Beck, Felix Brandl, Johannes 
Glaeser, Eva Koscher, Jens Reich, Martin Schröter, and Dr. Manuel Wörsdörfer. The 
regular exchange of ideas was a great encouragement to my work. 
                                                 
1
  Formation of norms in economic science. 
2
  Normative implications of general equilibrium theory. 
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1 Overview 
This thesis pursues one central hypothesis: In the history of economic thought, there has 
been a shift of focus from questions about justice to those dealing with efficiency. I aim 
firstly, at tracing this development in the history of economic thought, and secondly, at 
identifying reasons for this particular trajectory that economics took. 
Methodologically, my dissertation is therefore on the one hand a work of the history of 
economic thought and on the other hand a methodological investigation into the nature 
of economic science. 
So far, a comprehensive analysis of my research question is missing in economic litera-
ture. However, there are a number of important contributions on the issue. Concerning 
the role of efficiency and justice in economics, one has to mention Joachim Hagel’s Ef-
fizienz und Gerechtigkeit
3
, which offers a critical analysis of the concepts efficiency and 
justice in neoclassical welfare-economics. A historical analysis, however, is missing. In 
Lohn- und Preisgerechtigkeit
4
, Christian Hecker, on the other hand, discussed the devel-
opment of concepts of justice with a particular focus, namely on protestant and catholic 
social ethics, and of the German Ordoliberalism. The systematic discussion of reasons 
for these developments, and an analogous examination of the concept of efficiency 
were, however, not part of Hecker’s research program. 
My own analysis certainly stands in the tradition of Max Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism’5. Here, Weber found an increasing tendency towards instru-
mental rationality in human history. However, he was not entirely clear on this point. On 
the one hand, he identified an increasing striving for profit and rentability, on the other 
hand he assumed a general efficiency orientation to be universal.
6
 One reason for his 
                                                 
3
  ‘Efficiency and justice’. J. Hagel, Effizienz und Gerechtigkeit, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1993. 
4
  ‘Just wages and prices’. C. Hecker, Lohn- und Preisgerechtigkeit: Historische Rückblicke und aktuelle 
Perspektiven unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der christlichen Soziallehren, Metropolis, Marburg, 
2008. 
5
  M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, ed. by D. Kaesler, 3
rd
 ed.,  
C. H. Beck, Munich, 2010, first published 1904/05 as essays and 1920 as a monograph. 
6
  Cf. M. Weber, ‘Vorbemerkung’, in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Mohr Siebeck, Tü-
bingen, 1920, p. 4. 
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rejection of a relativistic view of human rationality might be found in his focus on scar-
city in the economic sphere.
7
 
Methodologically, my approach to explanations in economics refers on the one hand to 
the philosophical work of Maurice Lagueux
8
, and on the other hand the historical, inter-
pretive method
9
, going back to the Historical School, in particular the work of Werner 
Sombart
10
. 
Many might question the use and necessity of methodological studies in economics. 
Carl Menger, for instance, stated that: 
‘Only in one case, to be sure, do methodological investigations appear to be the most important, the most 
immediate and the most urgent thing that can be done for the development of a science. It may happen in 
a field of knowledge, for some reason or other, that accurate feeling for the goals of research coming from 
the nature of the subject matter has been lost. It may happen that an exaggerated or even decisive signifi-
cance is attributed to secondary problems of the science. Erroneous methodological principles supported 
by powerful schools prevail completely and onesidedness judges all efforts in a field of knowledge. In a 
word, the progress of a science is blocked because erroneous methodological principles prevail. In this 
case, to be sure, clarification of methodological problems is the condition of any further progress, and 
with this the time has come when even those are obligated to enter the quarrel about methods who other-
wise would have preferred to apply their powers to the solution of the distinctive problems of their sci-
ence.’11 
Ironically, after over a century of scientific inquiry in the field of economics that fol-
lowed Menger’s trajectory, his own statement seems to speak into the momentary situa-
tion, and reopens the discussion about the nature, scope, and method of economics. 
With my dissertation ‘From Justice to Efficiency: On a Shift in the Normative Focus of 
Economics’, I try to fill a gap that still exists in economic literature. In doing this, my 
analysis also transcends Weber’s approach in certain respects, since firstly, I do not con-
fine my argument by basing it on the scarcity postulate, secondly, I discuss several new 
factors that might have contributed to the focus on efficiency, and thirdly, I include as-
                                                 
7
  Cf. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie, 5
th
 ed., Mohr Sie-
beck, Tübingen, 1972, p. 199. 
8
  In particular: M. Lagueux, Rationality and explanation in economics, Routledge, Abingdon, 2010. 
9
  Verstehende Methode. 
10
  Cf. B. Schefold, ‘Werner Sombart: Verstehende Nationalökonomie’, in Die Zeit, 23 April 1993, p. 30, 
or cf. e.g. W. Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus I, Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig, 1902. 
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pects from the history of economic thought into my argument, in addition to general 
history. Obviously, since I am writing more than one hundred years after Weber, I can 
include aspects that Weber did not know about. Finally, I combine the analysis of the 
development of economic thought regarding efficiency with the analysis of contempla-
tion on justice, which Weber did not do as well. 
This thesis consists of two major sections: Section one focuses on the concept of effi-
ciency, while section two is centred on the concept of justice. In section one, chapter 3 
‘On the Historicity and Normativity of Efficiency’, discusses whether the concept of 
efficiency should be perceived as a law of nature, or a value neutral methodological 
element of economics or whether it is rather a normative concept. Furthermore, it exam-
ines several influences and developments that contributed to economics’ focus on effi-
ciency. 
Chapter 4 ‘Aspects of Efficiency: The Role of the Economic System’ scrutinises the 
term ‘efficiency’. Here, I present a number of different aspects of what ‘efficiency’ 
means, and compare the role of efficiency in market- and centrally-planned economies. 
Section two, regarding justice, begins with chapter 5 ‘The Concept of Justice in the His-
tory of Economic Thought’. The purpose of this chapter is equivalent to chapter 4, by 
clarifying what is meant by ‘justice’. Since, of course, this cannot be done analytically, 
this chapter provides an overview of what economists have written about justice. 
Finally, the purpose of chapter 6 ‘Remembrance of Concepts Past: Why Justice no 
longer seems to be relevant in Mainstream Economics?’ is equivalent to chapter 3. 
Whereas in chapter 3 the main question is, what factors might have contributed to the 
emergence of the focus on efficiency, chapter 6 asks, which factors played a role in the 
disappearance of the concept of justice from the focus of economics. 
Generally, my argument assumes that in the history of thought, there has indeed been a 
shift in the thought, the actions, and the self-conception of man. The hypothesis that 
                                                 
11
  C. Menger, Investigations into the method of the social sciences, New York University Press, New 
York & London, 1985, first published in 1883 as ‘Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwis-
senschaften und der Politischen Oekonomie insbesondere’, p. 27. 
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humans act in order to maximise an individual utility function is relatively new. My 
argument that the utility maximisation hypothesis is a poor approximation of behaviour 
in pre-modern societies (and that it is doubtful whether it is a good approximation of 
modern societies) has often been criticised during the time of my research. To respond 
to this criticism, the two main sections of this dissertation are preceded by an introduc-
tory chapter 2 ‘Developing a Relativistic Approach to Economics’, in which I justify the 
method of my dissertation. The concept of efficiency consequently is the explanandum 
of my analysis, not the explanans.
12
 This relativistic approach permits a change of 
thought and behaviour such as an increasing efficiency orientation. Also, the method 
hints at a historical and interpretive approach, which is reflected in the rest of my disser-
tation. 
I conclude with a summary of the results and an outlook for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
  B. Schefold, ‘Max Webers “Protestantische Ethik“ als Hinterfragung der Ökonomie’, in B. Schefold, 
Beiträge zur ökonomischen Dogmengeschichte, ed. by V. Caspari, Wirtschaft und Finanzen, Düssel-
dorf, 2004, p. 451. 
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 ‘Im Reich der Zwecke hat alles entweder einen Preis, 
oder eine Würde. Was einen Preis hat, an dessen Stelle 
kann auch etwas anderes, als Äquivalent, gesetzt wer-
den; was dagegen über allen Preis erhaben ist, mithin 
kein Äquivalent verstattet, das hat eine Würde . . . das 
aber, was die Bedingungen ausmacht, unter der allein 
etwas Zweck an sich selbst sein kann, hat nicht bloß 
einen relativen Wert, d.i. einen Preis, sondern einen 
innern Wert, d.i. Würde.’13 
 
2 Developing a Relativistic Approach to Economics 
2.1 Introduction 
‘Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends 
and scarce means which have alternative uses.’14 Founded on this famous definition of 
economics by Lionel Robbins, economic explanations of human actions are based on 
the utility maximisation postulate, according to which individuals act in a way that aims 
at a maximum of utility given scarce resources. 
Chapter 2.2 elaborates on the neoclassical utility maximisation approach. It identifies 
and discusses a number of problems that it cannot deal with. In particular if utility 
maximisation is formulated as a non-falsifiable, ex-post construction, the validity of the 
utility maximisation approach is doubtful. 
In contrast to the neoclassical theory of action, this thesis argues in favour of a relativis-
tic approach which focuses on identifying and understanding the various motives for 
action. In order to justify this relativistic approach, chapter 2.3 examines the nature of 
                                                 
13
  I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, ed. by W. Weischedel, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am 
Main, 1974, first published 1785, p. 68. ‘In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dig-
nity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is 
raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity. . . . but that which consti-
tutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative 
worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity.’ I. Kant, Groundwork of the metaphysics of 
morals, translation M. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 2005, reprint of 1
st
 ed. 
1998, p. 42. 
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explanations in economics. Some of the questions dealt with are: What does it mean to 
explain something? What is the role of rationality? How can rationality be defined, and 
what is an action?  
In chapter 2.4, economic explanations based on the utility maximisation approach are 
contrasted with a more comprehensive theory of actions for economics. Chapter 2.5 
draws some conclusions and provides an outlook to adjacent research questions. 
As a result, the operator ‘max’ in front of the neoclassical utility function appears as an 
explanandum rather than the explanans of human actions, as has already been indicated 
in chapter 1. How human thought and action became preoccupied with a maximum or 
optimum – rather than for example a satisficing solution – will then be examined in 
chapter 3 ‘On the Historicity and Normativity of Efficiency’ from a history of economic 
thought perspective. 
2.2 The Neoclassical Utility Maximisation Hypothesis 
In order to understand the utility maximisation hypothesis, it is best to see it at work. 
Therefore, consider the following example of traditional potlatches: 
A potlatch is a traditional festival that constitutes an important part of the cultures of the 
indigenous peoples of the American North-West Coast.
15
 Particularly in the past, Pot-
latches were held on many different occasions: weddings, funerals, inaugurations of 
new chiefs, etc. The central element of these feasts was the giving of gifts.
16
 The prepa-
rations for a potlatch could take several years and the host would give up most or even 
                                                 
14
  L. Robbins, An essay on the nature and significance of economic science, 2
nd
 ed., Macmillan, London, 
1949, p. 16. 
15
  Cf. R. Gadacz, ‘Potlach’, in The Canadian Encyclopedia, retrieved 23 February 2012, 
<http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0006431>. 
16
  Cf. K.-H. Kohl, Ethnologie – Die Wissenschaft vom kulturell Fremden: Eine Einführung, C. H. Beck, 
Munich, 1993, pp. 89-90. 
2.  Developing a Relativistic Approach to Economics 7 
 
 
all of his material wealth.
17
 Therefore, potlatches induced a form of wealth accumula-
tion with the single aim of redistributing or even destroying the amassed goods.
18
 
Indeed, in some cases, competitive forms of potlatches ended in the destruction of gifts 
and the host’s property. As a form of ritualised gift-exchange, potlatches had to be recip-
rocated and therefore hosts tried to humiliate or even ruin their rivals by destroying 
large amounts of gifts and sometimes even by setting their own house on fire during 
their own potlatch. Guests had to repay the invitation
19
 and failing to do so meant that 
they would face subordination.
20
 
For the modern observer this tradition seems to represent an example of a clearly ineffi-
cient institution. But is it really? Potlatches are certainly not nonsensical but serve spe-
cific functions. By means of the ritualised gift exchange, hierarchical relations are de-
termined inside of the indigenous society. To give is to show one’s superiority, to accept 
but to fail to return the gift means subservience.
21
 A new chief needs to hold a potlatch 
and hence he must be able to accumulate a large amount of wealth. Is this not a desir-
able ability that qualifies a member of society for chieftainship? Is the potlatch-
institution therefore efficient as a means of identifying potential candidates for the post 
of chief? 
On the other hand, efficiency means to achieve a maximum output for a given input or 
to achieve a given output with a minimum of inputs. Is such an optimum realised by 
means of a potlatch? Should the accumulated wealth not rather be consumed jointly or, 
even better, be invested in order to increase future production? 
2.2.1 Ubiquitous Maximisation 
Mainstream economics sees every human action as rational in a utility maximising 
sense. This approach has been formulated in one of its most radical and therefore clear-
                                                 
17
  Cf. Kwakiutl Indian Band (ed.), Potlach, retrieved 23 February 2012, 
<http://www.kwakiutl.bc.ca/culture/potlatch.htm>. 
18
  Cf. Kohl, pp. 89-90. 
19
  Cf. ibid., pp. 89-90. 
20
  Cf. M. Mauss, The gift, translation I. Cunnison, Cohen & West, London, 1966, originally in French 
1923, p. 72. 
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est forms by Ludwig von Mises.
22
 The utility-maximising-principle allegedly operates 
in every culture, every period of history,
23
 every economic system
24
, and in every sphere 
of human life
25
. 
Similarly, the formation of institutions is supposed to be directed at efficiency. Accord-
ing to Douglass C. North, the decisive factor for the development of institutions are 
transaction costs.
26
 The institutional framework is a product of the cultural inheritance 
and therefore path-dependent.
27
 The further development of these institutions, however, 
leads to efficient outcomes, since all-prevailing scarcity ensures that only efficient insti-
tutions survive.
28
 
This approach is crucial for the formulation of a significant number of theoretical mod-
els in modern economics. Its empirical application, however, regularly hints at impor-
tant limitations of the utility maximisation hypothesis. In particular, it is often not possi-
ble to incorporate nonmarket behaviour
29
 convincingly into this framework. There are 
                                                 
21
  Cf. Mauss, The gift, p. 72. 
22
  Cf. L. von Mises, The ultimate foundation of economic science, D. van Nostrand, New Jersey, 1962, 
pp. 76-7. 
23
  Cf. L. von Mises, Human action: A treatise on economics, 4
th
 ed., Fox & Wilkes, San Francisco, 1996, 
first published 1949, p. 66. 
24
  Cf. D. North, Structure and change in economic history, Norton, New York, 1981, p. 4. 
25
  Cf. G. S. Becker, The economic approach to human behavior, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 
1976, e.g. p. 4. 
26
  Cf. D. North, ‘Economic performance through time’, in American Economic Review, vol. 84, no. 3, 
1994, p. 361. 
27
  Cf. ibid., p. 364. 
28
  Cf. North, Structure and change, p. 7. 
29
  The difference between market- and non-market transactions is often not explicitly defined in eco-
nomic literature. In this context the distinction can best be understood in terms of an example: gift -
exchanges vs. goods-exchanges. The latter aim at the satisfaction of material needs, and are therefore 
concerned with ‘material provisioning’ (cf. ‘menschliche Unterhaltsfürsorge’. Sombart, p. 21). On the 
other hand, gift exchanges pursue different motives, for example fostering social bonds. Consequently, 
market transactions are transactions concerned with material provisioning/menschliche Unterhaltsfür-
sorge, whereas nonmarket transactions follow a different logic. Even authors such as Richard Posner 
implicitly refer to such a substantivistic/material concept of the market (cf. R. A. Posner, The econom-
ics of justice, Harvard Universtiy Press, Cambridge MA, 1983, pp. 1-2: ‘Is it plausible to suppose that 
people are rational only or mainly when they are transacting in markets, and not when they are en-
gaged in other activities of life, such as marriage and litigation an crime and discrimination and con-
cealment of personal information? Or that only the inhabitants of modern Western (or Westernized) 
societies are rational? If rationality is not confined to explicit market transactions but is a general and 
dominant characteristic of social behavior, then the conceptual apparatus constructed by generations 
of economists to explain market behavior can be used to explain nonmarket behavior as well’). 
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three main strategies to deal with shortcomings of the ‘maximisation-hypothesis’:30 
Firstly, one can see it as an approximation to reality. The idea of a utility-maximising 
Homo Oeconomicus would then be a purely theoretical construct, as a simplification of 
the complex reality, in order to analyse specifically economic problems, that is to say, 
actions in the market sphere.
31
 Secondly, one can evade the problems of the maximisa-
tion hypothesis in a Friedmanian way. According to this view, economics does not at-
tempt to formulate realistic and testable models, but simply aims at hypotheses and 
theories that deliver good predictions.
32
 The third and most common way to deal with 
inadequacies of the basic utility maximisation approach is simply to extend the content 
of the utility function.
33
 If observations do not fit the maximisation idea, ‘the calculation 
of benefits and costs that we employ is too limited’34. To refer to our initial example of 
potlatch-festivals: An action that seems inefficient at first sight since it appears to be 
wasteful from an economic point of view, can be made to fit into the maximisation ap-
proach by including variables other than economic well-being into the utility function; 
for example power, leisure, prestige, etc. If the observed behaviour should still not fit 
into the utility maximisation framework, one can always refer to non-observable psy-
chic costs which are supposed to explain the gap between observation and the expected 
behaviour.
35
 
In this manner, every human action can be interpreted as utility maximising in some 
way.
36
 However, this strategy seems to follow the logic ‘if at first you don’t succeed, 
                                                 
30
  Cf. V. Vanberg, ‘The rationality postulate in economics: its ambiguity, its deficiency and its evolution-
ary alternative’, in: Journal of Economic Methodology, vol. 11, no. 1, 2004, pp. 8-9. Cf. chapter 2.2.3 
for a discussion of the most important of these shortcomings. 
31
  Cf. K. Mathis et al., Efficiency instead of justice?: Searching for the philosophical foundations of the 
economic analysis of law, Springer, Dordrecht, 2009, p. 14. 
32
  Cf. Vanberg, p. 8. 
33
  Cf. ibid., p. 9. 
34
  North, Structure and change, p. 46. 
35
  Cf. Becker, The economic approach, p. 7: ‘When an apparently profitable opportunity to a firm, 
worker, or household is not exploited, the economic approach does not take refuge in assertions about 
irrationality, contentment with wealth already acquired, or convenient ad hoc shifts in values (i.e., 
preferences). Rather it postulates the existence of costs, monetary or psychic, of taking advantage of 
these opportunities that eliminate their profitability – costs that may not be easily ‘seen’ by outside ob-
servers.’ 
36
  Cf. H. Leibenstein, Beyond economic man: A new foundation for microeconomics, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA, 1976, p. 8. 
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redefine success.’37 Also, to include all the relevant factors into the model would put it 
outside the neoclassical framework, since the focus on scarcity and its mathematical 
structure would need to be given up.
38
 
When economists discuss behaviour on markets, the utility maximisation hypothesis 
might often be very useful and lead to important insights. Since economics is develop-
ing more and more into a general science of human action, discussing all spheres of life 
– market- and non-market – a more comprehensive behavioural paradigm is needed.39 I 
will give some hints on what such an approach might look like, later in this chapter. 
2.2.2 Related Discourses 
The fight over a positivistic or relativistic focus of economics has repeatedly been 
fought in the history of economic thought. In the first Methodenstreit
40
 Carl Menger and 
Gustav Schmoller debated about the historical method in economics. According to 
Menger, scarcity
41
 and the exclusive focus on self-interest
42
 in economic matters are 
universal features of every economy and therefore the theoretical framework and the 
economist’s toolbox would have to be universal as well.43 
                                                 
37
  D. L. Everett, Don’t sleep, there are snakes: Life and language in the Amazonian jungle, Pantheon, 
New York, 2008, p. 229. 
38
  Cf. J. A. Elardo & A. Campbell, ‘Choice and the substantivist/formalist debate: A formal presentation 
of three substantivist criticisms’, in Research in Economic Anthropology, vol. 25, 2006, pp. 267-84.  
Cf. in particular chapter 2.2.3.4. 
39
  Cf. Vanberg, p. 21. 
40
  ‘Dispute over method’. 
41
  Cf. K. Polanyi, The livelihood of man, ed. by H. W. Pearson, Academic Press, New York et al., 1977,  
p. 21. 
42
  Cf. M. Haller, ‘Mixing economics and ethics: Carl Menger vs. Gustav von Schmoller’, in Social Sci-
ence Information, vol. 43, no. 5, 2004, p. 17, or cf. Menger, Investigations, pp. 82-9. 
43
  Polanyi argued that later in his life, Menger seems to have doubted his former strong assertions. He 
did not authorise reprints or translations of the first edition of his Principles and worked on a revised 
version, which was published only posthumously. According to Polanyi, in this second edition, 
Menger was anxious to distinguish between exchange in market- and non-market economies. (Cf. Po-
lanyi, The livelihood, p. 22). Polanyi regrets that this slight shift has been lost in the history of eco-
nomic thought, since the second edition has never been translated into English and economists still re-
fer to Menger’s principles in its original version. However, in this second revised edition, published by 
his son, Karl Menger, appears only the distinction between a ‘technical’ and a ‘formal’ form of the 
economy (‘technisch-ökonomische’ vs. ‘sparende Richtung der Wirtschaft’). Here, ‘technical’ stands 
for the production-sphere with the aim of satisfying certain needs, whereas ‘formal’ stands for econo-
mising actions under conditions of scarcity. Furthermore, the distinction between economic and non-
economic exchange has already been there in the first edition of 1871. With this Menger meant only 
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Schmoller, on the other hand, criticised that positivistic economic laws were based on 
the ‘illusion of a stable original state’44. Economic actions would not be universally di-
rected at overcoming scarcity and would also not be exclusively self-interested. On the 
contrary, motives for economic actions are complex and built on values and norms.
45
 
Individuals are not continuously calculating maximisers but are bound by their cultural 
background.
46
 Values and norms are rooted in a particular culture and vary with place 
and time. It follows that concepts of economic theory must also be relative to the cul-
tural context. Schmoller can therefore count as a proponent of a cultural relativism,
47
 as 
opposed to Menger’s economic universalism. 
The same fundamental question re-emerged in the substantivist-formalist debate. Karl 
Polanyi, as the most prominent proponent of the substantivist position, distinguished 
between two meanings of the term ‘economic’: 
‘The first meaning, the formal, springs from the logical character of the means-end relationship, as in 
economizing or economical; from this meaning springs the scarcity definition of economic. The second, 
the substantive meaning, points to the elemental fact that human beings, like all other living things, can-
not exist for any length of time without a physical environment that sustains them; this is the origin of the 
substantive definition of economic.’48 
Polanyi maintained that the formalist approach is only appropriate for modern market 
economies and cannot be applied to primitive societies. In primitive economies, indi-
vidual actions do not aim at a maximum of utility but are led by cultural and normative 
factors.
49
 
                                                 
forms of exchange that are advantageous and those that are not. To conclude, there are no signs that 
Menger would have disavowed from his strong position, on the contrary, Karl Menger asserts in the 
introduction of the second edition that his father did not change his views in any fundamental issues 
between the publication of the first edition and his death in 1921 (C. Menger, Grundsätze der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre, Scientia Verlag, Aalen, 1968, reprint of the 2
nd
 ed. of 1923). 
44
  G. Schmoller, Über einige Grundfragen der Socialpolitik und der Volkswirtschaftslehre, Duncker & 
Humblot, Leipzig, 1898, p. 305 (‘Fiktion eines stabilen Urzustandes’). 
45
  Cf. Haller, p. 8. 
46
  Cf. H. H. Nau, ‘History Matters: From historical economics to modern insitutionalism’, in H. H. Nau 
& B. Schefold (ed.), The historicity of economics: Continuities and discontinuities of historical 
thought in 19
th
 and 20
th
 century economics, Springer, Berlin, 2002, p. 6. 
47
  Cf. Haller, p. 8. 
48
  Polanyi, The livelihood, p. 19. 
49
  Cf. K. Polanyi, ‘Anthropology and economic theory’, in F. Morton (ed.), in Readings in anthropology, 
2
nd
 ed., Thomas Cromwell Company, New York, 1968, as cited in J. Onorati, ‘Debating economic an-
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The formalist approach, on the contrary, stated that choice between alternatives under 
conditions of scarcity is universal. Individuals economise everything in order to maxi-
mise their individual utility function: income, leisure time, power, friendship, love.
50
 As 
a consequence, the tools of economics that deal with choice between substitutes can be 
applied to primitive economies just as well as to developed market economies. 
Furthermore, there have been attempts towards a concept of ‘bounded rationality’. Ac-
cording to this view, individuals are not perfect utility maximisers but are content with a 
suboptimal solution. 
Harvey Leibenstein, for instance, defined rationality as ‘calculatedness’. Complete ra-
tionality is a form of tight calculatedness, whereas selective rationality consists in loose 
calculatedness without necessarily being irrational.
51
 He then went on to define his own 
concept ‘X-inefficiency’ as ‘the degree to which actual output is less than maximum 
output (for given inputs)’52. 
Similarly, Herbert A. Simon wanted to replace ‘an optimality criterion by a satisficing 
criterion’53. Simon – as neoclassical economics – also starts with the basic assumption 
of pervasive scarcity,
54
 however, he sees the agent limited in his capacities to actually 
determine a real maximum in all circumstances. Agents are satisfied with a ‘good’, 
rather than an ‘optimal’ solution.55 
Both Leibenstein’s ‘X-efficiency’ and Simon’s ‘Satisficing’-approach do not convinc-
ingly break out of the neoclassical ‘utility-maximising’ framework. What both authors 
do is to make the degree of optimality a variable of the utility function itself. Therefore 
they simply optimise the degree of optimisation and in the end must assume universal 
efficiency of behaviour just as well. 
                                                 
thropology within a primitive context’, in Emory Endeavors Journal, vol. 1, 2007, retrieved 23 Febru-
ary, 2012, <http://history.emory.edu/home/assets/documents/endeavors/volume1/Joeys.pdf>, p. 4. 
50
  Cf. Onorati, p. 2. 
51
  Cf. Leibenstein, pp. 73-7. 
52
  Ibid., p. 95. 
53
  H. A. Simon, ‘Rationality as process and as product of thought’, in: American Economic Review,  
vol. 68, no. 2, 1978, p. 12. 
54
  Cf. ibid., pp. 14-6. 
55
  Cf. Lagueux, Rationality and explanation, p. 47. 
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Max Weber distinguished four types of rationality: Firstly, instrumental rationality as a 
means-ends-relationship. Secondly, value rationality as ethically, aesthetically, or relig-
iously motivated actions not as means to some end but as ends in themselves. Thirdly, 
affectual rationality as in particular in emotionally motivated actions, and traditional 
rationality as actions according to custom and habit. Weber called these four types of 
rationality ‘ideal types’. Real world actions might be between the ideal types or a mé-
lange of several forms.
56
 Consequently, Weber maintained in contrast to mainstream 
economics that not all actions are utility maximising in an instrumental sense of ration-
ality. Also, when he dealt with the formation and development of institutions, Weber 
saw irrational motives at work or at least motives that are no longer rational in a chang-
ing environment. 
On the contrary, Douglass C. North and with him New Institutional Economics would 
hold that institutions are ‘efficient solutions to certain economic problems.’57 
Whereas the first Methodenstreit was mainly concerned with the role of the historical 
method in economics, the Substantivist-Formalist-Debate with the right approach to the 
economies of archaic societies, and whereas Leibenstein and Simon questioned but in 
the end failed to leave the neoclassical utility maximising approach, this chapter at-
tempts to build on useful previous arguments in the struggle for a relativistic approach 
to economics, but to put it in a more general, non-maximising framework. 
2.2.3 On Some Problems of the Utility Maximisation Framework 
The endeavour to develop a theory of human action that can fit into a relativistic ap-
proach to economics needs to address a range of problems that the neoclassical utility 
maximisation hypothesis fails to incorporate. 
  
                                                 
56
  Cf. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 12-13. In the original: ‘zweckrational’, ‘wertrational’, 
‘affektuell’, ‘traditional’. 
57
  M. Granovetter, ‘Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness’, in American 
Journal of Sociology, vol. 91, no. 3, 1985, p. 488, and cf. North, Structure and change, p. 7. 
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2.2.3.1 Scarcity 
For instance, neoclassical theory is based on the assumption that all human action is a 
response to pervasive scarcity.
58
 Since neoclassical theory restricts itself to the formal 
meaning of the term ‘economic’, situations of choice are always construed as decisions 
under conditions of insufficient means.
59
 Even if one accepts this focus on choice, not 
all choices are subject to the same concept of scarcity. Operationally induced choice, for 
example, might be a choice between equally attractive alternatives, but nevertheless a 
choice needs to be made. Take the case of a crossroad: Turning left has the same advan-
tages or disadvantages as turning right, but you still need to pick one route in order to 
reach your destination. In this situation choice without scarcity is involved. Likewise, an 
individual might be confronted by a choice between alternatives without scarcity in the 
case of moral choices. You decide to do something simply because you think that this is 
the right thing to do.
60
 
The issue of scarcity was already a topic of discussion in ancient Greece, but the authors 
were aware of the fact that firstly, scarcity is a relative, that is to say, a social and cultur-
ally dependent concept, and that secondly, there are different forms of scarcity that need 
to be treated differently. 
Aristotle would say that animals ‘find their sustenance waiting for them’61. They do not 
need to produce and under normal conditions, their means for reproduction are available 
in abundance. Similarly, man finds his sustenance in the mother’s milk. He concludes 
that the focus on the insufficiency of means in the natural environment is a ‘demand 
side’ phenomenon and can only result as a misconception of the nature of the good 
life.
62
 Certainly then, scarcity is not a universal phenomenon but culturally relative. 
As another example from Ancient Greece, Polanyi referred to the agatha as honorary 
gifts. These are rare and therefore scarce, but in a very different way. They are inherent 
                                                 
58
  Cf. e.g. Mises, The ultimate foundation, pp. 2-3. 
59
  Cf. K. Polanyi, ‘The economy as instituted process’, in Trade and market in the early empires: Eco-
nomics in history and theory, ed. by K. Polanyi et al., Free Press, New York, 1957, p. 243. 
60
  Cf. Elardo & Campbell, pp. 273-77, or cf. Polanyi, ‘The economy as instituted process’. 
61
  K. Polanyi, ‘Aristotle discovers the economy’, in Trade and market in the early empires: Economics 
in history and theory, ed. by K. Polanyi et al., Free Press, New York, 1957, p. 81. 
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in rank and are rare just as there is only little space at the top of the pyramid. Contrary 
to simple economic goods like shoes, which can simply be produced in greater numbers 
in order to decrease their scarcity, the agatha would not be what they are if their number 
could arbitrarily be increased. Their scarcity is therefore a result of non-economic fac-
tors.
63
 
In neoclassical theory, the factors that enter one’s utility function have to be substitutes. 
You can either increase your utility by consuming for 20 Euros more or instead you can 
enjoy one more hour of leisure time. The opportunity cost of one hour of leisure is then 
20 Euros. Many motives of human action, like ‘reputation’ or the ‘experience of friend-
ship’ are scarce in a different way. There is no trade-off between ‘an experience of fam-
ily togetherness’ and the number of chewing gums consumed. In other words, there is 
no (Euro) price on family togetherness; I will come back to this point later on.
64
 
The absurdity of trying to subsume all motivations for human actions under one target 
function becomes even clearer in the case of a very particular ‘scarce good’: love. The 
reader does not have to be reminded that the supply of love might in fact increase 
through use and as a good it might not remain intact if it stays unused.
65
 The attempt to 
fully understand how the ‘marriage market’ operates solely on grounds of the neoclassi-
cal utility maximisation approach is doomed to fail.
66
 
2.2.3.2 Individualistic Perspective 
The utility maximisation approach is intrinsically individualistic; it is always individu-
als who maximise their utility.
67
 The applicability to traditional societies is therefore 
limited, since in these societies actions are often performed by groups (clans, tribes, 
families) rather than individuals.
68
 Margaret Mead gives a particularly illustrative ex-
                                                 
62
  Cf. Onorati, p. 81. 
63
  Cf. ibid., pp. 77-8. 
64
  Cf. Elardo & Campbell, pp. 273-77. 
65
  Cf. A. O. Hirschman, ‘Against parsimony: Three ways of complicating some categories of economic 
discourse’, in American Economic Review, vol. 72, no. 2, 1984, p. 93. 
66
  Cf. chapter 3 for a further analysis of the concept of scarcity. 
67
  Cf. E. Screpanti & S. Zamagni, An outline of the history of economic thought, Clarendon Press, Ox-
ford, 1993, p. 148. 
68
  Cf. Mauss, p. 3. 
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ample of the Arapesh of New Guinea, which shows how our modern view of agents as 
self-interested individuals is inappropriate for generalisations: 
‘Coconut palms and betel palms are planted not on one’s own hereditary house site, but on the house sites 
of one’s brothers, one’s uncles, one’s brothers-in-law, one’s mother’s brothers, so that a man may often 
live many miles from most of his palm trees. . . . In the care of pigs, the same diffuse, scattered method is 
followed. People do not feed their own pigs, but give them to others to feed. . . . If there is meat on his 
smoking rack over the fire, it is either meat which was killed by another – a brother, a brother-in-law, a 
sister’s son, etc. – and has been given to him, in which case he and his family may eat it; or it is meat 
which he himself has killed and which he is smoking to give away to someone else, for to eat one’s own 
kill, even though it be only a small bird, is a crime to which only the morally – which usually means in 
Arapesh mentally – deficient will stoop.’69 
Certainly collectivistic actions are not restricted to traditional societies. In fact mercan-
tilism, the classical economists, including Karl Marx
70
 in particular placed collective 
agents at the centre of their systems.
71
 To incorporate collective actions into the neoclas-
sical maximisation approach would change it out of recognition. 
2.2.3.3 Pure Self-Interest 
Since Adam Smith economists treat individuals as guided ‘in their economic activity 
exclusively by consideration of their individual [self-]interest’72. This account of Smith 
is undoubtedly over-simplified. In ‘The Theory of Moral Sentiments’ Smith stated that 
‘[h]ow selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary 
to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it’73. It is ‘sym-
pathy’ that enables man to act on motives other than self-interest, moral motives in par-
                                                 
69
  M. Mead, Cooperation and competition among primitive peoples, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, first 
published 1937, p. 31. 
70
  Cf. e.g. K. Marx, ‘Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage’, in K. Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen 
Ökonomie, vol. 1: Der Produktionsprozeß des Kapitals, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am 
Main, 1968, first published 1894, pp. 20-2. 
71
  Cf. Screpanti & Zamagni, p. 148. 
72
  Haller, p. 17, or cf. Menger, Investigations, pp. 82-9. Insertion by author. 
73
  Mathis et al., p. 89, or A. Smith, The theory of moral sentiments, ed. by R. P. Hanley, Penguin, Lon-
don, 2009, first published 1759, p. 13. 
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ticular.
74
 Smith is explicitly opposed to an interpretation of these ‘moral sentiments’ as 
expression of the individual’s pursuit of self-interest.75 
Empiricism indicates the existence of pro-social behaviour even in the animal kingdom, 
for example among rats
76
, certainly among humans in traditional societies
77
 and in mod-
ern societies, too
78
. The self-interest focused utility-maximising approach seems to be 
incapable of a proper understanding of a significant part if not most of (human) behav-
iour. Carl Menger would reply that at least insofar economic models are concerned, 
non-economic
79
 motivations cannot be taken into account. On the one hand it is ques-
tionable whether it is really true that only self-interested motivations are relevant in the 
economic sphere, but what is more: To say that economists do not include motivations 
other than self-interest into their models is one thing, but that does not mean that other 
types of motivations do not exist. This distinction does not seem to be clear in a consid-
erable part of contemporary contributions on this issue.
80
 
The neoclassical utility maximisation hypothesis is only equipped to include consequen-
tialist motivations. An individual always acts on reasons that merely serve as a means to 
some other end. In order to fully understand human actions it is necessary to refer to 
                                                 
74
  Hecker, p. 173. 
75
  Cf. ibid., p. 173, or cf. M. Trapp, Adam Smith: Philosophie und politische Ökonomie, Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1987, pp. 43-5. 
76
  Cf. B. Inbal & A. Bartal et al., ‘Empathy and pro-social behavior in rats’, in Science, vol. 334, 2011, 
pp. 1427-30. The authors show how rats free cagemates from a restrainer, even if no individual benefit 
is involved and reciprocity is not possible. 
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  Cf. Elardo & Campbell, pp. 272-3, or cf. K. Polanyi, The great transformation, Farrar & Rinehart, 
New York, 1944, p. 46. Polanyi observes that tribal societies keep all members from starving. 
78
  Cf. S. Meier, The economics of non-selfish behavior: Decisions to contribute money to public goods, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK & Northampton MA, 2006, pp. 135-7. The author studies donations of 
the Swiss after a natural disaster in Iran. The Swiss donations for the Iranian population cannot be ex-
plained by sympathy (giving to friends). Neither is it likely that Iran will ever reciprocate. 
79
  Similar to the distinction of market- vs. non-market transactions, some remarks need to be made about 
the difference of economic- and non-economic motives. For Menger economic goods are defined by 
the fact that their desired amount is greater than the available amount. Accordingly, the economic 
sphere is there wherever relative scarcity persists. In contrast, Polanyi was aware of the fact that goods 
can be scarce in different ways (cf. the discussion of the agatha). He understood ‘the economic’ as be-
ing concerned with ‘material provisioning’. Similarly Keynes distinguished between ‘economic pur-
poses’ and ‘non-economic purposes’. The former are concerned with the satisfaction of basic human 
needs (cf. menschliche Unterhaltsfürsorge), whereas the latter are about needs that exceed the basic 
material necessities. In this context, I adopt Polanyi’s use of the term ‘economic’. 
80
  Cf. e.g. S. D. Levitt & S. J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A rogue economist explores the hidden side of 
everything, Penguin, London, 2005. 
2.  Developing a Relativistic Approach to Economics 18 
 
 
Immanuel Kant and include deontological motivations for actions: ‘Der gute Wille ist 
nicht durch das, was er bewirkt, oder ausrichtet, nicht durch seine Tauglichkeit zu Errei-
chung irgend eines vorgesetzten Zweckes, sondern allein durch das Wollen, d.i. an sich, 
gut’81. Kant is interested not in subjective, but in objective factors that determine the 
individual’s will to action82 and defines his categorical imperative accordingly: ‘Handle 
so, daß die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Ge-
setzgebung gelten könne.’83 The categorical imperative is such an objective motivation 
for actions, an individual does not perform an action as a means to some end, but be-
cause it is objectively good and necessary.
84
 Efficiency, the core concept of economics, 
on the other hand, is an Imperativ der Geschicklichkeit
85
. In this case it does not matter 
whether the end of an action is reasonable, efficiency is solely focused on what one 
needs to do in order to attain one’s end.86 As an example of a categorical imperative, 
Kant discusses the Christian law of love: ‘Liebe Gott über alles und deinen Nächsten als 
dich selbst’. According to Kant, the utilitarian interpretation of this principle would have 
to read: ‘Liebe dich selbst über alles, Gott aber und deinen Nächsten um dein [sic] selbst 
willen.’87 As the religious example shows again, it seems that economic explanations of 
human behavior, based on the utility maximisation assumption, fail to understand how 
real life human actions work. 
A neoclassical attempt to include values and norms into the analysis can be seen in the 
work of Douglass C. North. He sees values and norms as ‘economizing device[s]’ in 
order to simplify decision-making processes.
88
 Assuming a Kantian perspective, one 
                                                 
81
  Kant, Grundlegung, p. 19. ‘A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, be-
cause of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in it-
self’. Kant, Groundwork, p. 8. 
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  Cf. ibid., p. 42. 
83
  I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, ed. by W. Weischedel, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1974, 
first published 1788, p. 140. ‘So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as 
a principle in giving of universal law.’ I. Kant, Critique of practical reason, translation M. Gregor, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 2005, reprint of 1
st
 ed. 1997, p. 28. 
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  Cf. Kant, Grundlegung, p. 43. 
85
  ‘Imperative of skill’, cf. Kant, Groundwork, p. 26. 
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  Cf. ibid., p. 44. 
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  Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, p. 205. ‘Love God above all, and your neighbor as yourself’, 
‘Love yourself above all, but God and your neighbor for your own sake.’ Kant, Critique of practical 
reason, p. 71. 
88
  Cf. North, Structure and change, p. 49. 
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would need to object. An action that is motivated by one’s beliefs, values or perceived 
duty means to do what one believes to be right. That is very different from acting as a 
means to attain some end. 
2.2.3.4 Calculatedness 
Jeremy Bentham has deeply influenced economic thought by assuming that ‘all men 
calculate’89 and in these calculations are governed by ‘two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure’90. According to Ludwig von Mises then, later on, these ‘means and ends or 
costs and proceeds’91 can always be clearly distinguished. There are no forms of ex-
change that do not fit exactly into this framework.
92
 The idea of an all pervasive utility 
maximisation as the sole motive for human action is built on this assumption that there 
is always a trade-off in the choice between two alternatives and that this trade-off is 
always calculable either in utility terms or in terms of monetary units or the individual’s 
willingness to pay. 
This construction is clearly contrasted by the work of many economic anthropologists. 
Marcel Mauss for example stated that 
‘[i]n the systems of the past we do not find simple exchange of goods, wealth and produce through mar-
kets established among individuals. For it is groups, and not individuals, which carry on exchange, make 
contracts, and are bound by obligations . . . Further, what they exchange is not exclusively goods and 
wealth, real and personal property, and things of economic value. They exchange rather courtesies, enter-
tainments, ritual, military assistance, women, children, dances, and feasts; and fairs in which the market is 
but one element and the circulation of wealth but one part of a wide and enduring contract. Finally, alt-
hough the prestations and counter-prestations take place under a voluntary guise they are in essence strict-
ly obligatory, and their sanction is private or open warfare.’93 
The obligation that Mauss wrote about was a threefold one: the obligation to give, to 
receive and to repay.
94
 Gift and counter gift can occur a long time apart. This ‘time 
                                                 
89
  J. Bentham, An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation, T. Payne, London, 1789, chap-
ter 14, xxviii. 
90
  Ibid., p. 14, emphasis in the original. 
91
  Mises, Human action, p. 40. 
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  Cf. ibid., p. 40. 
93
  Mauss, p. 3. 
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  Cf. ibid., pp. 37-41. 
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separation’ or ‘lack of simultaneity’ brings Pierre Bourdieu to conclude that ‘the gift 
brings a symbolic negation of calculability and economic rationality.’95 
The assumed universality of the inclination to calculate is also put in question by the 
observations of Daniel L. Everett who worked as an anthropologist among the Pirahã 
people, a indigenous South American tribe. He found that, uniquely among the current 
languages of the world, the Pirahãs have no numbers and no quantifiers. They would not 
say ‘there are four trees’ but ‘there is a tree, there is another, and another, and another.’ 
Furthermore, words like ‘all, each, every’, etc. simply do not exist in their language.96 
First of all the Pirahãs seem to be a counter example for an assumed universal inclina-
tion to calculate according to Bentham, but what is more, a pervasive striving for a max-
imum appears more than unlikely in such a cultural and linguistic framework. 
Another problem for the calculatedness-assumption are spheres of exchange,  
‘an arrangement where material objects are assigned to different spheres for transactional purposes. Peo-
ple freely exchange items within the same sphere and readily calculate their comparative values. But 
things in different spheres are not immediately exchangeable against one another, such that between 
spheres there is no ready conversion’97. 
For instance, the exchange of subsistence goods (e.g. food) follows different laws than 
the exchange of goods from the sphere of wealth (e.g. gold). Goods from different 
spheres of exchange cannot be easily compared in terms of a common denominator. 
Therefore the comparability of different commodities is culturally relative and might 
even be impossible in certain contexts. The construction of a utility function that works 
on the basis of calculable trade-offs between all relevant factors would then be impossi-
ble. 
Finally, as has been examined in chapter 2.2.3.4, deontological motives are of a com-
pletely different kind than consequentialist ones. If an individual acts according to a 
maxim, like the categorical imperative, and consequently attempts to do something, 
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  I. Negru, ‘The plural economy of gifts and markets’, in R. Garnett, E. K. Olsen & M. Starr (ed.), Eco-
nomic pluralism, Routledge, London, 2010, pp. 197-8. Negru is referring to P. Bourdieu, Outline of a 
theory of practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1977, in particular pp. 4-7. 
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  Cf. Everett, in particular pp. 117-9, 195-6. 
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because she
98
 simply believes that it is the right thing to do, there is no trade-off with 
other consequentialist motives that could be expressed in utility or monetary terms. 
A comprehensive theory of (economic) actions, however, would have to be able to in-
corporate all these different kinds of motives. 
2.2.3.5 Economic Motives 
According to Adam Smith, man has a natural ‘propensity to truck, barter, and exchange 
one thing for another.’ He continues that this is distinctively human, because ‘[n]obody 
ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with an-
other dog.’99 
On the other hand, everybody has heard about cats that, knowing that their owners care 
for their sustenance, often try to reciprocate this by offering the owner a mouse as part 
of its prey. This sequence of gift and counter-gift looks very much like a form of gift-
giving. Maybe some forms of exchange are even more natural than those that occur out 
of purely economic motives. Similarly, Polanyi distanced himself from Smith by saying 
‘[i]f so-called economic motives were natural to man, we would have to judge all early 
and primitive societies as thoroughly unnatural.’100 
In fact, Polanyi said, the focus on material motives is ‘arbitrary’. It is simply assumed 
that man acts on material incentives in his everyday life and the production processes 
are designed accordingly. Consequently man, who acts inside these structures, appears 
to be essentially materialistic. The same, however, could be done with any other possi-
ble motive. One could choose to assume man’s motives as traditional and organise pro-
duction accordingly, and then man would appear to the observer as naturally guided in 
his actions by tradition.
101
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  In order to avoid gender issues, I am sometimes using the female form, sometimes the male. 
99
  A. Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, ed. by E. Cannan, Random 
House, New York, 1994, first published 1776, p. 14. 
100
  K. Polanyi, ‘Our obsolete market mentality: Civilization must find a new thought pattern’, in Com-
mentary, vol. 3, 1947, p. 112. 
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‘In fact, human beings will labor for a large variety of reasons so long as they form part of a definite so-
cial group. Monks traded for religious reasons, and monasteries became the largest trading establishments 
in Europe. The kula trade of the Trobrian Islanders, one of the most intricate barter arrangements known 
to man, is mainly an aesthetic pursuit. Feudal economy depended largely on custom or tradition. With the 
Kwakiutl, the chief aim of industry seems to be to satisfy a point of honor. Under mercantile despotism, 
industry was often planned so as to serve power and glory. Accordingly, we tend to think of monks, West-
ern Melanesians, villains, the Kwakiutl, or seventeenth-century statesmen as ruled by religion, aesthetics, 
custom, honor, or power politics, respectively. Nineteenth-century society was organized in such a fashion 
as to make hunger or gain alone into effective motives for the individual to participate in economic life. 
The resulting picture of man ruled only by materialistic incentives was entirely arbitrary.’102 
Later, Gunnar Myrdal distinguished between an individual’s interests and attitudes. An 
attitude is ‘the emotive disposition of an individual or group to respond in certain ways 
to actual or potential situations’. This might include certain beliefs, a class conscious-
ness, or a perception of injustice. To deny that man acts only according to his economic 
self-interest, Myrdal emphasises that ‘[f]ortunately there are many people whose atti-
tudes are not identical with their interests.’103 
Finally, we can once again refer to Kant’s critique of practical reason, and state that to 
act according to the categorical imperative; that is, to act in a certain way because you 
believe it to be the right thing to do, is very different from acting out of purely economic 
motives. 
We can conclude that an explanation of human behaviour, even of strictly economic 
behaviour, is too limited if it only refers to economic motives. 
2.2.3.6 Ex-Post Explanations 
Another problem of the economic standard approach to explaining human behaviour is 
that ex-post every action can be interpreted as utility maximising.
104
 This is achieved by 
initially leaving the content of the utility function unspecified
105
 and then ex-post posit-
ing an appropriate formulation of the function
106
 that fits the observed behaviour.
107
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  Polanyi, The livelihood, pp. 11-2. 
103
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As long as it is impossible to behave non-utility-maximising, the utility maximisation-
hypothesis is meaningless.
108
 In other words, it is a tautology, since the statement is al-
ways true.
109
 The greater the number of possible falsifiers, the greater the information 
content of a hypothesis.
110
 If a statement has no possible falsifiers, like the utility maxi-
misation hypothesis, its information content is zero. 
Either you need to fix the utility function in advance and allow individuals to act irra-
tionally, that is non-utility-maximising, or the information content of an explanatory 
theory of human actions lies in identifying and understanding the ‘utility’-relevant fac-
tors, which sounds very much like the interpretive method of the historical school
111
 
rather than the neoclassical approach. 
2.3 Explanations in Economics 
If economics is about explaining ‘human behaviour’,112 how are explanations in eco-
nomics constructed? What role does the concept of rationality play? What do we mean 
when we say that an individual acts rationally and what does it mean to act, in the first 
place?  
2.3.1 The Meaning of ‘Explanation’ 
What does it mean to explain something? Mainstream economics tries to imitate the 
natural sciences in its explanations of economic processes and actions. Menger, for in-
stance, said that the relationship of theoretical economics to the economising individual 
is the same as the relationship of chemistry and the practising chemist. An individual’s 
                                                 
pothesis of rationality puts no observational restrictions on an agent’s actions. We can always rational-
ize behavior by positing an appropriate objective function.’ 
107
  Cf. G. Helgesson, Values, norms & ideology in mainstream economics, doctoral dissertation, Uppsala 
University, 2002, p. 144. 
108
  Cf. Leibenstein, p. 8. 
109
  Cf. F. Laville, ‘Should we abandon optimization theory? The need for bounded rationality’, in Journal 
of Economic Methodology, vol. 7, no. 3, 2000, p. 409. 
110
  Cf. R. Schnell, P. Hill & E. Esser, Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung, 9
th
 ed., Oldenbourg, 
Munich, 2011, p. 58. 
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  Cf. Schefold, ‘Werner Sombart’, pp. 59-61. 
112
  Robbins, An essay, p. 16. 
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behaviour might deviate from the law-like relationship, but the law itself has general 
explanatory power.
113
 
Similarly von Mises: ‘One must study the laws of human actions and social cooperation 
as the physicist studies the laws of nature.’114 He continues and distinguishes between 
praxeology and history. Whereas history is only concerned with particular cases of the 
past, the statements of praxeology are universal and valid in all instances.
115
 Von Mises’ 
position is in line with that of Richard A. Posner who maintained that people are ‘ra-
tional maximizers’116. According to Posner this applies to all areas of life, not just to the 
market; people are just as much rational maximisers when it concerns their marriage, as 
they are when their hourly wage in concerned. Consequently, the analytical toolbox of 
the economist can be applied to nonmarket behaviour as well.
117
 
So is there really no fundamental difference between explanations in the natural sci-
ences and those in economics? Yes, there is. When scientists try to explain something, 
they refer to laws of nature.
118
 A law of nature is ‘an empirical truth of great generality, 
conceived of as a physical (but not a logical) necessity, and consequently licensing 
counterfactual conditionals’119. If I hold an apple in my hand and let go of it, it will – by 
physical necessity – fall down to the ground. 
Explanations in economics, on the other hand, are rather ‘common-sense generaliza-
tions’120, referring to the rationality postulate. If a person acts, he does not do so because 
some law of nature, ‘makes him do it’, but because it is rational for him to act as he 
does. That does not mean that there are no laws in economics, but it certainly means that 
such laws must be of a different kind than the laws of nature. Consider the case of one 
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of the possibly ‘best-corrobated statistical “laws . . .” of economics’121: the law of a 
downward sloping demand curve. Demand decreases in case of a rising price. That, 
however, is not a result of some physical force that leaves no alternative to the individ-
ual, but we simply assume that the individual will react to an incentive and buy less if 
the price increases. If, for some reason he wanted to, he could buy more. The apple in 
my hand, in contrast, cannot choose not to fall down to the ground. 
Rationality-based explanations need to analyse and interpret the actors’ reasons, 
whereas this is neither necessary nor possible in the sphere of the natural sciences.
122
 
2.3.2 The Meaning of ‘Rationality’ 
What does it mean to act rationally? The original meaning of rationality can be traced 
back at least to Aristotle: acting ‘in accordance with good reasons’123. Up to and includ-
ing the classical economists, the concept of rationality remained an implicit and vague 
part of economic theory
124
 and also in everyday speech, this minimal definition of ‘ra-
tionality’ is still the common use of the term.125 Only since the marginal revolution and 
the work of Walras, Menger, and Jevons, rationality assumed its essential role in eco-
nomic theory and became defined as strict utility maximisation.
126
 
‘With the help of a cardinal unit of utility, it was made possible to represent a rational 
agent as a mere utility maximiser.’127 After abandoning cardinal utility theory, ordinal-
ists could retain the mathematical concept of utility maximisation with the help of 
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Paretian indifference maps.
128
 Later, Paul Samuelson focused his analysis on prefer-
ences that were revealed through choices, rather than on the maximisation of predeter-
mined preferences. Then rationality does not necessarily imply some form of maximisa-
tion, but consistency in choices.
129
 Through this process of formalisation and 
axiomatisation, the original meaning of the concept was forgotten more and more.
130
 
We can recapitulate: Rationality can be defined in a maximal and in a minimal way. 
According to the former, rationality is a synonym for maximisation and optimisation.
131
 
To act rationally means ‘choosing in accordance with a preference ordering that is com-
plete and transitive, subject to perfect and costlessly acquired information’132. If utility 
maximisation is assumed ex-post, then the concept is robbed of all its explanatory 
power. In order to have meaning, it must be possible to act non-utility-maximising.
133
 If 
a certain utility function is defined ex-ante, almost every action will be irrational in an 
optimisation sense.
134
 
‘Human beings rarely maximize and are far from being consistent; they hesitate, make 
mistakes, change their mind, regret, suffer from myopia; nonetheless, they are not stu-
pid’.135 This is exactly the minimal definition of rationality: acting for reasons, acting 
purposefully and intentionally. Under this view, it is difficult to find actions that are 
clearly irrational.
136
 They do exist, however, but distinguishing between a rational and 
an irrational action will be a matter of interpretation
137
 and therefore, of understanding 
the individual motives in the first place. 
That individuals act for a multitude of reasons has been shown in chapter 2.2.3. Thus, I 
cannot agree with Menger, who saw only one motive at work behind all human actions: 
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The purely self-interested attempt to substitute one state of affairs by another that suits 
oneself better.
138
 First of all, this is simply wrong. Just to mention three things: One 
would need to consider altruistic and deontological motives as well. Also, actions can be 
reactions to changing circumstances. But most importantly, Menger’s statement gives 
the impression that one can ignore the differences in the specific motivations of eco-
nomic actors. This chapter argues that the uncovering and understanding (Verstehen) of 
reasons is in fact the main task in analysing human actions. 
2.3.3 The Meaning of ‘Actions’ 
For humans to act means to act for reasons,
139
 but what is a reason? Reasons can be ei-
ther internal or external. According to internalism, ‘certain judgements, for instance that 
one ought to A, can provide a sufficient reason for which one A’s ’140. This approach is 
also called the desire-belief-model. In this framework, the fact that I go to the super-
market can be explained by firstly my desire to eat chocolate and also my belief that 
going to the supermarket is conducive to eating chocolate. According to this view, if no 
belief plays a part, a windfall event might occur and possibly even satisfy a desire, but it 
would be wrong to speak of an action. Correspondingly, if no desire plays a part, there 
might be physical movement, however, no action would be performed. Thus certain 
mental states – desires and beliefs – would explain actions: ‘if S A’s for r, then her want-
ing to r is part of what explains why she A’s. ’141 
A competing view sees actions as explained by external reasons. An action is a response 
to some external state of affairs in the world, rather than a response to a mental state of 
a person.
142
 For instance, I go out for a walk, because the sun is shining. 
The dispute as to which view is correct – internalism or externalism – is far from being 
solved, and judgements between the competing approaches are based on more than 
                                                 
138
  Cf. Mises, The ultimate foundation, p. 77. 
139
  Cf. R. Audi, ‘Acting for reasons’, in The Philosophical Review, vol. 95, no. 4, 1986. 
140
  Ibid., p. 512. 
141
  Ibid., p. 516. 
142
  Cf. R. Bittner, Doing things for reasons, Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York, 2001,  
pp. ix, 65. 
2.  Developing a Relativistic Approach to Economics 28 
 
 
purely theoretical reasons.
143
 For the purposes of this thesis, it does not matter, whether 
we assume external or internal reasons. Also, even for the externalist view, the favour-
able weather conditions are not sufficient for explaining my going on a walk, there must 
have been my desire to go outside in the first place, otherwise I would not have ‘chosen’ 
the shining sun as a reason for my action.
144
 
In this chapter I simply define human actions as actions for reasons, internal and exter-
nal,
145
 and I use a broad concept of desires: ‘wantings, urges, promptings, and a great 
variety of moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, 
and public and private goals and values’146. 
It follows that to act means to act consciously and purposively.
147
 The opposite of an 
action is not irrational behaviour, but actions without desires or beliefs, as for instance 
in a purely instinctive reaction.
148
 To act rationally is to act according to one’s reason 
and to act irrationally is to fail to act according to one’s true motives.149 
Again, one can see that in order to distinguish rational actions from irrational ones, one 
needs to know and to understand the agent’s reasons.150 As has been mentioned before, 
this is very different from explanations in the natural sciences. A physicist would never 
ask the question, ‘for what reason did this body move towards the other’. In Post-
Aristotelian science, one does not refer to the purpose of a thing, but only to general, 
testable laws of nature. On the contrary, for an economist it is a reasonable question to 
                                                 
143
  Cf. J. Dancy, Practical reality, Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York, 2002, pp. 154-8. 
144
  Cf. Bittner, pp. 107-8. 
145
  Here this paper refers to G. H. von Wright, who also distinguished between internal and external rea-
sons, without limiting explanations to just one of them. Cf. G. H. von Wright, ‘Explanation and under-
standing of action’, in Philosophical papers of Georg Henrik von Wright, vol. 1: Practical reason, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, pp. 53-66. 
146
  Bittner, pp. 3-4, or D. Davidson, ‘Actions, reasons, and causes’, in Journal of Philosophy, vol. 60,  
no. 23, 1963, p. 686. 
147
  Cf. Audi, p. 511, cf. L. von Mises, ‘The treatment of “irrationality” in the social sciences’, in Philoso-
phy and Phenemenological Research, vol. 4, no. 4, 1944, p. 530. 
148
  Cf. ibid., p. 534. 
149
  Thus, I disagree with von Mises‘ view that ‘[a]s far as there is scarcity of means, man behaves  
rationally, i.e., he acts. So far there is no room left for “irrationality”.’, Mises, ‘The treatment of “irra-
tionality” ’, p. 544. 
150
  Cf. Audi, p. 511. 
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ask, why an individual is consuming less, if the price for the good concerned has risen. 
In fact, understanding the motives is essential for explaining the action.
151
 
2.4 A Comprehensive Theory of Action for Economics 
The general idea of utility maximisation has already been discussed in chapter 2.2. 
Here, the neoclassical approach will be presented in a slightly more analytical way, in 
order to illustrate how it differs from an explanation of human actions based on the 
original meaning of the term rationality, that is ‘acting for reasons’. 
2.4.1 Maximal Rationality 
As discussed in chapter 1, the neoclassical model for the explanation of human actions 
considers exclusively choice under conditions of scarcity. It abstracts from the institu-
tional framework and therefore is supposed to be applicable to any society.
152
 
Consider an example. There are two fishermen: A and B, who live in the same village. A 
gets up very early after having slept for only a couple of hours, is very focused on his 
work, tries to catch as many fish as possible, and attempts to sell his catch for as high a 
price as he can, in order to maximise his income. He does not bother to have expensive 
or time consuming hobbies, and goes to bed early, since he needs to get up early the 
next morning. 
Then there is B. He sleeps long and goes out on the sea late. When he thinks he has 
caught enough fish to cover his usual expenses he sells his catch, possibly to the same 
trader every day. After work, he meets some friends or relaxes at home in his hammock. 
An economist, trying to explain human behaviour might ask himself how two individu-
als living under approximately the same conditions can still behave so differently? The 
neoclassical answer is: In both cases the same decision procedure takes place. Both in-
dividuals have a utility function that they try to maximise. 
                                                 
151
  Cf. Lagueux, Rationality and explanation, p. 202. 
152
  Cf. D. B. Fusefeld, ‘Economic theory misplaced: Livelihood in primitive society’, in Trade and mar-
ket in the early empires: Economies in history and theory, ed. by K. Polanyi, C. M. Arensberg &  
H. W. Pearson, Free Press, New York, 1957, p. 343. 
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                  (2.1) 
In both cases the individual utility would be a function of factors like the goods con-
sumed (   , leisure time (  , prestige (  , stability or safety (   and other relevant fac-
tors (  . The only difference would be that A and B put different weights to the individ-
ual factors. A’s utility function could then look like this: 
                                         (2.2) 
and B’s like this: 
                                       (2.3) 
Whereas for A income and consequently goods consumed are most important, B puts an 
emphasis on his leisure time. Seen from this perspective, both actions appear to be util-
ity maximising and therefore efficient in their own way. 
2.4.2 Minimal Rationality 
What happens, however, if some of the utility-relevant factors do not have a calculable 
trade-off with other factors, if for example individual C is confronted with the decision 
of whether to donate money to a charity or not. If C, for instance, is a religious person 
and feels obliged to do what he considers to be right, then his decision to donate is not 
an outcome of a reasoned weighting of different factors of his utility function, C acts 
according to a categorical imperative. Maybe C has true compassion for people who are 
worse off than himself, then subsuming his ‘altruistic’ motives under his own utility 
function, so that helping others simply makes him feel better, is simply a distortion of 
what is really going on. Neoclassically speaking, true altruism is having an interest in 
another person’s utility function, without knowing whether one’s action will have any 
impact on one’s own utility. Genuine altruism, deontological motives and other beliefs 
cannot be subsumed under one utility function in the same way as goods consumed and 
leisure time can be. In order to construct a trade-off one would need to trace back all 
factors to a common denominator, for example the willingness to pay for it. That is not 
2.  Developing a Relativistic Approach to Economics 31 
 
 
possible with all factors that determine human actions, as has been extensively dis-
cussed in chapter 1.3. 
On the other hand, an explanation of human actions in terms of the minimal rationality 
concept might be able to incorporate very diverse motives for actions. If rationality is 
not defined as maximising one’s utility, but as acting for reasons, these reasons can be 
very different in nature and do not necessarily have to stand in a trade-off to each other. 
Reasons for actions might indeed be goods consumed, leisure time, prestige, stability, 
but also (genuine) altruism, beliefs and other deontological motives. An explanation for 
action θ, performed by individual C, would need to be able to incorporate all these dif-
ferent motives: 
                                            (2.4) 
Some of these factors might indeed be of a calculable nature so that it would be possible 
to construct a trade-off between them. Such factors can be denoted as   . But then there 
are also other factors that are relevant for the individual’s actions, but cannot be traced 
back to a common denominator, these are denoted as   . Consequently one can formu-
late this more comprehensive approach to explanations of human actions in economics 
as: 
                               (2.5) 
Note that the individual factors are not subsumed under one pair of brackets, to indicate 
that they are not all of the same nature. Secondly, there is no ‘max’ placed in front of 
‘function’ 2.5. Since, according to the minimal rationality concept, to act rationally sim-
ply means to act for reasons and does not necessarily involve the pursuit of an optimum. 
This should not be interpreted as nonsensical behaviour. On the contrary, rational behav-
iour is purposive and intentional, nonetheless not necessarily optimal.
153
 In contrast to 
approaches such as Leibenstein’s or Simon’s, the non optimality is also no form of op-
                                                 
153
  Cf. P. Koslowski, ‘Economics as ethical economy and cultural economics in the historical school’, in 
H. H. Nau & B. Schefold (ed.), The historicity of economics: Continuities and discontinuities of his-
torical thought in 19
th
 and 20
th
 century economics, Springer, Berlin, 2002, p. 161. 
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timisation of secondary degree that optimises the degree of optimisation subject to the 
cost of calculation and information, and the limited calculating capabilities of the agent. 
One can also see that explanations based on the minimal rationality concept involve 
interpretations of the reasons for which individuals act, ‘interpretations that are not re-
quired, at least to the same degree, in explanations typical of natural sciences’154. Most 
appropriate for this endeavour seems to be an interpretive method (Verstehende Meth-
ode), as it was developed by the German Historical School, in particular by Werner 
Sombart. 
2.5 Discussion 
In order to conclude, this section elaborates on the limits of the utility maximisation 
approach and argues for the need to use a more comprehensive approach in the general 
case. Finally, some adjacent research questions are introduced. 
2.5.1 Conclusions 
A common interpretation of the neoclassical utility maximisation model is that, although 
it has many shortcomings, it is a useful approximation of reality, as long as one is con-
cerned with market processes.
155
 But even on markets, agents are rarely guided by 
purely economic, consequential motives.
156
 Furthermore, the standard approach be-
comes inappropriate, the more ‘economics is developing into a general social science, 
applicable to the non-market as well as to the market realm, and as it aims at explaining 
political and institutional phenomena no less than market behaviour’157. The broader the 
definition of economics, the broader the explanatory model for economic actions needs 
to be.
158
 
                                                 
154
  Lagueux, Rationality and explanation, p. 237. 
155
  Onorati, p. 4, Meier, p. 138, Haller, p. 18, Vanberg, p. 8. 
156
  Cf. Koslowski, ‘Economics as ethical economy’, p. 169.  
157
  Vanberg, p. 21. 
158
  Cf. ibid., p. 21. 
2.  Developing a Relativistic Approach to Economics 33 
 
 
Moreover, a theory in the social sciences is never completely value neutral. Even if it 
was true that the utility maximisation approach would be a useful approximation of real-
ity on markets, though not completely realistic, it is essential to distinguish between the 
theoretical results and reality itself. If economists decide to consider only economic 
motives in their explanatory models, one needs to be careful not to make the mistaken 
assumption that there were no other motives at all, as if, since we are not speaking about 
non-economic motives, there are none. 
Economists are very fond of exact results and mathematically elegant models. In this 
light, the explanatory model discussed in chapter 2.4.2 might seem too vague. But to 
speak with Voltaire: ‘Le doute n’est pas une condition agréable, mais la certitude est 
absurd’159, especially in a matter as complex as economics.160 
2.5.2 Outlook 
It is a rather recent development that the economy and in particular that the society is 
based on markets.
161
 As has been emphasised by the Historical School, the institutional 
framework has to be understood as historically formed and as a variable to be ex-
plained.
162
 In the words of Douglass C. North:  
‘History demonstrates that ideas, ideologies, myths, dogmas, and prejudices matter; and an understanding 
of the way they evolve is necessary for further progress in developing a framework to understand societal 
change.’163 
But it is not only the institutions that have evolved historically, ‘ideas do not originate in 
an ideological vacuum’ as well. ‘They are called forth by the previously existing ideo-
logical structure’164. Likewise, the efficiency focus; that is, the all-prevailing pursuit of 
                                                 
159
  Voltaire, Letter to Frederick II of Prussia, 06 April 1767, as cited in H. D. Kurz & N. Salvadori, ‘On 
critics and protective belts’, in H. D. Kurz & N. Salvadori (ed.), Understanding ‘classical’ economics: 
Studies in long-period theory, Routledge, London, 1997, p. 237: ‘Doubt is not an agreeable condition, 
but certainty is an absurd one.’ 
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  Cf. Kurz & Salvadori, p. 237. 
161
  Cf. Polanyi, The great transformation, p. 43. 
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  Cf. Koslowski, ‘Economics as ethical economy’, p. 143. 
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  North, ‘Economic performance’, p. 362. 
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  L. von Mises, Theory and history: An interpretation of social and economic evolution, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1957, p. 188. 
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an optimum, is not a quasi-law of nature, no necessity, but it is contingent, a product of 
the history of thought and changing economic conditions. 
This development, the striving for efficiency, will be the subject of the next chapter ‘On 
the Historicity and Normativity of Efficiency’. Referring to Max Weber who identified a 
tendency towards a growing dominance of a means-ends-rationality in various spheres 
of human life, I will analyse which factors contributed to the formation of the focus on 
efficiency. In the context of the theories of action, the question will be: Where does the 
‘max’ in front of the utility function come from? 
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3 On the Historicity and Normativity of Efficiency 
3.1 Problem Outline 
The idea of efficiency is central to economics.
165
 In fact, optimisation pervades all 
branches of the science
166
. In addition, economics is often held to be an imperialistic 
science,
167
 and thus the ideal of efficiency penetrates more and more hitherto non-
economic areas of life.
168
 Today, efficiency appears as a constituting part of economics. 
Economic logic almost seems to be defined as the logic of efficiency. The purpose of 
this chapter is to question this natural-law-like understanding of the concept of effi-
ciency and to show that on the contrary the concept has a history and has normative 
features. 
3.1.1 Introducing the Concept of Efficiency 
Efficiency means ‘obtaining the maximum output for given inputs’169. Other definitions 
sometimes emphasise the aspect of non-wastefulness
170
 and in economics efficiency is 
often used synonymously for ‘Pareto-efficiency’ which means that no further Pareto-
improvements are possible, where a Pareto-improvement is a reallocation that makes at 
least one individual better-off while no individual is made worse-off.
171
 Additionally, it 
is important to differentiate between efficiency and effectiveness. While efficiency de-
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  Cf. U. Knobloch, ‘Effizienz als oberster Wert? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit den Antworten institutio-
neller Ökonomik’, in Normative Grundfragen der Ökonomik: Folgen für die Theoriebildung, ed. by 
M. Held, Campus, Frankfurt am Main, 1997, pp. 169. 
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  Cf. e.g. P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of economic analysis, 5
th
 ed., Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge MA et al., 1983, first published in 1947, p. 21. 
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  Cf. G. Kirchgässner, ‘Ökonomie als imperial(istisch)e Wissenschaft’, in Jahrbuch für neue politische 
Ökonomie, vol. 7, 1988, pp. 128ff., or cf. J. Hirshleifer, ‘The expanding domain of economics’, in The 
American Economic Review, vol. 75, no. 6, 1985, p. 53. 
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  Cf. e.g. J. A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, 7
th
 ed., Francke, Tübingen, 
1993, pp. 253-4. 
169
  ‘Efficiency’, in A dictionary of economics, ed. by J. Black et al., Oxford University Press, 2009, re-
trieved 23 February 2012, 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t19.e957>. 
170
  Cf. e.g. B. Lockwood, ‘Pareto-efficiency’, in The new Palgrave dictionary of economics, ed. by S. N. 
Durlauf & L. E. Blume, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008, retrieved 23 February 2012, 
<http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_P000024>. 
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scribes the relation between inputs and outputs, effectiveness focuses on the degree to 
which a given objective could be achieved.
172
 
Writing about efficiency is rather difficult since terms as Pareto-efficiency, effective-
ness, optimality and maximum or minimum are often used synonymously. Since this 
dissertation deals with a wide range of academic literature and different ideas of effi-
ciency, in this context the term ‘efficiency’ is used in a broad sense standing for a con-
cept that mainly contains three aspects: an input-output-relation, non-wastefulness, and 
a maximum/minimum-logic. 
3.1.2 Definitions of Economics & Economic Imperialism 
In the history of economic thought, there have been many attempts to give the subject a 
precise definition. Early formulations usually define economics by its subject-matter. In 
the early 19th century, economics would usually be defined as the study of ‘the produc-
tion, the distribution and the consumption of wealth’173. Vilfredo Pareto later described 
the subject of pure economics as:  
‘Comme la mécanique rationelle considère des points matèriels l’économie pure considère l’homo 
oeconomicus. C’est un être abstrait, sans passions ni sentiments, recherchant en toute chose le maximum 
de plaisir ne s’occupant d’autre chose que de transformer les uns ou les outres les biens économique.’174 
For Werner Sombart, the subject-matter of economics is ‘die menschliche 
Unterhaltsfürsorge’175 and Marshall writes:  
‘Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business life; it examines that part of individual and 
social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requi-
sites of wellbeing.’176 
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  Cf. Lockwood. 
172
  Cf. P. Eichhorn, Das Prinzip Wirtschaftlichkeit, 2
nd
 ed., Gabler, Wiesbaden, 2000, p. 140. 
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  Cf. e.g. J. B. Say, A treatise on political economy; or the production, distribution, and consumption of 
wealth, Wells & Lilly, Boston, 1824, originally published in French 1803. Cf. G. J. Stigler, ‘Econom-
ics: The imperial science?’, in Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 86, no. 3, 1984, p. 301. 
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  V. Pareto, ‘Anwendungen der Mathematik auf Nationalökonomie’, in: Encyklopädie der mathemati-
schen Wissenschaften mit Einschluss ihrer Anwendungen, vol. 1, B. G. Teubner Verlag, Leipzig, 1905, 
p. 1100. ‘As mechanics is concerned with material points in space, economics is concerned with the 
homo oeconomicus, who is an abstract being, without passions or sentiments, always pursuing a 
maximum of pleasure, never caring for anything else, except for the transformation of one economic 
good into another.’ (translation: author). 
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  Sombart, p. 21. Cf. ‘material provisioning’ (translation: author). 
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Lionel Robbins’ definition of economics, formulated in 1932, is still today the most 
prominent one: ‘Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relation-
ship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.’177 Thus economics is 
no longer confined to the study of material well-being or even market processes. Time 
management, family planning, healthcare, etc. become elements of economic considera-
tions,
178
 which shows that even the definition of economics is a cause of its imperialistic 
nature. 
This development culminates in the definition of economics by Gary S. Becker. It con-
tains a decisive shift of attention away from the subject-matter of economics to its 
methods: ‘The economic approach assumes that all behavior results from maximizing 
utility functions that depend on different commodities’179. Hence, economics in this 
imperialistic sense is basically the application of a general socioscientific model of be-
haviour.
180
 This approach is no longer confined to phenomena related to production, 
distribution and consumption and since economics includes the traditional tools for 
handling market processes, when the methods of economics are applied to hitherto non-
economic phenomena, the market-logic is extended to all different areas of life. Eco-
nomics after Becker, is ‘a general analytical machine, the machine of maximizing be-
havior.’181 
3.1.3 Economics and Efficiency – Inextricably Interwoven? 
Is efficiency a constituting part of economics? Are both inextricably interwoven? For 
Becker, the answer is clearly yes, maximising behaviour lies at the heart of the eco-
nomic approach.
182
 You could for example argue that scarcity, as part of the nature of 
the world we live in, compels efficient economising. I will consider the issue of scarcity 
in the next chapter (3.2), but if efficiency were a necessary element of all economic be-
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  Robbins, An essay, p. 16. 
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  Cf. Becker, p. 4. 
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haviour, it would have been so in all periods of history. It will be necessary to analyse 
whether that is really the case. 
In ‘Stone Age Economics’, Marshall Sahlins finds that the typical hunter-gatherer socie-
ties were ‘uneconomic m[e]n’183. They seem to have constantly underused their poten-
tial, by for example resting and sleeping more than necessary.
184
 There is no sign of 
maximising behaviour in these societies.
185
 
The concept of efficient economising was also alien to many thinkers of ancient Greece. 
Plato wrote ‘our present fight in this matter is against two foes, poverty and plenty, of 
which the one corrupts the soul of men with luxury, while the other by means of pain 
plunges it into shamelessness.’186 This sounds very similar to Aristotle’s notion that vir-
tue is an intermediate between two extremes.
187
 Aristotle condemns chrematistics as an 
unnatural striving for profit maximisation and unlimited consumption.
188
 For him there 
is a natural limit to the pursuit of possession and consumption.
189
 Instead of profit and 
utility maximisation, concepts such as income conditional on status, quality and limited 
needs in order to live the good life are prevalent.
190
 
In general, traditional societies preceding capitalistic ones, were not efficiency oriented. 
Traditional societies were mainly static, focused on preservation and continuity
191
 and 
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 ed., Athe-
näum Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1966, p. 57. 
186
  Plato, ‘Laws’, in Plato in twelve volumes, vols. 10 & 11, translation R. G. Bury, Harvard University 
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nd
 ed., Deut-
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profit maximisation did not become prevalent before the arrival of capitalism
192
. I will 
discuss the transition from the traditional to the capitalistic society in a separate chapter. 
Momentarily this should suffice to indicate that efficiency oriented behaviour was a 
rather late arrival in the history of thought. 
Of course, the maximising-logic has certain advantages. For example, solutions of ex-
tremum problems give exact information and are easy to analyse with regard to parame-
ter changes.
193
 It could also be argued that the reason for Aristotle, not thinking in terms 
of efficiency is that he regarded economics to be a part of ethics rather than as a science 
of its own
194
. If you are concerned with the normative question of the good life, you will 
not be as much concerned with exact quantitative results as you will be if you are trying 
to pursue a value-free science. Only then is there a need for an exact criterion and what 
could this criterion be other than the optimum? 
First of all it has to be kept in mind that efficiency can only be a criterion for evaluating 
the means to achieve a given end. The ends themselves can by their very nature not be 
subject to efficiency considerations.
195
 But for evaluating means, the obvious alternative 
to maximising would be satisficing.
196
  
It remains to be shown how and why the focus on efficiency emerged and by doing so to 
show that efficiency as a guiding principle has a history and has to be considered as a 
norm-like concept rather than resembling a natural-law, as it often is portrayed in mod-
ern economic theory. 
3.2 Influences and Developments 
This chapter (3.2) is concerned with the analysis of several influences that might have 
played a significant role in the emergence of efficiency and maximising behaviour as 
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guiding principles. It does so by starting with the general fact of scarcity and then pro-
ceeding in a more or less chronological order of influences from the invention of time 
measurement implements to relatively recent developments in socio-biology. 
3.2.1 Scarcity 
Scarcity means that the existing amount of goods is less than the desired amount of 
goods or in other words:
197
 
In modern economics it is assumed that the demand for goods is insatiable whereas the 
means are limited. As Robbins’ definition of economics198 shows, scarcity has become 
the starting point for economic considerations. 
If we live in a world of scarcity, it is clear that we have to economise wisely, not wast-
ing our scarce resources,
199
 and consequently, already the scarcity postulate seems to be 
a reason for the logic of efficiency. 
Interestingly, scarcity does not seem to have diminished due to more and more efficient 
means of production. Sahlins for example called the preagricultural economy ‘the origi-
nal affluent society’200. In the modern economy both numerator and denominator of 
equation 3.1 seem to have increased. It cannot be decided if a society is affluent, in the 
sense of being able to easily satisfy its wants, by the number of goods available alone. 
The hunter-gatherer societies had scarce wants and relatively plentiful means, and hence 
Sahlins came to his conclusion of the affluent preagricultural society.
201
 
The focus of modern economics on scarcity is not altogether satisfactory. As Schum-
peter showed, the entrepreneur is not only managing scarce resources, he is creatively 
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bringing new realities into existence.
202
 This seems to be a more fruitful approach to 
economics in general. 
3.2.2 Medieval Monasteries 
Medieval Benedictine and Cistercian communities constitute an early influencing factor 
towards the efficiency oriented western culture. The Rule of Saint Benedict organises 
the monastic lives of Benedictine orders. It postulates a life according to the justice of 
God rather than a life focused on efficiency and the ordered accumulation of goods.
203
 
Monks are not allowed to own any property
204
 other than that which the abbot assigns to 
them
205
, and the abbot in turn aims at the fulfilment of demand
206
. The ideal of monasti-
cal life is frugality
207
 and monks are supposed to always avoid immoderacy
208
. When 
selling goods, Benedictines do not aim at a profit, they are even urged to set prices be-
low the market price in order to glorify God.
209
 If, however, they obtain a surplus, it is 
generally used to beautify churches and liturgy.
210
 
The first orders of Cisterciansy were formed in France at the end of the 11
th
 century as a 
result of a return to a stricter observance of the Rule of Saint Benedictine. On the one 
hand this involved a concentration on manual labour and self-sufficiency on the other 
hand a focus on frugality and thus an ascetic tendency.
211
 As a result, Cistercians were 
able and willing to produce a surplus which is not consumed. Rather, surpluses were 
being reinvested, augmenting the capital basis of Cistercian monasteries and resources 
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were used for the permanent improvement of technology.
212
 In addition, Cistercians 
developed an elaborate system of bookkeeping to analyse costs and revenues and to 
make predictions for future periods of production.
213
 Even two centuries before the in-
vention of mechanic time measuring implements, Cistercians adopted a mode of time 
economising, ordering their monastic lives according to hour glasses.
214
 
The first reactions to the economic success of the Cistercians were mistrust and envy. 
The secular population rarely had contact with the monks except for in economic mat-
ters. Cistercians made an appearance as competitors in negotiations regarding the pur-
chase of land and as competitors and trading partners on market places.
215
 Nevertheless, 
the economic superiority of the Cistercians evoked imitators. In particular, secular rulers 
lacked the bookkeeping and management skills of Cistercian monasteries. Therefore, 
more and more often, Cistercian experts were lent to secular institutions like city or ter-
ritory governments.
216
 It has to be assumed that the regular and time economising forms 
of production that Cistercians adopted, influenced secular producers for example via the 
contact on market places.
217
 Furthermore, the surpluses of Cistercian monasteries served 
to supply the growing urban population and also the rural population during famines. In 
times when the rural population could not sustain itself and it had no financial reserves 
in order to buy the Cistercian surplus, people could only survive by borrowing, hoping 
to pay back from their own surpluses in the future. Thus, the Cistercian surplus produc-
tion worked as an incentive to an increase in production and to utilise potentials for effi-
cient techniques of production. In addition, secular farmers used to produce coopera-
tively. Since they therefore had to share the fruits of technological improvements, 
incentives for innovations were low. Cistercian monasteries, however, could keep all 
gains in productivity to themselves and thus had very high incentives to innovate. It can 
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be assumed that the success of Cistercian innovative practices induced secular produc-
ers to imitate them.
218
 
Over time, the spiritual motivation of the norm of manual labour in combination with 
the ideals of self-sufficiency and frugality was altered to a norm of efficiency, aiming at 
the optimal sale of a maximal surplus. Manual labour had become connected with a 
moral value
219
 but was no longer a spiritually ascetic activity alone, but a rational, eco-
nomic occupation. Efficiency slowly obtained priority over spirituality.
220
 It is important 
to keep in mind that even though the community was very prosperous, the individual 
monk was impecunious.
221
 The striving for efficiency was not yet connected to self-
interested behaviour. Later, with the decline of Cisterciansy, medieval guilds continued 
to assign moral values, rooted in religion, to manual labour;
222
 now, however, pursuing 
individual wealth. 
3.2.3 Chronometry 
‘Time is money’223. This famous expression was coined in 1748 by Benjamin Franklin, 
but it could also serve as a slogan for the 21
st
 century. However, it marks a completely 
new development, since time did not play an equally important role in traditional socie-
ties.
224
 
Originally, in societies without division of labour, there was no need for the develop-
ment of a concrete time measuring system. Days were unequally long, depending on the 
light-dark rhythm in the course of the seasons.
225
 The amount of holidays was enormous 
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in precapitalistic times and workers had no particular need to rush.
226
 This did not 
change until the invention of adequate time measuring implements. Only then did hours 
become equally long and they found their way into the daily routine of people with the 
appearance of mechanical clocks that indicated the time with bells, which was only at 
the beginning of the 14
th
 century.
227
 Being equally long, hours could then be used as 
arithmetic units and could even be expressed in monetary units.
228
 Consequently, time 
was used to control working hours and also to calculate costs per unit.
229
 
From then on, time became a scarce resource and thus valuable.
230
 After ‘producing’ 
disposable time became an economic activity, time became even costly.
231
 According to 
Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic, wasting your time was, as a matter of fact, even the most 
serious sin.
232
 Franklin’s expression is the culmination of this development. Not only do 
you spend money when you actually buy something, but also simply consuming leisure 
time is costly, since you could do something else and earn money. Time finally became 
a scarce good that has to be efficiently economised. 
3.2.4 Physics 
There has always been a vague idea of the thriftiness of nature, that nature always takes 
the shortest way.
233
 The first scientific expression in form of a law of nature, however, 
was made by Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759). His work is usually seen 
as the first formulation of the principle of least action.
234
 There were predecessors to 
Maupertuis: Pierre de Fermat’s principle of least time for example is a generalisation of 
Heron’s principle that light takes the shortest possible way between two points.235 Mau-
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pertuis, trying to resolve a contradiction between mathematics and philosophy, intro-
duced the concept of ‘action’ and stated that a corpuscle of light between two given 
points A and B always takes the way that requires the least action. He gave his approach 
a mathematical formulation and defined action as       , where    stands for the dis-
tance and    for the speed.
236
 His main accomplishments lie in the mathematical formu-
lation and in the fact that his reformulation made the application of the principle of least 
action applicable to different fields as well. In fact, Maupertuis himself claimed the 
status of a meta-law for the principle of least action: 
‘Les loix du Mouvement & du Repos déduites de ce principe, se trouvant precisement les memes qui sont 
observées dans la Nature: nous pouvons en admirer l’application dans tous les Phenomênes. Le 
mouvement des Animaux, la végétation des Plantes, la révolution des Astres, n’en sont que les suites & le 
spectacle le l’Univers devient bien plus grand, bien plus beau, bien plus digne de son Auteur, lors qu’on 
sait qu’un petit nombre de loix, le plus sagement établies, suffisent à tous ces mouvements.’237 
Maupertuis’s formulation is actually a strict minimum and no maximum-principle.238 
Nevertheless what is relevant in this context is that he saw the economic principle at 
work everywhere in nature. 
17
th
 century physics is thus completely consistent with the philosophy of Gottfried Wil-
helm Leibniz (1646-1716). Leibniz saw the ultimate goal of the universe in maximising 
existence.
239
 God decides to create the best of all possible worlds and by that a maxi-
mum of essence with a minimum of energy and hence follows the principle of 
compossibility; that is, the compatibility of essences and individuals in the world.
240
 
Accordingly, the maximum principle of economics is of metaphysical origin.
241
 Leibniz, 
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in line with 17
th
 century science, was the first to not only search for ‘the Good’ but for 
‘the Best’ and to demand an explicit mathematical proof of it.242 The imperialism of 
economics should therefore not be surprising if you accept that the economic principle 
is not only binding for firms and enterprises but is actually the metaphysical foundation 
of the world we live in.
243
 It should be noted that Leibniz still was aware of the danger 
of a mistaken anthropocentrism in this context. For him it was clear that human beings 
are not the only maximands in the metaphysical process of maximisation. The optimisa-
tion of totality, however, is only possible for an infinite consciousness and not a reason-
able project for limited human minds.
244
 
Analogies from physics and especially mechanics widely influenced economics. For 
some economists, analogies from physics are even essential to economic theory, at least 
for its neoclassical tradition.
245
 Besides the principle of least action several other analo-
gies are common: Pareto for example suggested that the second law of thermodynamics 
has an important application to distribution theory in economics. According to the the-
ory, redistribution of wealth necessarily involves a loss of total wealth.
246
 In physics, the 
second law of thermodynamics states that it is impossible to convert heat completely 
into work in a cyclic process, and consequently a perpetual motion machine is impossi-
ble.
247
 Walras observed that physics and economics deal with different subject-matters. 
Physics deals with ‘external’, publicly observable phenomena whereas economics deals 
with ‘internal’ phenomena which are of a psychological nature and thus not publicly 
observable. However, he was of the opinion that since both kinds of phenomena can be 
quantified in principle, they can therefore also be subject to mathematical methods. He 
concluded that economics and mechanics are both mathematical sciences.
248
 As in mod-
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ern definitions of economics, he put an emphasis on the methods of economics rather 
than on the subject-matter itself. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen went so far as to say that 
‘Any system that involves a conservation principle (given means) and a maximization 
rule (optimal satisfaction) is a mechanical analogue.’249 That includes substantial parts 
of modern economic theory. 
3.2.5 The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism 
Feudalism just like capitalism is based on a specific type of the division of labour. In 
Feudalism the landlord owns the land as tenure from the king and the landlord rents the 
land to a vassal who has to pay the rent in form of drudgery or in kind.
250
 In contrast, in 
capitalism, there is a class of capitalists who own the means of production, and a class 
of workers without property.
251
  
There are different views on why the transition from Feudalism (approx. 1000 to 
1525
252
) to capitalism occurred. Basically one can differentiate on the one hand the ma-
terialistic view of history that states that it was an inevitable development and on the 
other hand the view that the shift was due to the emergence of a particular capitalistic 
spirit or mind-set.
253
 Factors that probably have been of major importance for the emer-
gence of capitalism were firstly, new technologies, secondly, the appearance of a free 
class without property, and thirdly, new and growing markets (especially in colonies), 
and fourthly beginning capital-accumulation.
254
 In this context, however, the reasons for 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism are of secondary importance; particularly 
relevant are the effects the transition had on the pervasiveness of efficiency-oriented 
thinking. 
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‘Tradition and inherited status give way to competition and merit’255: Whereas in tradi-
tional and feudalistic societies everyone was supposed to have an income according to 
status, that is no longer the case in capitalistic societies. Furthermore, ‘productive work, 
household consumption or work, community or government activity’ were not consid-
ered to be economic activities but ‘feudal obligations or traditional or religious duties’. 
They ‘were done because it was right and normal to do them or because they pleased 
God or the gods or because they earned or conferred status. They were not done out of 
economic motivation.’256 Only with the arrival of capitalism did that change and as a 
result, for the first time in history, profit, income, and acquisitions became ends in 
themselves. In capitalism, maximising profit is even considered to be virtuous.
257
 Feu-
dalistic societies were focused on preservation and continuity, since the social order was 
understood to be created and intended by God.
258
 This is typical for societies based on 
agricultural production. Because of the high fluctuations in output, economic phenome-
na did not seem to be rationally controllable. Such a system would have to be primarily 
concerned with preservation and continuity.
259
 Only with a relatively constant output 
could humans start to see the production process as controllable and become interested 
in the maximisation of the output of production. 
Especially important seems the breakdown of traditional feudal relationships. Fealty and 
bondage were replaced by freedom. In the feudal system, duties were chosen with re-
spect to the poorest (the marginal) piece of land. For everyone but the peasant who 
worked on the marginal land, there was no urge for efficiency. After the breakdown of 
the feudal system, peasants had to compete among themselves on a free market, and 
only those who managed their land efficiently could survive.
260
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A different view of the inefficiency of feudalistic production has been formulated by 
Bertram Schefold:
261
 
Figure 1: Inefficiency of Feudalism 
 
Source: Cf. B. Schefold, Lecture notes for the introductory economics course at the 
Goethe University Frankfurt, retrieved 23 February 2012, <http://www.wiwi.uni-
frankfurt.de/profs/schefold/>, Part B, p. 234. 
Since the land Λ is divided into the land that the lord used for his own sustenance and 
the fief; that is, the land that the vassals cultivated, there were two different modes of 
agricultural production. On the one hand, the vassal lived at subsistence level and at-
tempted to maximise the output of his piece of land regardless of his own effort. In fig-
ure 1 this is depicted by point β, a situation in which the marginal product of labour 
tends towards zero. On the other hand, work on the lord’s land is performed by the vas-
sals. For them every hour spend working on the lord’s land means one hour less that 
they could work on their own. For this reason and also since production on the lord’s 
land benefited solely the lord, the vassals had little motivation to work efficiently. Point 
α in figure 1 shows how the actual production on the lord’s land is below the production 
possibilities with given labour input. Also, the lord’s land is not completely cultivated, 
as would be the case at   . The output could easily be increased by cultivating more of 
the lord’s land. However, the feudal lord had no interest in cultivating the land fully and 
in organising production efficiently, they preferred to use the remaining land for other 
purposes, for instance for hunting. 
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Why did these obviously inefficient modes of production prevail? It is not the case that 
the lords behaved irrationally; they simply followed a different kind of rationality. They 
had an interest in preserving the existing power structure, and keeping the vassals as 
villains bound to their small piece of land. 
3.2.6 The Separation of Household and Firm 
A further development is the separation of household and firm, as it is characteristic of 
capitalism. Strictly speaking, this is another aspect of the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, but since it is of major importance for the analysis of this chapter, it deserves 
a section of its own. 
There were internal and external influences that lead to the disintegration of the house-
hold as the unit of common production and consumption. Internally, with the increasing 
differentiation of skills and wants of the individuals, while at the same time the eco-
nomic opportunities were growing, the close bond between the individual and the 
household community became intolerable from the perspective of the individual. Exter-
nally, the state had an interest in the disintegration of households, since this augmented 
its possibility to levy taxes.
262
 Moreover, the development of a rational legal framework, 
including formally regulated wage contracts was conducive to the local separation of 
consumption and production.
263
 
According to Max Weber, however, the decisive development was the division of 
household and firm regarding bookkeeping, rather than the spacial aspect.
264
 Weber 
identified several cases in the history in which household and firm were locally sepa-
rated. Separate bookkeeping on the other hand is a distinct phenomenon of modern capi-
talism. This was accompanied by a generally growing sense of calculation (Rechenhaf-
tigkeit), even in locally integrated households. In a monetised economy, this meant that 
the balance of individual use and contribution became obvious to the members of a 
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household.
265
 In the original form of household-communism, such mutual offsetting did 
not exist
266
 and was even impossible, since internal prices of goods produced in the 
household and consumed internally did not exist
267
. As a consequence, the household 
was reduced to being a place of common consumption, while production takes place 
externally.
268
 
With the separation of household and firm, two distinct spheres of human life come into 
existence: In the sphere of the firm, individuals maximise their profit, whereas in the 
sphere of the household, individuals aim at the fulfilment of demand.
269
 Therefore, two 
different forms of rationality could develop. In his vocation, an individual can behave 
strictly economically rational, whereas in the household other rationalities prevail: com-
passion, togetherness, love, justice, need satisfaction, redistribution, etc. 
3.2.7 Utilitarianism & Marginal Revolution 
Classical utilitarianism ‘defines the rightness of acts or rules as maximisation of aggre-
gate utility’.270 This is best captured in Bentham’s famous expression of the ‘greatest 
happiness principle’: ‘[I]t is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the 
measure of right and wrong . . .’271. 
Utilitarianism as a moral principle has three basic elements: welfarism, sum ranking and 
consequentialism. In this context ‘welfarism’ means that the goodness of a state of af-
fairs is to be derived only from utility information about that state. ‘Sum ranking’ means 
that the utility information consists only of the sum-total of all the utilities in the rele-
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vant state and consequentialism assesses every choice according to its consequences.
272
 
A bigger sum of total utility is better than a smaller one. Consequently, ‘[a]ccording to 
utilitarianism, my moral duty is to maximize happiness’273. Utilitarian ethics can there-
fore be seen as a formal ethics of efficiency.
274
 
This is the philosophical foundation of the marginal school in economics. Accordingly, 
for Jevons the task of economics is to ‘maximise pleasure’ 275. Similarly Friedrich von 
Wieser: Keeping the subjective theory of value of the marginalists in mind, the aim of 
economics must be the highest utilisation of economic goods
276
, in order to obtain a 
welfare maximum for society.277 
One central concept of marginalism in the analysis of consumer choice is the maxi-
misation principle. A consumer will choose different goods until the marginal utility 
he derives from them are equal. Once the marginal utility for every monetary unit 
spent is equal for each possible use, the consumer has reached an optimum. The law 
of diminishing marginal utility guarantees that such an optimum exists.
278
 This 
maximisation principle and the idea that competition indeed brings about such an 
optimum, are the basis of neoclassical theory.
279
 It follows a utilitarian ethic
280
 in 
which the maximisation of a utility function is the central concept.
281
 The realisation 
of the ordinal nature of utility made it impossible to construct a social utility function 
in the sense of a sum-total of individual utility values. This, however, did not lead to 
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the abandonment of utilitarian ideas but to the paretian reformulation in which the 
social welfare maximum is defined as a Pareto-optimum, as a state in which it is im-
possible to make any individual better off without making any other worse off.
282
 
Thus, the central element of modern neoclassical theory is maximisation. 
3.2.8 Mathematisation of Economic Theory 
Physics defines its equilibria by maximum principles, that being the most concise and 
accurate method to analyse for example the paths of particles.
283
 It is not surprising that 
economics seeing itself as ‘social physics’284 desires the same accuracy in its methods. 
It tries to accomplish this by the use of mathematical methods. With the ongoing pro-
gress and increasing complexity of mathematical theory, the range of applications in 
economic theory increases. The story of the mathematisation of economics runs parallel 
to the adoption of metaphors from physics.
285
 Free human beings with indeterminate 
options to choose from do not fit into an atomised, deterministic view of the economic 
world and hence man is conceived as a ‘pleasure machine’286, which allows the applica-
tion of mechanical terms and mathematical reasoning. The neoclassical program corre-
sponds to the worldview of Laplace,
287
 who thought that if science only knew the initial 
states of all particles and all natural laws, nothing would be uncertain, everything could 
be predicted
288
. Physics has given up this thought a long time ago, in general equilib-
rium economics it is still prevalent. The danger is in particular a false sense of certainty 
in making any kind of prediction. 
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General equilibrium theory appears to be the pinnacle of the mathematisation of eco-
nomics and it shows how central ideas of maximisation are to modern economic think-
ing. Already in the early formulation of Walras, a general equilibrium is defined as the 
solution of profit and utility maximisation under constraints.
289
 And still in the ground-
breaking existence proof of Arrow and Debreu a general equilibrium is basically defined 
by four equations:
290
 1. Profit maximisation of firms, 2. Utility maximisation of house-
holds, 3. A normalised price vector, 4. The condition that the value of the sum of all 
excess demands is equal to zero.
291
 
In welfare economics even a third fundamental form of maximisation is added: the 
maximisation of general welfare, in the sense of a Pareto optimum.
292
 
3.2.9 The Interaction of Economics and Biology 
The development of modern economic theory and that of the biological theory of evolu-
tion were interdependent. For instance, when Charles Darwin was working on the prin-
ciples of evolution, he was strongly influenced by the thought of Robert Malthus.
293
 
Malthus said that every population has a ‘constant tendency to increase beyond the 
means of subsistence’294, because population if unchecked would increase in a geomet-
rical ratio, whereas the means of subsistence could only be made to increase in an ar-
ithmetical ratio.
295
 Darwin came to two conclusions: Firstly, there has to be some kind 
of competition or ‘struggle for existence’ among the members of the population if the 
resources are not sufficient to nourish all individuals. Secondly, whether an individual 
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succeeds in the struggle for existence or not, is not entirely arbitrary, but dependent on 
the characteristics of each individual. Different characteristics are unequally successful 
so that a process of ‘selection’ occurs.296 The analogy between economics and biology is 
thus the following: In economics individuals pursue their own pleasure or utility, in bi-
ology they strive for survival. In both cases the individuals are subject to competition in 
which usually the ‘fittest’ are successful and survive.297 It seems that nature operates 
efficiently, always choosing the cheapest option and rejecting wasteful organisms in the 
process of evolution.
298
 
There is no clear trail in Darwin’s writings, but it seems clear that he was also influ-
enced by Adam Smith
299
 and other Scottish economists and philosophers
300. Darwin’s 
view appears to be much more optimistic than Malthus’301 and hints to a tendency to 
continuing improvement. As has been already stated, the relationship between econom-
ics and biology has been one of mutual influence. In the late 19
th
 century Social Dar-
winism viewed the market as the ‘most natural form of social organisation’, resembling 
a process of competition for scarce resources in which only the fittest survive.
302
 Today, 
evolutionary economics is an established branch of economic theory
303
 and Ghiselin 
even went so far as to say that economics and biology are both part of a super-science 
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‘General Economy’, which he defined as ‘the study of how the availability and utiliza-
tion of resources affect the structure and activity of organized beings.’304 
3.3 Efficiency and Norms 
The concept of normativity is difficult to apply to the field of economics. To give a brief 
analysis of the normativity of efficiency, this chapter uses only the widely known defini-
tion of Peter Stemmer, however, the same analysis could be carried out by means of 
different approaches to the concept with possibly different results. 
Stemmer defines three types of obligations (Drei Arten des Müssens): Firstly, obliga-
tions in the sense of natural laws. In that case, one event necessarily leads to another. It 
is not possible that something else follows from the initial event and the same ‘obliga-
tion’ would still persist even without the existence of any living beings. This kind of 
obligation is not normative.
305
 Secondly, there are logical obligations – obligations of 
consistency. For instance, if you assume A and B then you also have to assume C. In this 
case you ought to do something but you could also do otherwise. This kind of obligation 
is also not normative.
306
 And finally, normative obligations, which are defined by sanc-
tions. You ought to do X because otherwise you will be sanctioned.
307
 
In what sense now is it possible to speak of efficiency as a norm? Efficiency is certainly 
no natural law, such that it would be impossible to act in an inefficient way. Given the 
basic assumption of neoclassical theory, scarcity, it is, however, possible to speak of 
efficiency as a logical obligation. If we assume that resources are scarce, you should try 
not to waste any. Especially, if we adopt Edgeworth’s picture of man as a ‘pleasure ma-
chine’ for a moment, efficiency would also be a logical obligation. Given the choices 
that an individual has, her preferences, constraints and the possible outcomes, she will 
choose the optimal option. It is clear that this view in fact excludes any free choice. If 
an individual only acts as a maximising machine, only mechanic transformations of 
                                                 
304
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known relationships between parameters are carried out,
308
 no free choices. Under the 
assumption of perfect competition, efficiency is also a normative obligation. Since the 
maximum profit under perfect competition is zero, firms that do not maximise their 
profits will go bankrupt. 
What about efficiency as a normative concept for the curriculum of economics as a sci-
ence? We have seen that efficiency has normative aspects for the entrepreneur in his 
practical economic activity. Is efficiency also normative in the sense that an economist 
ought to base his theoretical models on assumptions of efficient behaviour? Again, effi-
ciency is clearly no natural law for an economist. It is possible to write a research-article 
without using the concept of efficiency. Also, efficiency is not generally a logical obli-
gation. It might, however, be one in certain contexts. If the research question is to find 
the profit maximising output of a firm, you will need to use the concept of efficiency. In 
this case, of course, efficiency is already part of the question. Also, if you are looking 
for the ‘optimal’ output, efficiency is necessarily involved. If you would ask for the 
break-even point, efficiency would only be indirectly involved. This already hints to the 
nature of efficiency in the economic curriculum as the rules of the game, rather than a 
norm. If economists decide to talk only about efficiency, it will consequently be the cen-
tral element of economic theory. Economists could clearly decide to do otherwise, to set 
up different rules of the game and to consider also concepts like satisficing behaviour. 
Finally, there is also a normative side to the concept of efficiency in the economic cur-
riculum. Because, if the rules of the game are as they are, academic journals will only 
accept publications that use the concept of efficiency. If you do not play by the rules of 
the game, you will be sanctioned by being excluded from ways to publish your research 
work and thus from the scientific community. 
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3.4 Metaphors and Efficiency 
Economics as a science did not develop its own language, but always borrowed meta-
phors and analogies from natural sciences.
309
 Metaphors are pictographic comparisons 
that use similar characteristics to describe something unknown by something known. 
The word metaphor derives from the greek metaphérein, which means transfer, to bear. 
By using a metaphor, insights from one field of knowledge are being transferred into 
another one.
310
 Originally, metaphors in economics were taken from medical science, 
later from physics and since recently from evolutionary biology. 
Francois Quesnay is probably the most famous example of someone who introduced 
metaphors from medical science to economics. His tableau économique is often seen as 
an analogy to the human blood circulation,
311
 although some authors criticise this inter-
pretation and propose that a mechanistic interpretation of Quesnay’s analogy would be 
more appropriate to his original intentions.
312
 
For most of the history of economic thought, analogies from physics, and mechanics in 
particular, have been the most common ones. The physiocrats, being deeply influenced 
by Descartes, saw the economy as clockwork. A metaphor that emphasises an external 
manipulator that for example winds up the clock.
313
 Later on, classical theory under the 
influence of Newton, had the picture of scales or the planetary system in mind. This 
view is in stark contrast to the absolutistic view of society, understanding the economy 
as a self-regulating system. Consequently, it is the task of the economist to reveal law-
like causalities in the economy. Political, ethical or sociological considerations are to be 
excluded from the work of the economist.
314
 Neoclassical theory and especially general 
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equilibrium theory got its metaphors from mechanics.
315
 Walras’ idea for his formula-
tion of a general equilibrium might for instance have been influenced by Louis Poinsot’s 
‘Eléments de statique’. Poinsot shows how the equilibrium of a system, consisting of 
many factors, influencing each other by their force of gravity, can be determined by the 
solution of a system of equations.
316
 As has already been shown, the neoclassical gen-
eral equilibrium theory is equivalent to a Laplacean world view. The final state in the 
model is completely determined by the initial state and the application of a set of gen-
eral laws.
317
 According to this world view, the neoclassical Homo Oeconomicus acts like 
a machine and is also termed as such by the first neoclassical theorists.
318
 Quantum 
physics destroyed the deterministic, materialistic and mechanistic world-view. If it is 
not true that the world is a machine, why should the economy or men be machines?
319
 
Consequently, deterministic natural laws would have to be rephrased as ‘statistical-
laws’.320 Maybe the emergence of econometrics can be seen as such a development in 
economics. Generally, it seems reasonable to substitute the Newtonian with a Heisen-
bergian model. The Newtonian paradigm, as used in classical and neoclassical econom-
ics, was the basis for the competitive free market system. The economy was described 
and interpreted in terms of classical physics and mechanics, in analogy to the planetary 
system, a self-regulating system that automatically moves to a point of equilibrium.
321
 
To influence the economy from outside would thus be an unnatural and undesirable in-
terference.
322
 In contrast, the Heisenbergian model corresponds to the managerial soci-
ety of the 20
th
 century.
323
 According to Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty, it is im-
possible to determine the position and the velocity of a particle at arbitrary precision. 
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This destroys the basis for exact predictions.
324
 In addition, the Copenhagen Interpreta-
tion of quantum physics implies that the observer has an effect on the observed reality; 
that is, you cannot distinguish reality from its measurement.
325
 A concept that is actually 
familiar to the economist: We cannot know what the preferences of individuals are, be-
fore they are disclosed.
326
 Preferences therefore only become real to the observer in the 
moment they have effects on the consumer choice. Overall a Heisenbergian world-view 
in economics leads to an emphasis on concepts like market power, the possibility to 
exert influence on the system by way of for example administered prices or creative 
managerial actions and the impossibility of exact predictions.
327
 It would follow that if 
we cannot know what the future will be like (especially since the Laplacean world view 
turned out to be wrong), it would rather be the task of the social disciplines to ‘conduct 
a rational dialogue about what the future should be’ rather than to be concerned with 
what is.
328
 Probably out of fear of the consequences of modern physics for the world-
view of economics, there have been little inclusions of metaphors from 20
th
 century 
physics into economics
329
. 
Since the middle of the 20
th
 century, economics takes its metaphors often from evolu-
tionary biology. The basis for the theory of evolution is scarcity
330
 and in the resulting 
struggle for existence only the fittest will survive. The analogy drawn from this to eco-
nomics is that only those who manage their resources efficiently and are successful in 
the competition for scarce resources, will prosper. However, this analogy is flawed: First 
of all, human beings in contrast to animals and especially plants are capable of produc-
ing their means of subsistence and they are indeed very creative in increasing the pro-
ductivity of production processes. Whereas plants and most animals compete for an 
absolutely fixed amount of resources, humans are able to increase supply. Certainly, 
resources in the end are finite also for humans, but the difference has to be noted and is 
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of importance as the history of Malthus’ theory shows. In particular, the above interpre-
tation is based on a mistaken understanding of how evolution works. Animals do not 
maximise their fitness in order to be more successful in the struggle for existence, but 
rather, natural forces and the scarcity of resources wipe out everything that is not suffi-
ciently adapted. As a consequence, the characteristics of creatures change over many 
generations, and over time only beings that are very closely adapted to their environ-
ment remain. Note that this is a completely passive process, no one is maximising any-
thing. It is a ‘mechanistic’, ‘unplanned’ process of adaption.331 Compare this to eco-
nomic processes which have so much to do with creative, conscious, planned and stra-
strategic actions of entrepreneurs and consumers. In evolutionary theory, the complex 
structures of organisms only exist to keep the organism alive until the organism was 
able to pass the underlying information (the genes) on to the next generation. The struc-
tures have thus only the purpose of conserving information.
 332
 This is of course a reduc-
tionistic explanation of living-beings, but certainly helpful to understand the logic of 
evolution. Applying this to economics, the purpose of a firm is only to break-even and 
in doing so to survive the current period, and the consumer would only strive to earn an 
income sufficient to survive. Evolutionary economics in this sense is not about maximi-
sation of profit, income or utility, it is about surviving and thus about making no losses 
and being able to satisfy basic needs. One more difficulty of the application of the evo-
lutionary logic to economics should be noted: In biology, the process of selection is 
usually not a matter of life and death. It is all about the Adaptionswert
333
, the contribu-
tion to the gene pool of the next generation.
334
 The critical point is: Firms do not repli-
cate. They can continue to exist, grow or go bankrupt, but one ‘adult company’ of this 
period does not produce a set of ‘baby companies’ in the next period. And also: There 
are no genes. 
The analogy of the logic of evolution to economics is flawed. That is not further surpris-
ing; metaphors can only illustrate certain aspects and will necessarily be flawed in rela-
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tion to other aspects of the subject, but since metaphors have a deep impact on the self-
concept of a discipline, it is important to be aware of the limitations of the metaphors 
one uses. 
3.5 Discussion 
This chapter has tried to analyse the concept of efficiency in the context of economics. 
It has been shown that efficiency should not be understood as a law of nature, but that 
efficiency as a guiding principle in economic life and theory has a history. The under-
standing of efficiency has developed over time and our modern view of it is partly a 
result of our culture and economic system. Besides scarcity, several other influences 
have been critically analysed: the invention of time measuring techniques, medieval 
monasteries, the discovery of natural laws in physics, the transition from feudalism to a 
capitalistic system, the separation of household and firm, utilitarianism and the marginal 
revolution, the mathematisation of economic theory and finally some interdependent 
aspects of economics and biology. It has furthermore been shown that efficiency has 
features of a norm and in the concluding chapter, an overview of the use of metaphors in 
economics and its effects on the understanding of efficiency was given. 
The purpose of chapter 3 was not to criticise the concept of efficiency itself, but to at-
tempt to illuminate the nature of the concept and therefore to make the reader aware of 
its limitations. The argument is similar to the argument about the analogies from evolu-
tionary theory. It is not about criticising the analogy as such, but to criticise a naive and 
uncritical use of it and to remember that it is only an analogy. It is clear also that no 
consumer or entrepreneur literally calculates the optimum of his or her utility function 
or profit function, respectively. The appropriate picture has been given by Milton 
Friedman, who compared the problem to a top billiard player who acts as if he knew all 
the relevant mathematical and physical formulae, but actually simply has an excellent 
feeling for where and how to hit the ball.
335
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Why is the whole issue important, after all? Because a world-view always has effects on 
your actions and the way you think (and the way you do research in this context). Weber 
saw the positive effects on effectivity that the rationalisation of all different areas of life 
had. But he was also aware of the ‘Versachlichung’, ‘Verunpersönlichung’,336 ‘Ent-
menschlichung’, and ‘Entseelung’337 that this development caused. Further, an approach 
that is only based on efficiency, might exclude important elements from its considera-
tion. There is for example the danger of economics becoming an ahistorical discipline. 
As has been shown, conditions of our modern capitalistic society are often understood 
as natural-law-like facts rather than historical developments. Also, economics is in the 
danger of becoming an inhuman discipline in the sense of not having conscious, free 
agents as its subjects, but maximising machines. Robins’ definition of economics for 
instance does not even mention human beings. In an economic system that is purely 
based on efficiency, human beings are in danger of degenerating to objects rather than 
being the subjects of economic processes, as for example Christian social ethics sees 
them.
338
 This is also captured in what Peter Koslowski called ‘entelechial efficiency’:339 
The economy does not only have to produce efficiently, but it also has to produce what 
humans want. Entelechial efficiency in this context means that the economy allows for 
humans to actualise a maximum of expressivity of the human, entelechial, self. And 
finally it should never be forgotten that human beings are not the only maximands in the 
process of maximisation. A comprehensive concept of efficiency has to include ecologi-
cal dimensions as well.
340
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4 Aspects of Efficiency: 
The Role of the Economic System 
4.1 Introduction 
The term efficiency covers several aspects of one phenomenon. All single aspects have 
three things in common: an input-output-relation, non-wastefulness and the logic of 
maximising or minimising. Often, single aspects of efficiency are used as a synonym for 
‘efficiency’. This chapter (4. Aspects of Efficiency) tries to give an in-depth analysis of 
the term efficiency in chapter 4.2 with the aim of clearing up some of the confusion 
about the term. 
Different economic systems attempt efficiency in different ways. In chapter 4.3 I show 
how market economies and centrally planned economies approach the issue of effi-
ciency. Particularly important is, whether the economic systems can live up to their 
ideal of efficiency. Several hindrances to efficiency will be discussed, before chapter 4.4 
draws some conclusions about the different roles that efficiency plays in both economic 
systems. 
4.2 Economic Efficiency 
The purpose of chapter 4.2 is to distinguish three aspects of efficiency: technical effi-
ciency, distributive efficiency, and the efficiency of the output mix. This will be done by 
giving an overview of standard textbook microeconomics. Hence, in order to simplify 
matters, the existence of a neoclassical production function is assumed. This suffices to 
clarify the logic of the different aspects of efficiency. For a detailed analysis of the rea-
sonableness of the neoclassical production function, refer for example to the work of 
Bertram Schefold.
341
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4.2.1 Technical Efficiency 
Technical efficiency or productive efficiency means that there is no production vector 
that allows to produce a higher output with the given amount of inputs or that a given 
output cannot be produced with fewer inputs.
342
 Or to put it in another way: ‘A possible 
point in the commodity space is called efficient whenever an increase in one of its coor-
dinates (the net output of one good) can be achieved only at the cost of a decrease in 
some other coordinate (the net output of another good).’343 
Figure 2: Technical Efficiency 
 
Source: Cf. U. Cantner et al., Produktivitäts- und Effizienzanalyse:  
der nichtparametrische Ansatz, Springer, Berlin, 2007, p. 4. 
Figure 2 shows a production process. χ denotes inputs and y output. Every point in the 
graph stands for an input-output combination and the area below the production func-
tion F (including F itself) is the set of possible technologies and thus possible input-
output combinations. For every point below F it is possible to either increase the output 
with the given amount of inputs or to produce the same amount of output with less in-
put. For points on F a further improvement of that kind is not possible. Points on F are 
therefore roughly speaking technically efficient.
344
 
                                                 
342
  Cf. U. Cantner et al., Produktivitäts- und Effizienzanalyse: der nichtparametrische Ansatz, Springer, 
Berlin, 2007, p. 4. 
343
  T. C. Koopmans, ‘Analysis of production as an efficient combination of activities’, in T. C. Koopmans 
(ed.), Activity analysis of production and allocation, Wiley, New York, 1951, p. 60. Koopmans was in 
fact among the first to introduce this concept of Pareto efficiency to production processes 
(cf. ibid., pp. 2-3). 
344
  That this is only roughly and not strictly true will be shown in chapter 4.2.1.1. 
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4.2.1.1 Input vs. Output Efficiency 
Technical efficiency can be further distinguished into input efficiency and output effi-
ciency. Starting from point B in figure 3, the firm could produce a higher amount of 
output (y’’) with the same amount of inputs (χ’’) and reach point B’’. In that sense, B is 
not output efficient. Also, the firm could reach point B’ and produce the same amount of 
output y’ with less inputs χ’. In that sense, B is not input efficient. 
Figure 3: Input vs. Output-Efficiency 
 
Source: Cf. Cantner, p. 7. 
In this example it is obvious that B is not efficient. Now consider the case of a produc-
tion function that at some point becomes parallel to the horizontal axis. Starting from a 
point on the horizontal part of the production function, if you increase the amount of 
inputs, output will remain constant. A point on the horizontal part of the production 
function would be output efficient, but not input efficient, since with the given amount 
of inputs you could not produce any more output but you could produce the same 
amount of output with fewer inputs. This shows that the statement above about the 
technical efficiency of the production function has to be qualified as saying that all 
points on the production function are output efficient and input efficient only if the pro-
duction function is monotonically increasing. This is also captured in figures 4 (a) and  
4 (b). 
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Figure 4: Input vs. Output-Efficiency – Two Technologies 
 
Source: Cf. F. Breyer, Mikroökonomik, 3
rd
 ed., Springer, Berlin, 2007,  
pp. 11-3, and cf. Cantner, p. 7. 
The two dashed lines in both figures stand for two different technologies, one is capital-
intensive, the other labour-intensive. All points on both lines are input efficient. The two 
marked points in figure 4 (a) represent the same level of output. In figure 4 (b) an iso-
quant connects both points. All points on the isoquant represent the same level of out-
put, produced with the use of different technologies. All points on the isoquant and be-
tween the two dashed lines are input and output efficient. The points of the isoquant 
above or to the right of the two marked points represent output efficient but not input 
efficient combinations, since the same amount of output (represented by the isoquant) 
could be produced with fewer inputs.
345
 
4.2.1.2 Efficient Input Supply vs. Efficient Input Use 
Efficient input supply by an individual is achieved when the (opportunity) costs of sup-
plying input z are equal to the compensation for its supply.
346
 
                                                 
345
  Cf. F. Breyer, Mikroökonomik, 3
rd
 ed., Springer, Berlin, 2007, pp. 11-3, and cf. Cantner, p. 9. 
346
  Cf. H. Gravelle & R. Rees, Microeconomics, 3
rd
 ed., Prentice Hall, Harlow et al., 2004, pp. 284-5. 
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Figure 5: Efficient Input Supply 
 
Source: Cf. H. Gravelle & R. Rees, Microeconomics, 3
rd
 ed., 
Prentice Hall, Harlow et al., 2004, p. 285. 
Figure 5 depicts supply of input z by an individual on the horizontal axis and consump-
tion of the individual on the vertical axis. The more of z the individual supplies, the 
more she can consume. However, the individual also has to consider the opportunity 
cost of supplying z. I
0 
and I
1
 are indifference curves of the individual. In A
0
 the supply 
of z is not efficient. I
0
 and the consumption possibility curve cross. The individual can 
increase her utility by shifting to A
1
 with a higher supply of z and a higher level of con-
sumption. At this point the slope of both curves is equal to the individual’s marginal rate 
of substitution between consumption and input supply.
347
 
Turning now to the efficient use of inputs, let us first consider the case of two inputs, 
one output and one producer, and afterwards the case of two producers and two inputs. 
Allocative efficiency means the efficient use of inputs in their right proportions accord-
ing to their relative prices.
348
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  Cf. Gravelle & Rees, pp. 284-5. 
348
  Cf. Cantner, p. 10. 
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Figure 6: Efficient Input Use 
 
Source: Cf. Cantner, p. 9. 
Figure 6 shows the efficient choice between two inputs, capital (C) and labour (L) to 
produce a given amount of output, represented by the isoquant (I). α is an isocost-line, 
its slope is given by the relative prices of C and L. All points on           and           are input 
efficient, all points on I are output efficient. Both E and D are thus input and output effi-
cient. The tangent point of α and I gives the cost minimising input proportions to pro-
duce the amount of output represented by I. Thus only E is allocatively efficient, since 
only E is cost minimising given the relative prices of C and L.
349
  
Figure 7 depicts the allocation of two inputs among two producers or two forms of use. 
z1 stands for the amount of resource z that is allocated to firm 1 and u1 stands for the 
amount of resource u that is allocated to firm 1. z2 and u2 respectively are the amounts of 
z and u that are allocated to firm 2. Starting from 01 in the direction of 02, the output of 
firm 1 increases, as is depicted by convex isoquants. And starting from 02 in the direc-
tion of 01 the output of firm 2 increases. Allocations at intersection points of isoquants 
cannot be efficient, since by reallocations, the output of at least one firm can be in-
creased without reducing the output of the other firm. Efficient allocations are given at 
tangent points of isoquants, which can be connected to form the contract curve           . At 
points depicting efficient allocations, the slopes of the isoquants must be equal to the 
marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS); that is, the rate at which inputs can be 
                                                 
349
  Cf. Cantner, pp. 9-10. 
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substituted for each other, while keeping the output constant.
350
 At these points, no fur-
ther Pareto-improvements are possible. 
Figure 7: Efficient Input Use – Two Producers 
 
Source: Cf. Gravelle & Rees, p. 286. 
4.2.1.3 Static vs. Dynamic Efficiency 
So far the analysis has been purely static. Static efficiency means that no options of pro-
duction and need satisfaction remain unused.
351
 If more than one period is included to 
the analysis, several other aspects have to be taken into account. First of all, relative 
prices can change. In the context of production, the production function or technical 
efficiency remain unchanged, but the allocative efficiency might be altered.
352
 
                                                 
350
  Cf. Gravelle & Rees, pp. 285-6. 
351
  Cf. J. Schumann et al., Grundzüge der mikroökonomischen Theorie, 8
th
 ed., Springer, Berlin et al., 
2007, p. 37. 
352
  Cf. Cantner, p. 12. 
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Figure 8: Dynamic Efficiency – Relative Price Changes 
 
Source: Own figure, based on Cantner, p. 9. 
In figure 8, relative prices between input C and L have changed compared to figure 6. L 
became relatively cheaper, while C became relatively more expensive and as a result, 
the isocost-curve α pivoted. After the adjustment, the allocatively efficient production 
takes place at point G. 
Secondly, product and process innovations might take place.
353
 Product innovations 
cannot be analysed with the graphic tools used so far, and would also be more relevant 
in the context of consumer choice. In the context of production, process innovations 
play a more decisive role. After a process innovation took place, it might be possible to 
realise points above the old production function, which is equivalent to an upwards shift 
of the same. 
In figure 9 the old production function F
*
(t) shifts to F
*
(t+1). Points that have so far 
been technically efficient, are no longer so. Whereas B was a point of the production 
function in period t, in t+1 it is possible to produce either more output with the same 
amount of inputs (B’’) or to produce the same amount of output with fewer inputs 
(B’).354 Dynamic efficiency is therefore either the ability to enhance production capacity 
over time without an increase in inputs
355
 or the ability to achieve the same level of out-
                                                 
353
  Cf. Schumann, p. 37. 
354
  Cf. Cantner, pp. 12-4. 
355
  Cf. P. R. Gregory & R. C. Stuart, Comparative Economic Systems, 6
th
 ed., Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 
1999, p. 44. 
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put over time with fewer inputs. This can be measured by the growth of output in rela-
tion to the growth of input.
356
 
Figure 9: Dynamic Efficiency – Process Innovation 
 
Source: Cf. Cantner, p. 13. 
It should also be noted that if only short term efficiency is pursued, it might be reason-
able to ruin machinery and lose customers, as long as it leads to an increase in effi-
ciency. Whereas if long term efficiency is pursued, sustainability, trust, etc. have to be 
taken into consideration.
357
 
4.2.1.4 Efficient Scale 
By efficient scale the ‘right’ or ‘optimal’ size of a firm is meant, whereas size is meas-
ured in units of output produced. At the efficient scale of the firm, average costs are at a 
minimum, which is the equivalent of saying that total factor productivity is at a maxi-
mum.
358
 
Figure 10 shows three different output levels of a firm. F
* 
is the production function, χ 
is the amount of input, y is the output and B, C and D stand for three different sizes of 
production. The slope of every line is equal to total factor productivity for every given 
size of production. The slope and thus total factor productivity is at its maximum at the 
tangent to the production function; that is, point D. The slope of both the lines through B 
                                                 
356
  Cf. Gregory & Stuart, p. 44. 
357
  Cf. M. Shubik, ‘On concepts of efficiency’, in Policy sciences, no. 9:2, 1978, p. 124. 
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and C are less than the one through D. At point B, the scale is less than efficient, at C it 
is greater than efficient.
359
 
Figure 10: Efficient Scale 
 
Source: Cf. Cantner, p. 11. 
4.2.1.5 Efficiency, Profit Maximisation, Cost Minimisation 
The profit maximising output is technically efficient
360
 and also cost minimising. To 
show that profit maximisation implies cost minimisation, consider the following proof: 
Firstly, the logic of cost minimisation will be shown,
361
 and then in the second step the 
profit maximising solution will be derived and finally it will be shown that both solu-
tions are identical. The problem of cost minimisation with two inputs, labour (L) and 
capital (C) can be stated as 
   
    
      (4.1) 
            . (4.2) 
The cost function consists of the input of labour units multiplied with the wage rate (w) 
plus the input of capital multiplied by the cost of capital (r). The given output (Q) is a 
                                                 
358
  Cf. Cantner, pp. 10-1. 
359
  Cf. ibid., pp. 10-2. 
360
  Cf. F. A. Cowell, Microeconomics: Principles and analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006,  
p. 22. 
361
  The derivation of the cost minimising solution follows D. Besanko & R. R. Braeutigam, Microeco-
nomics, 3
rd
 ed., Wiley, New York, 2007, pp. 260-1. 
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function of labour and capital. We look for the production technique that leads to mini-
mal costs while producing output Q. To solve (4.1) subject to (4.2), define the Lagran-
gian function 
                           (4.3) 
where λ represents the Lagrange-multiplier. The first order conditions for an optimal 
solution (with positive values for L and C) are: 
  
  
      
       
  
 
(4.4) 
  
  
      
       
  
 
(4.5) 
  
  
               
(4.6) 
By combining (4.4) and (4.5) you get 
       
  
       
  
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
(4.7) 
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
(4.8) 
Here,     stands for the marginal product of factor i. The result means that at the cost 
minimising input combination the additional output that the enterprise gets from every 
additional monetary unit spent on labour is equal to the additional output it gets from 
every additional monetary unit spent on capital. 
Let us now turn to profit maximisation. The objective function is 
   
     
                      (4.9) 
Profit ( ) is equal to revenues (production function times price vector P) minus costs 
(labour costs wL and capital costs rC). The first order conditions for an optimum are 
  
  
  
  
  
       
 
   
 
(4.10) 
  
  
  
  
  
       
 
   
  
(4.11) 
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Marginal costs are therefore equal to the price. Combining (4.10) and (4.11) leads us to 
 
   
 
 
   
 
(4.12) 
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
(4.13) 
You can immediately see that (4.13) is equal to (4.8). Profit maximisation is therefore 
equivalent to cost minimisation.
362
 
The result that cost minimisation and profit maximisation are just two sides of the same 
coin is not further surprising. If costs are not minimised, a profit cannot be maximised, 
since you could still increase the profit by further reducing the costs. A profit maximis-
ing (or cost minimising) output is also technically efficient. That is to say, if    ; that 
is, y is a feasible output vector, and profit maximising for some p>>0, then y is effi-
cient. The logic of the proof is similar to the one just mentioned: Suppose the opposite 
was true. There would be a      such that      and     . Since p>>0, this im-
plies that         . But then it would not have been true that y was profit maximising 
in the first place.
363
 
If an output vector is profit maximising, it is not possible to produce an output that leads 
to a higher profit with the given inputs, thus it is output efficient. If an output vector is 
cost minimising, it is not possible to attain the same level of output or the same profit 
with less input and it is thus input efficient. 
It remains to be noted that cost minimisation is equivalent to profit maximisation only 
under perfect competition. If market power prevails the above analysis does not hold. 
Under perfect competition, consumers maximise their welfare by setting marginal utility 
equal to the price. Marginal costs also equal the price and therefore marginal utility is 
equal to marginal costs: 
                     
(4.14) 
                                                 
362
  The derivation of the profit maximising solution follows Besanko & Braeutigam, pp. 358-9. 
363
  Cf. A. Mas-Colell et al., Microeconomic theory, Oxford University Press, New York et al., 1995,  
p. 150. 
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A monopolist sets MC equal to MR, where MR is less than the price. It follows that 
marginal cost will be less than marginal utility: 
                        
(4.15) 
If market power prevails, producers will use fewer resources in these industries than 
would be efficient. Society would benefit from an increase of production but the mo-
nopolist will not increase production since an additional unit of output would reduce his 
profits.
364
 
4.2.2 Distributive Efficiency 
After analysing efficient production, we now turn to efficient consumption. Starting 
from a given amount of goods available for consumption, a distribution is efficient if it 
is not possible to make one individual better off without making someone else worse 
off.
365
 
Figure 11: Efficient Exchange 
 
Source: Cf. Gravelle & Rees, p. 283. 
The Edgeworth-box in figure 11 shows all exchange solutions between two individuals. 
Individual 1, starting from   , can consume more of x by moving to the right and more 
                                                 
364
  Cf. W. J. Baumol & A. S. Blinder, Microeconomics: Principles and policy, 9
th
 ed., South Western, 
Mason, 2004, p. 201. 
365
  Cf. Besanko & Braeutigam, p. 628. 
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of y by moving upwards. Individual 2, starting from    can consume more of x by mov-
ing to the left and more of y by moving downwards. 1’s indifference curves are convex 
in    with an increasing level of utility in the upper-right direction (Individual 2 respec-
tively in the lower-left direction). Intersection points of individual 1 and 2’s indifference 
curves cannot be efficient, because it is still possible to increase the utility of one indi-
vidual without decreasing that of the other. Such Pareto-improvements are no longer 
possible at tangent points of indifference curves, thus these points are points of efficient 
exchange, denoted as efficient distributions. The contract curve            is the set of all 
points of efficient exchange. At these points the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is 
equal for all individuals or households. That means for example that individual 1 might 
be willing to give up three    in order to receive one   . In a situation of efficient ex-
change, individual 2 would be willing to exchange at the same terms. If the MRS was 
not the same for all individuals, both would be able to improve their situation by ex-
change.
366
 
4.2.2.1 Uncertainty 
In the case of uncertainty, production and consumption or exchange and consumption 
do not happen instantaneously, but there is an ex ante state before the actual state of the 
world        out of all possible states of the world) is revealed and an ex post state 
after it has been revealed. The question arises whether an ex ante efficient allocation is 
also ex post efficient. This issue is to be discussed in this chapter.
367
 
Given an allocation  , household h can consume   
  under the state of the world  . The 
resulting utility of household h is   , h = 1, 2, . . . ,   . ‘An allocation   is ex-ante 
Pareto-efficient if it is feasible and there is no other feasible allocation   
  with associ-
ated utility levels   , h = 1, 2, . . . ,    such that, for all h,  
      (4.16) 
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  Cf. Gravelle & Rees, p. 283. 
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  Following Cowell, pp. 250-2. 
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with strict inequality for at least one h.’368 Using subjective probability weights   
  and 
expectations about utility     , condition 4.16 can be transformed to: 
   
       
        
   
   
    (4.17) 
Condition 4.17 states that an allocation is ex-ante efficient if there is no other  
allocation with a higher expected utility. ‘The allocation   is ex-post Pareto-efficient  
if there is no other feasible allocation a with associated utility levels 
   =      
  , h = 1, 2, . . . ,    such that, for all h, and all   : 
     
        
     (4.18) 
with strict inequality for at least one h.’369 
Comparing 4.17 and 4.18 it follows that ‘[i]f there is no state of the world which is re-
garded by any household as impossible, then any ex-ante Pareto-efficient allocation 
must also be ex-post Pareto-efficient.’370 It does not follow, however, that every ex-post 
Pareto-efficient allocation must have been ex-ante Pareto-efficient. 
This approach assumes firstly that probabilities and secondly that all possible states of 
the world are known. If it is reasonable to doubt these assumptions, the analysis does 
not hold. 
4.2.2.2 Efficiency and Utility Maximisation 
If     is the amount of commodity i consumed by individual j, and 
    
                   is the utility that an arbitrary individual 1 derives from the con-
sumption of his commodity bundle, then Pareto-efficiency requires: 
 
 
                                                 
368
  Cowell, p. 251 (emphasis added). 
369
  Ibid., (emphasis added). 
370
  Ibid. 
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                     . 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
 
(4.21) 
The utility function of individual 1 is to be maximised without a loss in utility of any 
other individual 2, . . . , m.
371
 
Thus efficiency implies utility maximisation. 
4.2.3 Efficient Output Mix 
In a society that is economically efficient, there is no way to reorganise with the effect 
of making at least one individual better off without making any other worse off.
372
 For 
this to be the case it is not sufficient that production is technically efficient. For exam-
ple, in a society of tea drinkers, it would not be efficient to produce lots of coffee and no 
tea, even though coffee production might be technically efficient.
373
 In addition to tech-
nical and distributive efficiency it is necessary that those services and commodities are 
being produced that are being demanded by consumers. Otherwise it would still be pos-
sible to make individuals better off without making any other worse off.
374
 The technical 
term for this condition is that the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) has to be equal 
to the marginal rate of substitution (MRS). If this requirement is not fulfilled, then 
households would for example be willing to give up more    for    than it costs to pro-
duce    in terms of   .
375
 
4.2.3.1 Competitive Equilibrium and Total Surplus 
In a competitive equilibrium, consumer and producer and thus total-surplus are at a 
maximum. Consumer surplus is defined as the sum of the summed up differences be-
                                                 
371
  Cf. W. J. Baumol, Economic theory and operations analysis, 4
th
 ed., Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1977, 
pp. 502-3. 
372
  Cf. Shubik, pp. 123-4. 
373
  Cf. Baumol, Economic theory, p. 503. 
374
  Cf. Schumann, p. 276. 
375
  Cf. Gravelle & Rees, pp. 286-8. 
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tween consumers’ willingness to pay and the market prices and thus the area between 
        and the demand curve (shaded in light grey) in figure 12.  
Figure 12: Total Surplus 
 
Source: Cf. N. G. Mankiw, Principles of microeconomics, 
3
rd
 ed., South Western, Mason, 2004, p. 149. 
Producer surplus is defined as the summed up differences between the marginal costs of 
producers and the market price and thus the area between         and the supply curve 
(shaded in dark grey). Total surplus AEB is at its maximum at the market price    with 
the equilibrium quantity   . It is not possible to increase total surplus further by either 
increasing or decreasing  . Also it is not possible to increase either consumer surplus or 
producer surplus without decreasing the other by changing  . It follows that the com-
petitive equilibrium is efficient in terms of total surplus.
376
 
4.2.3.2 Competitive Equilibrium and Efficiency 
In a competitive general equilibrium all three requirements for economic efficiency are 
fulfilled: Firstly, production is technically efficient; that is, the MRTS is equal for all 
production processes. Secondly, the distribution is efficient, so there is no alternative 
distribution of production that is a Pareto-improvement; that is, the MRS is equal for all 
households and thirdly, it is being produced what is being demanded, which means the 
output mix is efficient or the MRS is equal to the MRT.
377
 Economic efficiency is given 
only if all three conditions are fulfilled. 
                                                 
376
  Cf. N. G. Mankiw, Principles of microeconomics, 3
rd
 ed., South Western, Mason, 2004, pp. 149-50. 
377
  Cf. Gravelle & Rees, pp. 293-6. 
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Figure 13: Competitive Equilibrium 
 
Source: Based on Breyer, p. 204. 
Figure 13 shows such a situation. Production takes place on the transformation curve  , 
which stands for technical efficiency. Also at the equilibrium point   , the MRT (slope 
of  ) is equal to the MRS, which means that what is being produced is what is being 
demanded and finally, exchange is efficient, since the MRS is equal in point F for both 
depicted households    and   .
378
 
4.3 Comparative Economic Systems 
So far it has been argued that the marginal conditions describe a state of technical, dis-
tributive and output mix efficiency. Elsewhere it has been asserted that these marginal 
conditions are formulated without any relation to a certain economic system.
379
 This 
chapter (4.3) analyses in how far the role of the concept of efficiency varies in different 
economic systems and considers for this purpose the cases of a market economy and a 
centrally planned economy. It will be shown what the function of an economic system 
is, in what sense this relates to the concept of efficiency and whether both the market 
                                                 
378
  Cf. Mas-Colell, p. 564, and cf. Besanko & Braeutigam, pp. 628-9. 
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economy and the centrally planned economy, can fulfil the requirements for economic 
systems equally well. 
It has to be noted that the aim of this chapter is not to give a comprehensive comparison 
of two economic systems, but simply to analyse the role of the concept of efficiency in 
them. To ask this is not equivalent to the question which one of the systems is more ef-
ficient. An answer to this kind of question would best be found by an empirical study. 
This chapter, however, does not attempt an empirical comparison, but is an analysis of 
the role of efficiency in market and centrally planned economies. 
4.3.1 Introducing Market and Centrally Planned Systems 
An economic system is ‘the set of institutional arrangements used to allocate scarce 
resources’380 and thus the entirety of laws, information and coordination mechanisms, 
aims, behavioural patterns and incentive arrangements that govern the functioning of an 
economy
381
. The economic system can be distinguished in terms of the coordination 
mechanism (central vs. decentral), property rights (private ownership vs. collective or 
state ownership) and incentive arrangements (tradition vs. self-interest vs. coercion).
382
 
Here the distinction is mainly being made between one economic system with central 
planning and one with decentral planning. The distinction in terms of property rights is 
not decisive in this context and will be neglected unless otherwise noted. Incentive ar-
rangements will play a major role in chapters 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. There it will be assumed 
that in both systems self-interested motives prevail. 
As the name implies, in the market economy, markets coordinate the activities of deci-
sion making units, using the forces of supply and demand.
383
 Such systems are charac-
terised by freedom of consumption and freedom of production. Freedom of consump-
tion means that individuals can decide freely, which products to consume in which 
quantities and in which qualities, confined only by their income. Freedom of production 
                                                 
379
  Cf. Schumann, p. 276. 
380
  Gregory & Stuart, p. 3. 
381
  Cf. U. Baßeler et al., Grundlagen und Probleme der Volkswirtschaft, 19
th
 ed., Schäffer-Poeschel, 
Stuttgart, 2010, p. 26, and cf. Gregory & Stuart, p. 22. 
382
  Cf. Baßeler, p. 27. 
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  Cf. Gregory & Stuart, pp. 20-1. 
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means that the producing units decide themselves which products to produce and which 
technologies to use. Coordination is thus organised by means of a free price system.
384
 
The foundations of market systems in terms of social theory and philosophy are to be 
found in the classical, English Liberalism formulated by Smith, Ricardo or Mill.
385
 As a 
critique of absolutism, it envisions a society which is not based on values, laws and in-
stitutions, laid down by ‘those above’; that is, clergy, nobility, state, etc. Rather, society 
is supposed to evolve spontaneously, by acts of autonomous and free persons. Liberal-
ism does not only reckon such a society to be possible but to be even more productive 
than a centrally dictated and controlled order.
386
 
According to this concept, human acts are not socially productive or morally desirable, 
because they are in accordance with ideal norms and ends, but because they are being 
approved of by other members of society, who are equally imperfect and self-
interested.
387
 
A centrally planned economy is one in which all economic activity is organised on the 
basis of plans that have been formulated by a central planning board. The simplest form 
of this type is a Robinson-economy (or Eigenwirtschaft), with only one individual or 
family.
388
 In this case, the head of the family plans all economic activity and delegates 
work according to everybody’s capabilities and disposability.389 Obviously in this sense, 
planning also takes place in market economies. Households and enterprises are usually 
organised according to this hierarchical principle and are in need of planning just as 
well.
390
 The difference between market economies and centrally planned economies is 
                                                 
384
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thus not that in one case planning takes place and in the other it does not, but that in 
market economies, planning takes place only decentrally in the household or enterprise 
itself and in the centrally planned economy, planning takes place in the central planning 
board, binding for all individual entities. 
There are three forms of centrally planned economies possible: (i) the totally centrally 
planned economy, (ii) the centrally planned economy with free exchange of consump-
tion goods and (iii) the centrally planned economy with free consumer choice. In the 
first case of the totally centrally planned economy, both the use of productive resources 
and the use of consumption goods are centrally determined. In the second case, with 
free exchange of consumption goods, in addition to (i), centrally distributed goods can 
be freely exchanged among consumers. Finally with free consumer choice (iii), only the 
use of productive resources is centrally planned. Individuals can freely choose, what to 
consume, restricted only by their income.
391
 In this chapter a centrally planned economy 
of type (iii); that is, one with free consumer choice, is assumed. However, this distinc-
tion is of no major importance for the purposes of this chapter, since free consumer 
choice in a centrally planned economy is not equal to full consumer sovereignty, as will 
have to be shown in chapter 4.3.3. This case assumes the existence of money and prices, 
but since they will have to be centrally fixed, this does not have the same implications 
as in market economies. It should be noted, that a centrally planned economy is not 
equal to one in which there is no private property. Such a combination of central ad-
ministration and collective ownership is possible (Soviet Union) but not necessary, as 
the case of Germany in the years from 1936-1945 illustrates. Private ownership of the 
means of production was not abolished, but disposal over private property was re-
strained.
392
 Here, limited private ownership is assumed to justify the assumption of self-
interested behaviour patterns in both economic systems. Furthermore, planning is un-
derstood as the ‘method’ of a well-intentioned dictator or government. This chapter is 
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not concerned with the presumably socialist ‘ends’ of left or right-wing political re-
gimes.
393
 
The idea of central economic planning arises from the critique of the capitalist market 
mechanism. The market is seen as wasteful. In contrast to central planning, the market 
is regarded as unable to determine precisely the input of resources that is necessary for 
an optimal satisfaction of wants. Rather the outcomes of markets are haphazard and can 
only be right by chance. Furthermore, the market mechanism leads to the isolation of 
individuals, frequent economic crises, mass unemployment and a wasteful use of scarce 
resources.
394
 The overcoming of the ‘anarchy of the market’ is seen as an act of libera-
tion of the human race. Friedrich Engels wrote:  
‘Die Anarchie innerhalb der gesellschaftlichen Produktion wird ersetzt durch planmäßige bewußte Orga-
nisation. Der Kampf ums Einzeldasein hört auf. Damit erst scheidet der Mensch, in gewissem Sinn, end-
gültig aus dem Tierreich, tritt aus tierischen Daseinsbedingungen in wirkliche menschliche . . . Erst von 
da an werden die Menschen ihre Geschichte in vollem Bewußtsein selbst machen, erst von da an werden 
die von ihnen in Bewegung gesetzten gesellschaftlichen Ursachen vorwiegend und in stets steigendem 
Maß auch die von ihnen gewollten Wirkungen haben. Es ist der Sprung der Menschheit aus dem Reich 
der Notwendigkeit in das Reich der Freiheit.’395 
To compare economic systems, one has to be clear about the criteria by which the sys-
tems ought to be judged. According to Walter Eucken, ‘in either case [,whether centrally 
planned or market economy,] the aim is to provide for certain needs by combining 
means of production and labour supplies for productive purposes.’396 If this is true, then 
that economic system is preferable which leads one of two equally endowed economies 
to produce more goods. This hints to the notion that the most preferable economic sys-
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tem is one which is more efficient. ‘A society is economically efficient if there is no 
way to reorganize which can make any individual better off without making at least one 
other individual worse off.’397 This statement shows that the matter of efficiency is more 
complex than simply to ask, which economy is more productive. But an even more gen-
eral question arises as to where do you get your criteria from, with which you assess 
economic systems? Every comparison of economic systems requires a criterion or norm 
according to which the systems ought to be compared. The choice of this criterion is 
necessarily a value judgement, since it is not possible to arrive at it by solely scientific 
means. It follows that every assessment of economic systems and institutions regarding 
their desirability involves a value judgement. It is possible to say, ‘economic system A is 
more efficient than system B’, without introducing any value judgement. However, it is 
not possible to conclude that ‘since economic system A is more efficient than system B, 
A is preferable to B’, as a value free statement.398 Of course, this gets even more diffi-
cult, if you use multiple criteria. Then there is only one case in which it is possible to 
come to a conclusion without any further complications and that is when one system 
ranks highest according to all criteria. It has to be expected, however, that different eco-
nomic systems perform better or worse depending on the criteria. Then the choice of 
criteria is still value laden, but in addition you would also need to form a scale of pref-
erences in order to determine which indicators have a higher priority.
399
 That involves 
further value judgements. 
As has already been noted, this chapter does not attempt to give a conclusive assessment 
of centrally planned and market economies, neither does it try to establish the concept 
of efficiency as the sole criterion for such an assessment. The aim is rather to analyse 
the role of the concept of efficiency in both systems and to highlight differences. 
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4.3.2 The Function of an Economic System 
What is the function of an economic system? The three main questions every economic 
system has to answer are: (i) What is to be produced, (ii) how is it going to be produced 
and (iii) for who is it going to be produced?
400
 
The question of how corresponds to technical efficiency. If an economic system solves 
this problem successfully then the economy produces on the transformation-curve. This 
condition is captured in the requirement that the MRTS has to be equal for all produc-
tion processes. For who should be produced is equivalent to the issue of distributive 
efficiency; that is, the question of efficient exchange. If this is successfully dealt with, 
then no more Pareto-improvements are possible by exchange of consumption goods and 
the economy is on the contract curve of the Edgeworth-box of exchanges. That means 
that the MRS has to be equal for all households. Finally, what should be produced, ad-
dresses the problem of an efficient output mix. In order to work economically efficient, 
it is not only necessary that production takes place in a technically efficient way and 
that the output is distributed in a Pareto-efficient way, but that the output meets the pref-
erences of the consumers. This is expressed in the third marginal condition that the 
MRS ought to be equal to the MRT.
401
 
The next step is to present how centrally planned and market economies attempt to an-
swer these three central questions of every economic system. 
In a market economy the coordination takes place by the price mechanism. It ensures 
that demand and supply are equalised.
402
 The function of the price mechanism is three-
fold: Firstly, it serves as a mechanism for communicating information. Via the price 
system it is possible for every economic agent to ‘act according to an infinite amount of 
information that is not directly known’403 to himself. The consumer for example does 
not have to be aware of production techniques, innovations, crop failures, political dis-
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turbances in remote economies, the price system provides all necessary information for 
the consumption decision.
404
 Secondly, the price system serves as an incentive mecha-
nism:
 
It encourages the supply of productive resources and induces changes of behav-
iour. Finally, the price mechanism fulfils the task of coordinating the (primary) distribu-
tion of income.
405
 In a market economy freedom of consumption and freedom of 
production prevail. This means that consumers decide themselves what to consume 
within their own budget and producers decide independently, what and how to pro-
duce.
406
 
Thus the decisions what, how and for who is to be produced in a market economy are 
being made as follows: Consumers decide what should be produced.
407
 Bringing their 
purchasing power to the market, they influence the production decisions of producers 
decisively.
408
 How production takes place is being decided upon by the competition on 
factor markets.
409
 In order to maximise their profits, producers attempt to combine pro-
ductive resources in an efficient way, according to their prices that have been deter-
mined on the factor markets. 
Finally, the question of for who is to be produced is decided by the preferences of the 
households and their incomes according to supply and demand on the factor markets.
410
 
Incomes are determined as prices for factors of production, and according to neoclassi-
cal theory they are equivalent to the productive contribution of each factor.
411
 However, 
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in most market economies, the distribution of income usually deviates from the pure 
merit principle by redistribution.
412
 
In a centrally planned economy coordination does not take place by decentral planning 
of the individual actors on markets, but is exercised by a central planning board. Thus 
the decisions, what, how and for who to produce are exercised not by the market but by 
bureaucrats and politicians.
413
 The equalisation of supply and demand takes place with 
the use of budgeted balance sheets rather than by prices:
414
 In a first step, enterprises 
send data to the central planning board (e.g. stock and demand for employees, raw ma-
terials, preliminary products and other productive resources). Then the planning board 
compiles budgeted balance sheets that try to form a consistent plan of how to produce 
the required quantities of goods and services. After that inputs are allocated to produc-
tion processes in the balance sheets. Subsequently the plans are checked for consistency 
and the budgeted balance sheets are revised until the ultimate plan for all enterprises of 
the economy is finalised.
415
 
Whereas in market economies consumers themselves determine what ought to be pro-
duced, in centrally planned economies, the planning authorities do. In theory the thereby 
produced bundle of goods does not have to be different from that of a market economy. 
However, one could presume that the decision of what to produce is influenced by the 
interest of the planning board itself and a social preference function that would also con-
tain the preferences of consumers,
416
 but would be biased towards certain goods as for 
example armament.
417
 Also, whereas in market economies production must meet a de-
mand backed by purchasing power and consequently the supply side has to react to the 
demand side, that is not the case in centrally planned economies. The central planning 
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board cannot only amend production to the needs of the consumers, but can also amend 
the consumption side, by for instance rationing, halting of construction works, etc.
418
 
The matter of how to produce is an interplay of technology requirements, producers and 
the planning authorities. Producers report their endowments and requirements to the 
planning board which bases its decisions on these data. The central planning board allo-
cates resources to the enterprises and can pursue political aims by this (e.g. expansion or 
contraction of sectors). Furthermore, producers in their production process are limited 
by technology requirements, have to fulfil the predetermined plan and try to minimise 
their own efforts. Overall, the logic of markets and input prices play only a limited role 
in the choice of an input mix.
419
 
Also in centrally planned systems, income is distributed according to merit (for who).
420
 
The biggest difference to market economies in this context is the view that only labour 
is productive and should receive income, based on Marx’ labour theory of value. In 
practice this is not consistently carried out, however, since usually interest is paid on 
bank deposit and credits and there is a charge to a production fund that can be seen as a 
rate of return on capital.
421
 In socialism, of course, in the final stage of ‘communism 
sensu stricto’, distribution is not based on the contribution of every labourer, but on the 
principle ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!’422 Al-
though centrally planned economies try to distribute income according to individual 
performances, other goods such as university places, leading positions in enterprises and 
politics, etc. are often rather distributed according to loyalty to the system and political 
achievements.
423
 In terms of the distribution of personal income distribution a more 
equitable result is to be expected than in market economies.
424
 With regard to the distri-
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bution of resources among consumption and investment, a clear bias to the latter is 
likely. In fact, centrally planned economies very often aim at maximum investment. 
Therefore, the planning board would not distribute fewer resources to consumption than 
is necessary to keep the productivity of labour stable, but it would also not distribute 
more resources to the consumer goods industry as is necessary, in order to maximise 
investment. It follows that labour receives a subsistence minimum of food, clothing and 
labour which is sufficient for the desired level of labour productivity.
425
 
In this discussion the question has been left open as to whether simply real goods are 
distributed or if consumers receive a monetary income with which they can freely 
choose between goods. For the purpose of this chapter, this does not make a big differ-
ence. Even if the planning authorities fix prices on which consumers can base their con-
sumption decisions, these prices would neither be able to fulfil their functions as incen-
tives nor as an information system, since they would not effectively reflect scarcity 
relations and would often be (welfare-)politically biased.
426
 Also the price system in a 
centrally planned economy would not ensure consumer sovereignty. Because firstly, the 
planning board would have already determined which goods have to be produced, prior 
to the consumption decision. Secondly, the consumer is not the ‘king’ in centrally 
planned systems, since enterprises do not have to compete for buyers and are neither 
forced to sell their goods nor to meet certain quality standards
427
 or supply particularly 
appealing products. 
The ideal of central planning is ‘the swiftest possible central mobilisation of all avail-
able resources’428, which has three different aspects: (i) output (target) maximisation, 
(ii) input minimisation and (iii) inventory minimisation.
429
 Planning, accordingly, aims 
at a general plan equilibrium, a concept that stands for a situation in which no marginal 
unit of any good can be reallocated in order to yield a higher marginal utility. Or in 
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other words, the marginal utility of every good has to be equal in all uses.
430
 Conse-
quently efficiency is also an ideal of central planning.
431
 An efficient plan would then 
mean that no reallocations of factors are possible that lead to a higher output in one sec-
tor without reducing output in other sectors. Since all information the planning board 
has, necessarily needs to be simplified and aggregated, no central plan can ever be fully 
efficient in this sense. A more realistic concept might be the efficient use of information. 
Here, information is treated as given and the planning authorities attempt to formulate 
the best possible plan.
432
 Clearly this concept corresponds more to consistency than op-
timality.
433
 
This discussion makes it clear that both centrally planned and market economies aim at 
efficiency. Nevertheless reality in both systems might prove to be different. A compari-
son of the role of the concept of efficiency in these two economic systems thus has to be 
particularly concerned with their reality, rather than with the ideal form of the system.
434
 
In the next chapter this will be done in an analytical, rather than an empirical way. 
4.3.3 Market Failure vs. Plan Failure 
Although the market is a very efficient mechanism, market economies are affected by 
often fundamental market failures. Centrally planned economies also aim at efficiency, 
its coordination mechanism, however, has several defects. This fact is captured by the 
term plan failures. This chapter will at first analyse the former and then the latter. 
The most important market failures (in a broad sense) are: (i) imperfect consumer sov-
ereignty, (ii) public and merit goods, (iii) externalities, (iv) market power, (v) disequilib-
ria, economic crises and underemployment, (vi) inequalities and poverty. 
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For economic efficiency consumer sovereignty is required. Even in market economies 
this is not fully realised. Consumers are constantly influenced
435
 for example by the 
marketing measures of private enterprises. Furthermore, democratic governments also 
often influence the decision of what should be produced,
436
 for example out of welfare 
political motivations. 
Public and merit goods are goods that are not sufficiently supplied by the market, since 
they are nonrival in consumption, for example national defence. Once a public good is 
in place, another person’s cost of consuming it is zero.437 An efficient supply of public 
goods cannot be guaranteed by the market, but only by state intervention. 
A similar problem is the existence of externalities,
438
 situations in which market transac-
tions have effects on individuals who did not participate in the transaction. In conse-
quence, social and private costs or benefits of the consumption of goods differ. If a posi-
tive externality prevails, less than the efficient amount of a good is supplied by the 
market. If negative externalities exist, from the point of view of the society, more than 
the efficient amount of a good is being consumed.
439
 For example air pollution implies 
social costs that do not enter into the production decision of private enterprises, and 
consequently natural resources are overused. Certainly externalities are a problem in 
market economies, but one can assume that it is not exclusively an issue of any particu-
lar economic system and is therefore an equally grave problem in centrally planned 
economies.
440
 
Perfect competition is a prerequisite for several aspects of efficiency. The reality of 
market economies is often one of oligopolies and monopolies.
441
 The consequences of 
market power are prices above and produced quantities below the competitive level. 
Hence less productive resources are allocated to sectors of imperfect competition than 
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would be efficient. These resources will either be employed in industries in which their 
marginal yield is less or are left unemployed.
442
 
Disequilibria and economic crises are prevalent in market systems.
443
 These phenomena 
lead to the shrinkage of output and widespread unemployment of productive re-
sources.
444
 The idleness of productive resources, especially of labour is paradoxical, 
since ‘[o]ne set of people is short of goods, another, it may be the same set, is short of 
work that might produce the goods’445. Some authors argue that centrally planned sys-
tems can avoid such inefficiencies.
446
 
Only consumers with purchasing power can influence the production process in a mar-
ket economy.
447
 Since post-tax available income is usually very uneven, the purchasing 
power of the rich has the biggest impact on production decisions. Productive resources 
are thus directed to the satisfaction of the less urgent needs of the rich (e.g. luxury 
goods) and not sufficiently to the basic and most urgent needs of the poor (e.g. nutrition, 
housing, and education).
448
 Since the purchasing power is very uneven, the demand 
price does not reflect the relative urgency of the needs of different consumers. Produc-
tive resources are inefficiently allocated and the maximum social welfare is not at-
tained.
449
 Inequalities in market systems therefore lead to technical inefficiencies (mis-
allocation of productive resources) and economic inefficiencies (the impairment of 
consumer sovereignty). 
There are many forms of plan failure, one could in fact mention innumerable deficien-
cies of centrally planned systems. In the following I will sum up the most important 
aspects into nine points: (i) information problems, (ii) incentive problems, (iii) control 
and enforcement problems, (iv) the influence of politics, (v) allocation problems (vi) 
adaptivity and flexibility, (vii) innovation problems, (viii) externalities, (ix) black mar-
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kets. Some of these problem sets cannot be separated accurately, nevertheless they de-
scribe distinct phenomena. 
Points (i) up to (iii) for example, are interconnected. In spite of that fact, all three points 
are dealt with separately, where (i) stands for the problem of the existence, finding and 
computation processes of information, whereas (ii) is not concerned with the incentives 
to give or to use information but with incentives to merit. And while (ii) is a bottom-up 
perspective, (iii) means rather the perspective of the planning board and thus a top-down 
approach. I will now turn to each category in detail. 
In order to make reasonable planning decisions the planning board needs information 
about the available resources, the optimal production techniques and the preferences of 
the consumers.
450
 It can obtain this information only with the help of the consumers and 
enterprises.
451
 Several difficulties emerge: Firstly, the information might not be avail-
able at all.
452
 Consumers for example might not be able to formulate their needs of the 
coming planning period in advance. Also the incentives to transfer correct information 
are flawed.
453
 Presumably consumers might be reluctant to reveal their real preferences 
for instance for goods like Viagra, psychotherapy, critical literature, etc. Incentives for 
enterprises to transfer realistic information are malfunctioning as well, which will be-
come clear after the discussion of ‘soft plans’. Apart from that, asymmetric information 
prevails between the planning board and the enterprises. Individual enterprises will al-
ways have an advantage over the planning authorities since they have much better in-
sight into internal production processes.
454
 Furthermore, only quantitative information 
can be transferred to the planning board, qualitative information as changes in technol-
ogy, skills of workers, etc. are problematic in this respect.
455
 The available data will be 
very complex and given the limited capacities of any planning authority,
456
 only very 
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rough, aggregated data will be dealt with.
457
 It follows that the data over which the 
planning authorities command will be flawed from the start.
458
 Even taking the data as 
given it is questionable whether the planning board with its limitations and the costs of 
data processing, will be able to build an efficient plan from the available information. In 
market economies these information problems are solved with the use of market 
prices.
459
 
‘An incentive mechanism should induce participants at lower levels (agents) to fulfil the 
directives of participants at higher levels (principals).’460 Such a mechanism is neces-
sary since bureaucrats, households, and managers all have different interests,
461
 and 
neither is identical with the public interest. The central plan for an economy has the 
characteristics of a law. Plan fulfilment is thus regulated by law. In addition there are 
monetary incentives for the fulfilment and over-fulfilment of the plan in form of bo-
nuses.
462
 Consequently managers and households pursue the maximisation of bonuses. 
Since bonuses can amount to 50 to 70 percent of income they play a central role in the 
budgets of households. In many centrally planned economies bonuses became a quasi-
permanent part of income and many households relied on receiving bonus payments.
463
 
This also means that managements are under constant pressure from ‘above’ and ‘be-
low’ to earn bonuses by plan fulfilment. The central planning board exercises pressure 
on directors as do the workers.
464
 At the same time a company’s management is in-
volved in the plan forming process, which leads to the formulation of ‘soft plans’.465 
Managements have an incentive to work towards low targets in the plan of the next pe-
riod, in order to be able to fulfil the future plan easily. The same incentives are at work 
in the context of inventories and capacities. If plan fulfilment is already achieved, man-
agers will aim at increasing inventories rather than present production. Also there is a 
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tendency to install spare capacities, which will make it easier to reach higher targets in 
the future. The strongest incentive is towards a small over-fulfilment of the current plan. 
In that case managements and workers receive their bonuses and at the same time they 
prevent receiving significantly higher target values for the future. 
Furthermore the formulation of target values is problematic. Planners can for example 
either set the target to produce a particular number of nails or to set the target in terms 
of the total weight of all nails produced. In the former case the enterprise will try to pro-
duce particularly small nails and in the latter to produce particularly heavy nails, in both 
cases to reach the target as easily as possible.
466
 Consequently in centrally planned 
economies those enterprises are rewarded which fulfil a plan, the softer the better, in-
stead of those enterprises which work economically and produce according to consum-
ers’ needs. That holds even if it involves waste of productive resources, lack of innova-
tions and deteriorating quality.
467
 This shows that plan fulfilment is neither equal to cost 
effectiveness
468
 nor to production according to consumers’ preferences469 and thus is not 
equivalent to economic efficiency. 
To sum up the incentive problem, centrally planned economies have firstly multiple cri-
teria (e.g. number of nails, maximum of resources available, etc.) instead of just a single 
measure of success as profitability would be. Secondly, incentives are discontinuous and 
thus lead to a dichotomy between success and failure. Agents will act according to an 
‘all-or-nothing philosophy’470 with the consequence of lethargic behaviour (or even 
building up of inventories) if reaching the targets no longer seems possible any longer 
or irrational spurts in order to fulfil the plan in the last minute.
471
 
Incentives are an automatic sanction mechanism. As has been shown, incentives are 
mainly built on the positive incentive to receive bonuses for plan fulfilment. A negative 
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automatic sanction and enforcement mechanism for the failure to fulfil plans is missing. 
In market economies the ultimate sanction for inefficient behaviour is insolvency.
472
 
Apart from the absence of bonuses, inefficient behaviour can only be sanctioned discre-
tionary. Planning authorities are in no position to judge whether missing the target is 
due to a lack of productive resources, laziness, poor quality of the allocated labour force 
or mistakes of the management. To a certain degree all discretionary sanctions will then 
be arbitrary, since it is neither possible to always sanction failure nor to never sanction 
it. What is more, transfer of wrong data to the planning board cannot be sanctioned 
properly. Mainly those enterprises which have fulfilled the plan have an incentive to 
manipulate the data whereas those which have failed the target cannot hide their failure 
anyway.
473
 This makes it very difficult for the planning authorities to detect fraud in 
data transfer. 
A further problem of the centrally planned system is the influence of politics on the 
economy. Politics favours the short term satisfaction of the needs of consumers with the 
intention of preventing burgeoning discontent. This often happens at the expense of 
measures for the long term consolidation of the economy.
474
 A further result of the in-
fluence of politics on the economy is the bias towards certain goods like public goods, 
defence goods and the socialisation of consumption.
475
 The problem of the influence of 
politics is to be seen as equivalent to the issue of market power in market economies. In 
centrally planned systems, the concentration of power in private hands can be neglected, 
instead economic power is concentrated in the hands of the state.
476
 
For an efficient allocation of resources among other things it is necessary that every 
worker is allocated to that task for which he is trained or for which he is best suited. 
Since in centrally planned economies, workers are compulsorily assigned to certain jobs 
this is unlikely to happen. In addition wage differentials are much less than in market 
systems and thus incentives to attract the best workers are insufficient. And even if 
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wage differentials are significant, they do not automatically correspond to different pur-
chasing powers, due to a lack of available consumer goods. It follows that price and 
income signals do not function as a mechanism to allocate workers to their most produc-
tive use.
477
 
A further aspect that shows how a central plan fails to allocate resources efficiently is 
foreign trade. Central planning by the method of budgeted balance sheets leads to the 
export of goods which are temporarily in excess supply and the import of goods which 
are temporarily in excess demand. Whereas the most efficient way would be to concen-
trate production on goods for which the economy has a competitive cost advantage and 
export them in exchange for goods for which the economy has a competitive cost disad-
vantage.
478
 
The adaptivity and flexibility of the system is a major point of dispute.
479
 According to 
Friedrich A. Hayek it is even one of the most controversial issues between proponents 
and opponents of central economic planning. All economic decisions arise as a conse-
quence of change. If change appears only occasionally then it is feasible to make long 
term plans that are only adjusted once in a while, for example at meetings of the plan-
ning board. But if, however, changes occur frequently, long term planning will fail. 
Only prices which change simultaneously can guarantee fast and correct adjustments of 
the system.
480
 
‘Government creates scarcely anything . . . A government could print a good edition of 
Shakespeare’s work, but it could not get them written.’481 The lack of innovations is a 
major issue in centrally planned economies. Since target values in the central plan are 
increasing from period to period there is an incentive to make the existing production 
processes more and more efficient. Incentives to create something entirely new, how-
ever, are absent.
482
 The planning of innovations would have to take place before the 
                                                 
477
  Cf. Bernholz & Breyer, pp. 202-3. 
478
  Cf. Brown & Neuberger, p. 186. 
479
  Cf. Lampert & Bossert, p. 43. 
480
  Cf. Sik, p. 33. 
481
  Pigou, Socialism versus Capitalism, p. 80. 
482
  Cf. Bernholz & Breyer, pp. 194-5. 
4.  Aspects of Efficiency 100 
 
 
planning of production. Since in reality most innovations occur during the plan realisa-
tion as processes of trial and error, an ex ante consideration of innovations in the plan-
ning process is not possible.
483
 This leads to the paradox that enterprises are not entitled 
to buy goods that are necessary for a newly invented production process on the market. 
Neither are they allowed to sell goods at the market that were not part of the central 
plan.
484
 Whereas in market economies there is an inherent incentive to innovations, 
since they offer the innovator a competitive advantage on the market, in centrally 
planned systems there is even a disincentive to innovations, because innovators have to 
reckon with higher target values in subsequent plans.
485
 In practice, centrally planned 
economies often circumvent their innovative weakness by adapting innovations from 
market economies.
486
 
The problem of externalities is an equally serious issue in centrally planned economies 
as it is in market systems.
487
 One could argue that the empirical lack of environmental 
friendly technology is a disadvantage of centrally planned systems. Power plants in the 
German Democratic Republic for example had to use 70 % more coal in order to pro-
duce the same amount of electricity as power plants in Western Germany.
488
 On the 
other hand, this effect could be counterbalanced by a lesser intensity of production 
processes in centrally planned economies. Overall, it is to be expected that externalities 
are an equally serious problem in both market and centrally planned systems. 
The pressure to fulfil plan requirements at certain deadlines favours the formation of 
illegal black markets. As has been shown, there is a tendency to the marginal over ful-
filment of plans. If a company produced significantly more than was required it has an 
incentive to sell the excess supply on an illegal market rather than bringing the goods to 
the official market in order to avoid higher target values in the subsequent period.
489
 
Even though this practice is unwanted, planning authorities are not interested in bring-
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ing an end to it. Even the planning board is subordinate to a higher level in the hierarchy 
(e.g. the ministry, the dictator) and thus under the pressure to fulfil target values itself. 
Consequently it is interested in as many successful plan fulfilments as possible under its 
supervision. If black markets are conducive to the planning authorities’ own interest, 
they will be ignored.
490
  
4.4 Efficiency and the Economic System 
It remains to draw some conclusions from the analysis of market- and centrally-planned 
economies with respect to the different aspects of the concept of efficiency that have 
been explored in chapter 4.2. As has been shown, efficiency is the ideal of both systems. 
The discussion is supposed to highlight, in how far this is also true in practice; that is, 
considering the above mentioned forms of market and plan failure. Since chapter 4.2 is 
based upon the microeconomics textbook formulations of efficiency (and thus the the-
ory of market economies), the following analysis will speak mainly of the particularities 
of centrally planned systems as deviations from this theoretical background, unless spe-
cifically noted. 
4.4.1 Technical Efficiency – Conclusions 
In market economies, disequilibria, economic crises and unemployment result in a pro-
duction below the production possibilities frontier and thus in a technically inefficient 
situation. Furthermore, market power leads to a reduced production; that is, to addi-
tional technical inefficiencies. 
On the other hand, in centrally planned economies, the information problem means that 
the planning board does not even know what the exact resource endowments of the 
economy are, much less which combinations of factors would be efficient. According to 
the analysed dysfunctions of incentive, control and sanction systems, the planning au-
thorities would not be able to allocate the resource in such a way as to achieve an effi-
cient outcome. And also because of the inappropriate use of foreign trade, the centrally 
planned economy will stay below its production possibilities and therefore in a techni-
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cally inefficient state. One additional point has to be mentioned in terms of the adaptiv-
ity and flexibility of the system. Points on the production possibilities frontier are only 
efficient for a given amount of resources.
491
 Whenever changes for example in the re-
source endowments occur, a centrally planned system is at best able to continue to work 
according to the old plan, which is no longer efficient. Only constantly changing prices 
are able to function as a mechanism for the flexible adaption of the economy to sudden 
changes. 
Also in terms of the efficient input supply and efficient input use the practice of centrally 
planned economies deviates from the textbook economics of chapter 4.2. Firstly, re-
sources are centrally allocated so that the supply decision of the household is a matter of 
obedience to the law rather than an economic decision. Secondly, resources are used 
with the intention of fulfilling the target values, not to maximise profit. Consequently 
resources might be over- or under-used and would only be accidentally used according 
to their marginal productivity (until their marginal utility is equal to their marginal cost). 
The issue of static vs. dynamic efficiency is less clear. The decision, where to produce 
on the transformation curve; that is, how much of the resources to devote to the produc-
tion of consumer goods or to investment, is dominated by consumers in market econo-
mies and by planners or bureaucrats in centrally planned economies.
492
 Consumers are 
likely to be biased towards consumer goods, whereas decision makers in centrally 
planned economies have repeatedly shown to be biased towards investment. In fact, 
they usually aim at the maximisation of investment.
493
 One could therefore assume that 
centrally planned systems would rank higher in terms of dynamic efficiency. However, 
there are several countervailing effects. Firstly, incentives do not work towards the 
maximisation of the actual production, but to the minimisation of production require-
ments,
494
 which hinders dynamic efficiency. Secondly, it has been shown that there is a 
lack of innovation in centrally planned systems, which also tends to countervail the high 
investment rate of centrally planned economies. 
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The economic system seems to make a difference even in terms of the efficient scale of 
enterprises. Economies of scale and standardisation make the process of central plan-
ning easier and at the same time competition loses its central role. Hence, the optimal 
size of the firm tends to be larger than in market economies.
495
 
A price system in a centrally planned economy, will consist of more or less strictly fixed 
prices. It follows that the price system does neither represent utility valuations of con-
sumers nor effective scarcity or cost relationships. As a consequence, the price system is 
not able to serve as the basis for utility maximisation and cost minimisation.
496
 Without 
an effective price system centrally planned economies cannot achieve the maximisation 
of utility and the minimisation of costs as the market economy does (cf. chapter 4.2.1.5). 
4.4.2 Distributive Efficiency – Conclusions 
Given the higher frequency of state interventions, centrally planned economies are 
likely to have a more equal distribution of income than market systems.
497
 But that does 
not hinder distributive efficiency understood as Pareto-efficiency. Consumers can 
choose and exchange goods freely, market prices indicate scarcity relations and there-
fore all possible Pareto-improvements can be attained by the consumers. 
The discussion of the information problem in centrally planned economies makes clear 
that planning boards cannot know the true preferences of consumers. An administered 
distribution can therefore not constitute an efficient one. If consumers are allowed to 
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exchange assigned goods among each other they would be able to realise some possible 
Pareto-improvements. That of course does first of all not mean that consumers get what 
they need (in terms of perfect consumer sovereignty) and secondly, it is unlikely that all 
possible Pareto-improvements will be realised. Exchange processes between individual 
households will take place locally so that different exchange relations will come into 
existence at different places. Furthermore, consumers will not be aware of the complete 
variety of supplied goods, for example at remote locations of the economy and in par-
ticular would not be able to attain, oversee and compute all the relevant information that 
would be expressed in competitive prices. If the planning board sets administered 
prices, they would not effectively express scarcity relations and therefore they could not 
bring about efficient distributions. Queuing, rationing and an excess supply of undesired 
goods would prevent efficiency. 
Often the state intervenes in order to bring about a politically desired distribution. Espe-
cially some goods, for example jobs in leading positions, university places and luxury 
goods would regularly be distributed according to one’s loyalty to the system, particular 
political merits etc., instead of being distributed according to merit.
498
 
What has been said about the adaptivity and flexibility in the context of technical effi-
ciency is also relevant for distributive efficiency. If changes in the economy occur, cen-
trally planned systems are forced to continue to work according to the old plan in the 
short run. The distribution that resulted from the old plan is no longer efficient, how-
ever. This problem would be solved by a system of free, competitive prices in market 
economies. New relative prices would form and the distribution of goods would change 
according to these new prices. A centrally planned economy can only react by changing 
the central plan, which will take time and at least until then, distribution will remain 
inefficient. 
Finally, black markets do in fact help to realise an efficient distribution since they make 
further Pareto-improvements possible. Nevertheless they are of course not desired by 
the state, probably because they hint at dysfunctions of the system. 
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4.4.3 Efficient Output Mix – Conclusions 
As has been discussed in chapter 4.3.3 consumer sovereignty is imperfect even in mar-
ket economies. Hence, consumers do not necessarily get to consume what they really 
desire. Also market power and inequalities add to this. Big international corporate 
groups have a high influence on the consumer and conversely households with particu-
larly high purchasing power have a much greater influence on production decisions of 
enterprises than have those with lower incomes. 
Moreover, the existence of public and merit goods as well as externalities means that 
markets do not lead to an efficient output mix without the intervention of the state. The 
problem of externalities exists in both kinds of systems. In centrally planned economies, 
however, several other aspects have to be considered as well. The information problem 
for instance means that the planning board does not know the actual preferences of the 
consumers and can therefore not decide what to produce in an economically efficient 
way. 
Besides, there are incentives to fulfil the central plan. But that is not identical with in-
centives to produce as desired by the market or consumers, respectively. The state has 
different interests than individual households. Whenever the state interferes with the 
market, it often leads to a bias of production towards certain goods (e.g. armament). 
In a standard neoclassical framework, the number of choices available to the consumer 
does not specifically enter into the definition of efficiency. If the consumer, however, 
values a variety of possibilities, it could be argued that the lack of product innovations 
in centrally planned systems diminishes economic efficiency, since it does not produce 
what consumers desire. 
4.5 Final Remarks 
It has been shown that the three main aspects of the overall concept of economic effi-
ciency are technical efficiency, distributive efficiency and efficiency of the output mix. 
Economic efficiency in the comprehensive sense is given only if all three aspects are 
fulfilled. These three aspects of efficiency are closely related to the three questions that 
every economic system tries to answer: how to produce (technical efficiency), for who 
to produce (distributive efficiency) and what to produce (efficient output mix). 
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Both market and centrally planned systems strive for the ideal of efficiency. In practice, 
however, market failures and plan failures exist, which hinder the achievement of eco-
nomic efficiency. The price mechanism of market economies seems to be a very effec-
tive remedy for many problems of centrally planned systems. 
Having the strength of market systems in terms of efficiency in mind, there must be 
other values and norms that lead decision makers to the formation of centrally planned 
systems or to speak with Ludwig van Mises
499
:  
‘The knowledge of the fact that rational economic activity is impossible in a socialist commonwealth 
cannot, of course, be used as an argument either for or against socialism. Whoever is prepared himself to 
enter upon socialism on ethical grounds on the supposition that the provision of goods of a lower order 
for human beings under a system of a common ownership of the means of production is diminished, or 
whoever is guided by ascetic ideals in his desire for socialism, will not allow himself to be influenced in 
his endeavours by what we have said . . . But he who expects a rational economic system from socialism 
will be forced to re-examine his views.’500 
This chapter could not deal with competing motives behind economic systems besides 
efficiency. It is clear, however, that also market systems consider values and norms 
aside from pure economic efficiency. According to Friedrich August Hayek, for exam-
ple, the main problem of centrally planned systems is not that planning leads to ineffi-
ciency, but that it leads to ‘serfdom’. Central planning is therefore a contradiction to 
democracy, since democracy ‘is an obstacle to the suppression of freedom which the 
direction of economic activities requires.’501 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
499
  He speaks of ‘socialism’ instead of ‘central planning’. But in the context of this quotation, both terms 
are interchangeable. 
500
  L. von Mises, ‘Economic calculation in the socialist commonwealth’, in N. G. Pierson & F. A. von 
Hayek (ed.), Collectivist economic planning, 6
th
 ed., Routledge, London, 1963, p. 130. 
501
  F. A. von Hayek, The road to serfdom, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1944, p. 70. 
5.  The Concept of Justice in the History of Economic Thought 107 
 
 
5 The Concept of Justice  
in the History of Economic Thought 
5.1 Introduction 
‘Is there a just distribution of economic goods?’502 In 1894 Gustav Schmoller observed 
a renaissance of the question of justice in the public debate
503
 and we could equally well 
come to the same conclusion today. Few issues are similarly prevalent in contemporary 
public discourse. Be it the question of justice and public deficits
504
 or the alleged social 
injustice of a limit to public debt
505
, the justness of collective wage agreements
506
 and 
managerial salaries
507
, the discussion about the euro-zone rescue pact,
508
 debates about 
income distribution
509
 and reforms of the tax system
510
 or the decision of the European 
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Court of Justice to demand equal insurance premiums for men and women
511
, the con-
cept of justice is on the public agenda. What do economists contribute to this? Surpris-
ingly little. Just to give an impression: Two particularly popular textbooks on micro- 
and macroeconomics by Hal R. Varian and Olivier Blanchard, respectively, do not even 
mention the issue of justice.
512
 Economics has become the science of efficiency.
513
 This, 
however, is in stark contrast to the intentions of the founders of the subject.
514
 The his-
tory of economic thought has a long and rich tradition of contemplation on the issue of 
justice.
515
 Off the beaten track there remain some economists who perceive the exclu-
sive focus on efficiency as an impoverishment of economic thought,
516
 however, main-
stream economics – i.e. neoclassical economics – has banned the concept of justice 
from its focus. 
This chapter traces the contemplation on justice in the history of economic thought. 
Starting with early approaches in Ancient Greece, Rome and even before (chapter 5.2), 
over the debate on the just price and the combination of Aristotelian philosophy with 
biblical tradition in the Middle Ages (chapter 5.3), the influence of the reformation and 
the enlightenment on the concept of justice in the Early Modern Period (chapter 5.4), to 
the Modern Era with essential developments such as classical economic theory, utilitari-
anism and the Historical Schools (chapter 5.5). The final chapter presents some contem-
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porary approaches to justice (chapter 5.6): some thinkers of ordoliberalism, the ‘Theory 
of Justice’ by John Rawls, the ‘Idea of Justice’ by Amartya Sen, and some remarks from 
economic ethics.  
5.2 Early Approaches 
Systematic philosophical and scientific contemplation on the idea of justice can be 
found for the first time in the writings of Plato.
517
 But even before, in archaic societies, 
a perception of justice existed, not in the sense of abstract principles, but rather as an 
implicit element of morality. In archaic, self-subsistent societies, there was a sense of 
‘the right rate of exchange’. As long as such societies traded among themselves, these 
exchange rates remained fairly constant, but when trading in exchange for foreign – in 
particular European – goods, there were no ‘right exchange rates’ according to tradition, 
and this resulted in disorder. Here, traditional exchange rates built a reference point for 
social justice and morality.
518
 
The state in the form of the tribal god-king played an important role in the development 
of justice, law and freedom as institutionalised values. Originally trade and barter were 
perceived as gainful, antisocial, and a threat to the cohesion of the clan. Only the action 
of the god-king as the ‘fount of justice’519 was able to remove ‘the tribal ban on transac-
tions by eliminating the stigma of gain, with its disruptive implications.’520 
5.2.1 Plato 
For the ancient Greeks, economics was part of ethics and ‘the study of economic prob-
lems therefore was subordinate to the solution of the more important problems of ethics 
and jurisprudence.’521 The question of justice had priority over the issue of an efficient 
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allocation of resources. The contemplation of justice did not follow some kind of divine 
revelation but was a matter of philosophical reasoning.
522
 Even though Plato sometimes 
refered to justice as ‘divine’, he saw it as a secular phenomenon with its final justifica-
tion lying in the idea of the good.
523
 
Plato distinguished three parts of the soul: reason, spiritedness, and desire. To each part 
of the soul corresponds a certain virtue: Wisdom corresponds to reason, courage to spir-
itedness and temperance to desire. Justice as a fourth virtue ensures that every part of 
the soul fulfils its proper function. Justice, therefore, has the function of organising all 
other virtues.
524
 The ‘having and doing of one’s own would be accepted as justice.’525 
Here, ‘to each his own’ does not primarily mean a just distribution of goods but a distri-
bution of functions and activities.
526
 
Plato was mainly interested in social justice rather than distributive justice. Justice aims 
at social cohesion,
527
 injustice on the other hand destroys the society.
528
 Extreme pov-
erty as well as extreme wealth in this regard are a danger to society,
529
 and thus Plato 
suggested that no man should own more than four times the possessions of someone 
else.
530
 
Concerning prices, Plato postulated that nobody should ever charge two different prices 
for the same good.
531
 In addition to the postulate of uniform prices, goods should be 
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traded for their ‘real value’. It remains open, what this ‘real value’ is, but some interpre-
tations conclude that Plato’s criterion are the costs of production.532 
5.2.2 Aristotle 
According to Aristotle, justice is the most perfect virtue.
533
 Like all other virtues, it is a 
mean between extremes:
534
 ‘just action is intermediate between acting unjustly and be-
ing unjustly treated; for the one is to have too much and the other to have too little.’535 
Injustice in contrast relates to extremes.
536
 
Aristotle distinguished between general justice and particular justice. ‘Both the lawless 
man and the grasping and unfair man are thought to be unjust, so that evidently both the 
law-abiding and the fair man will be just.’537 Thus, acting in accordance with general 
justice means to act in accordance with the law.
538
 This includes also the unwritten law, 
the particular nature Zeus has assigned to every creature.
539
 General justice therefore 
orders the social life and it can be distinguished from the other virtues by its being con-
cerned with other members of society.
540
 
Particular justice assigns shares to different individuals.
541
 Whereas not acting in ac-
cordance with general justice means to be a transgressor of law (Übertreter), not acting 
according to particular justice means to violate equality (Übervorteiler).
542
 
Particular justice can furthermore be differentiated into distributive justice and rectifica-
tory justice. Distributive justice means the distribution of honour, money and other 
goods.
543
 An unequal distribution can be in accordance with distributive justice, as long 
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as all distribution takes place according to the same criteria.
544
 Instead of equality, dis-
tributive justice is based on proportionality.
545
 A ‘distribution of moneys [sic] from the 
public treasury which follows the same ratio as the respective contributions (to the pub-
lic revenues) bear to one another.’ Put in mathematical terms: ‘The shares of A and B 
being C and D respectively, A:B = C:D; and it follows alternando that A:C = B:D and 
hence the wholes are in the same ratio; that is, (A+C):(B+D)=A+B and the original ratio 
of A to B is preserved after the distribution.’546 
Figure 14: Aristotle and Justice 
 
Source: Author, referring to B. Schefold, Wirtschaftsstile – Band 1: Studien zum Ver-
hältnis von Ökonomie und Kultur, Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1994. 
Rectificatory justice plays a corrective role in transactions between individuals, which 
can be either voluntary or involuntary transactions. An example for corrective justice in 
voluntary transactions is justice in sales and purchases; an example for justice in invol-
untary transactions is correcting or sanctioning theft or murder.
547
 In this context indi-
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viduals are treated equally,
548
 ‘compensation should be proportionate to the loss and the 
punishment proportionate to the wrong.’549 
If for example individual V has lost AE in a transaction with individual M by means of 
deception (cf. figure 15), M has made a gain from the transaction whereas justice is the 
mean between gain and loss. Corrective justice demands to assign the arithmetical mean 
of what the individuals have too much and too little, to both parties 
       
 
.
550
  
Figure 15: Aristotle and Rectificatory Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. by D. Ross, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1988, originally ήθικά Νικομάχεια, around 350 BC, book V 1132b. 
Therefore, whereas distributive justice corresponds to a geometrical proportion, correc-
tive justice corresponds to an arithmetical proportion.
551
 And, whereras corrective jus-
tice means equal treatment of individuals; distributive justice does not mean the equali-
sation of two individuals but of two relations.
552
 Finally, whereas justice in voluntary 
transactions is a matter of civil law, justice in involuntary transactions is a matter of 
criminal law.
553
 
A special case is justice in exchange, which is a part of reciprocity and as such it is nei-
ther simply identical with distributive nor with corrective justice. In some cases recip-
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rocity can even be unjust. If for example an officer slaps a soldier, retaliation; that is, 
returning the slap would be unjust, because it would not be according to the law.
554
 
The equitable is not legally just but it is just in the sense of being a correction of legal 
justice.
555
 The written law is necessarily general. In some particular cases it might be 
incorrect and then the equitable is an improvement of written law.
556
 
To sum up, justice is if everyone fulfils his duties and receives what is rightfully his 
(‘wenn jeder, der das Seinige tut, auch das Seinige erhält’557). That is not equivalent to 
an equal distribution, since people equal in status receive equal things, but people un-
equal in status receive unequal things.
558
 If justice in this sense prevails, the shoemaker 
has the shoe in mind, not the price he receives for it and a physician has his patients in 
mind, not the income he receives from treating them. The idea of doing what is yours to 
do (das Seinige tun) by maximising your profit and thereby achieving the best for soci-
ety was alien to Aristotle.
559
 
Aristotle considered chrematistics, acquisition as an end in itself, as unnatural. Accord-
ing to him, exchange of goods has to be a just exchange.
560
 This is a matter of a just 
price. In contrast to modern economists, Aristotle was not interested in how prices form 
in the market, but in the question which prices should prevail.
561
 The price and ‘what is 
rendered in return’ have to be equivalent. Neither buyer nor seller ‘is better or worse off 
after the trade.’562 The just as an intermediate is therefore the mean between gain and 
loss.
563
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5.2.3 Romans 
In the context of the exchange of goods, the ancient Romans were not as focused on 
ethical considerations as were the ancient Greeks; freedom of contract had priority.
564
 
As long as a transaction was free of dolus (i.e. cunning, deceit, fraud), bargaining of 
prices was relatively free. There were mainly two exceptions: the edict of Diocletian 
and the practice of laesio enormis.
565
 In his edict of 301 AD, Diocletian set a price ceil-
ing on a multitude of prices.
566
 The price edict explicitly constricted itself to setting a 
maximum for prices, since regulating prices exactly and thereby taking away competi-
tive advantages of particular provinces would be unjust.
567
 Laesio enormis (‘excessive 
violation’) applied if prices were unduly high or low. A price was considered to be too 
high, if it was higher than 150 % of the just price and too low, if it was below 50 % of 
the just price.
568
 Here the just price was usually perceived to be the normal and custom-
ary price as an outcome of free competition. This price was not a transcendental stan-
dard of value but specific to a certain time and place and specific to certain market con-
ditions.
569
 
5.3 Middle Ages 
The church fathers and scholastics took their ancient predecessors in combination with 
the biblical scripture as their starting point. Thus, some words have to be said about 
justice in the Christian Bible.
570
 
In the early scriptures of the Old Testament, a person is just, if the court decides in his 
favour. Justice was restricted to a particular situation. Later the differentiation became 
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more general between those who are just (pious) and those who are sinners (godless).
571
 
Justice was perceived as an objective phenomenon and in order to be just, one needed to 
act in accordance with God’s revealed commandments.572 Justice in the New Testament 
has two dimensions: Firstly, justice as a matter of a personal relationship with God and 
secondly, ethical behaviour as being necessary in order to be just.
573
 Further, the justice 
of God in the Bible means God’s covenantal faithfulness. At first, faithfulness to Israel 
(Old Testament) and later faithfulness to all mankind (New Testament).
574
 Generally, 
mankind cannot achieve justice by means of their own efforts, but justice is a graceful 
gift by God.
575
 
5.3.1 The Church Fathers 
The Church Fathers built the foundation for Christian ethics, by a combination of Aris-
totelian philosophy and interpretations of the biblical scriptures
576
. Their ideas were thus 
deeply rooted in the Christian doctrines.
577
 The concept of justice was also central to 
Augustine’s ‘The City of God’: ‘In the absence of justice, what is sovereignty but or-
ganized brigandage?’578 ‘Justice is the virtue which accords to each and every man what 
is his due.’579 For Augustine it was clear that justice on earth will always be imperfect580 
and true justice is not attainable without the true religion.
581
 
Augustine acknowledged two systems of evaluating economic goods: one is evaluation 
by natural order, the other evaluation by utility. He perceived a natural order in all 
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things: ‘those that live are ranked higher than those that do not . . . the sentient are supe-
rior to the non-sentient . . . Among sentient beings, the intelligent are higher than the 
non-intelligent’ and so forth. On the other hand considerations of utility do not always 
follow this natural order: ‘sometimes we so prefer certain non-sentient things to others 
which are sentient . . . For, who would not rather have food in his house than mice, 
money than fleas?’ 582 This system of value has been important for the scholastic con-
cept of the just price.
583
 The Church Fathers themselves were not pursuing the determi-
nation of the just price. They were rather interested in a certain ethical attitude of the 
parties involved in economic exchanges.
584
 
Augustine discussed the question whether everyone wants to buy cheap and sell dear. In 
this context he mentioned an example of somebody who paid significantly more than 
was expected of him when being offered a valuable manuscript by an ignorant salesman 
for a very cheap price.
585
 This attitude of the buyer was an ideal for the scholastics as 
well, but instead of having been interested in the attitude alone, the scholastics tried to 
determine what the just price would be exactly.
586
 
5.3.2 The Scholastics 
Simply stated, there were three groups of medieval authors: the Roman lawyers, the 
canonists and the theologians or scholastics.
587
 The romanists, standing in the tradition 
of the ancient Roman law, emphasised the freedom of bargaining. They developed a 
theory of the just price only in so far as they extended the practice of laesio enormis to 
all types of goods, not only to land.
588
 The canonists accepted laesio enormis to deter-
mine the just price for land. As a new aspect they advised to consider also the quality 
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and the quantity of revenues from this land when assessing it. However, in the context 
of movable goods, where the element of rent is absent, the canonists usually identified 
the just price with the current market price.
589
 A strict theory of the just price can there-
fore only be found in the writings of the third group, the scholastics. 
The scholastics did not try to establish a new science; their aim was rather to give guid-
ance for human conduct
590
 by reconciling economic considerations with Christian eth-
ics
591
. Hence, their perspective was intrinsically ethical. They asked a theological ques-
tion and gave a theological answer to it.
592
 Concerning the concept of justice in the 
economy, their central interest was the just price. Deviations from the just price had to 
be avoided for three reasons: firstly, avarice is one of the seven deadly sins, secondly, 
charging a price other than the just price would be against the eights
593
 commandment 
‘[y]ou shall not steal’594, and thirdly, the just price was an expression of the general vir-
tue of justice, which dominated the medieval culture in form of the writings of Antiq-
uity, the holy scriptures, and works of art in churches and cathedrals.
595
 When speaking 
of the just price, the scholastics usually perceived every good as having one true objec-
tive value. This true value could be identified by the estimation of the community.
596
 
The scholastics were influenced by two legacies: Firstly, there was the classical heri-
tage, in particular the Aristotelian influence. From this emanated a kind of ‘objective’ 
justice, which is socially oriented. Departures from just states of this kind involve the 
danger of impairing social cohesion. Secondly, there was the Christian heritage, which 
implied a second, rather subjective, understanding of justice. Seen from this perspective, 
justice has to do with an inner state of individual righteousness. Pursuing justice means 
following God’s commandments.597 
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Albertus Magnus (1200-1280) with reference to Aristotle distinguished distributive and 
commutative justice, a differentiation that was followed throughout the whole medieval 
period.
598
 What was new was his high esteem of labour.
599
 As a consequence, value is 
the result of need or want on the one hand and the cost of production; that is, labour 
input and raw materials, on the other hand.
600
 Albert saw a good estimation of this just 
price in the market price, as long as it is an outcome of voluntary transactions free from 
fraud.
601
 Albertus Magnus approved of price-fixations by the authorities, as long as they 
aimed at protecting the weaker party in market transactions.
602
 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) demanded that every economic exchange ought to be just. 
Without justice, the economy would not fulfil its proper function.
603
 Having said that, 
Aquinas saw a difference between human and divine law. Whereas human law sets only 
an ethical minimum, divine law leaves nothing unpunished.
604
 As the economy can only 
fulfil its function if it is just, so can the price only serve its purpose as a just price.
605
 For 
Aquinas the requirement that the price be just follows from the golden rule: ‘All things 
whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them’606. 
‘Since no one wishes to acquire a good at a price in excess of its worth, no one should 
try to sell it for more than it is worth.’607 The just price is an inherent property of the 
object itself, it is the ‘true value’ of the object.608 By saying that ‘to sell a thing for more 
than its worth, or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust and unlawful’609, 
Aquinas distanced himself from the canonists who would accept a price as the outcome 
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of free bargaining only restricted by laesio enormis.
610
 Like Albertus Magnus, Aquinas 
saw the true value of a thing determined by its demand and the cost of production; that 
is, the labour input and the cost of raw materials. He would accept the current market 
price as a good estimation for the just price.
611
 However, demanding the current market 
price does not always have to be perfectly virtuous. Aquinas cited a story of Cicero in 
which a merchant brings wheat to a country that suffers a famine. The merchant knows 
that more food is on its way to the market and needs to decide whether he can sell his 
merchandise for the high current market price or whether he has to tell his clients that 
more wheat will be arriving soon and thereby lowering the market price. According to 
Aquinas, the merchant does not have to mention that more wheat is on its way, selling 
his merchandise for the current market price would be just. However, it 
would be more virtuous of him to inform his exchange partners.
612
 
Furthermore, a seller may sell his goods for more than he paid for them, as long as he 
improved them in some way, for example by changing its place, transforming it in terms 
of time or as a compensation for taking a risk.
613
 The justness of the market price lies in 
its objective, social nature, since it is the outcome of many independent estimations of 
buyers and sellers. Perfect competition of trading partners implies the absence of the 
exploitation of individual exigency and market power. In contrast, in situations with 
monopoly power, the social nature of the market price is missing and it cannot count as 
just.
614
 Also in the context of wages, Aquinas postulated an equality of price and what 
the buyer receives in return. According to him, every class of society deserves a certain 
income, since Aquinas saw the differentiation of the classes as part of the divine order. 
The wage ought to reproduce this natural order.
615
 To sum up, for Aquinas ‘justice is a 
                                                 
610
  Cf. Baldwin, pp. 69-70. 
611
  Cf. Schinzinger, pp. 25-6. 
612
  Cf. R. de Roover, ‘The concept of the just price: Theory and economic policy’, in The Journal of 
Economic History, vol. 18, no. 4, 1958, p. 21. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II.II. qu. 77  
a. 3. The story is taken from Cicero, De officiis, translation J. Higginbotham, University of California 
Press, Berkeley CA, 1967, book III, ch. 12. 
613
  Cf. Sewall, pp. 18-9, and cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II.II. qu. 77 a. 4. 
614
  Cf. Baldwin, pp. 79-80, and cf. U. Fehl, ‘Die Frage nach dem gerechten Preis’, in G. Gutmann &  
A. Barthel (ed.), Ethik und Ordnungsfragen der Wirtschaft, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1989, pp. 260-1. 
615
  Cf. Schinzinger, pp. 26-7. 
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habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will’616 
and being a matter of proportionality, justice is person-specific.
617
 
Albertus Magnus and his student Thomas Aquinas, distinguished the exchange of goods 
from commutative justice. Goods exchange is rather a matter of reciprocity. ‘A city, 
which was the unit of economic life based on the principle of division of labor, could 
not exist unless there was proportional exchange of goods. Without this reciprocal com-
pensation, the losses incurred would eventually result in total enslavement of the citizen 
body, because a slave is one who is not justly rewarded for his work.’618 This reciprocity 
requires a proportional equality of value in order to guarantee justice.
619
 Again it can be 
seen, how the scholastics focused their idea of justice on the reproduction of the social 
system. 
In the time after Aquinas, goods were produced more and more often far away from the 
place of their consumption. Consumers were very often ignorant of the actual cost of 
production and hence the element of utility became increasingly important for the de-
termination of true value and thus of the just price.
620
 Anthony of Florence (1389-1459) 
for example attempted a synthesis of freely floating prices and price-fixation. He distin-
guished natural value and value in use. Only value in use is relevant for the value in 
exchange. It has three determining factors: firstly, utility, secondly, scarcity, and thirdly, 
subjective evaluations of individuals. Since these subjective valuations can differ, an 
exact estimation of the just price is not possible. Anthony defines a range of acceptable 
prices: the lowest price is the pious price (pretium iustum pium), then there is the price 
of interest (pretium discretum), and the highest is the strict price (pretium rigidum). 
                                                 
616
  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II.II qu. 58 a. 1, emphasis in the original. Cf. Baldwin, pp. 61-2. 
617
  Cf. ibid., pp. 61-2. 
618
  Thomas Aquinas, Ethicorum, documenta catholica omnia, Rome, 1998, Lib. V. Lect. VIII, p. 267.  
Cf. Alberti Magni, Opera Omnia, ed. by A. Borgnet, Vivès, Paris, 1891, Lib. V tract. II caput IX, as 
cited by Baldwin, p. 63. 
619
  Cf. Baldwin, p. 74. 
620
  Cf. Sewall, pp. 24-5. 
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Prices are just as long as they float in this range of pious and strict price.
621
 Extra-profits 
as a result of monopoly power, however, were condemned.
622
 
Leonhard Lessius (1554-1623) as a representative of the late scholastics condemned 
usury as a violation of the practice of justice.
623
 He adopted the terms of Aristotelian 
philosophy with one exception. Lessius treated wage hierarchies as part of commutative 
justice rather than distributive justice. Different wages exist to compensate for different 
activities.
624
 According to him, just prices can either be set by the authorities or they are 
based on valuations of the community.
625
 
5.4 Early Modern Period 
For Martin Luther, ‘sin’ is the antonym of ‘justice’.626 He disapproved of usury, since it 
would be responsible for price increases and famines, and he disapproved of monopo-
lies, since they cause excessive prices. Prices should be set by the authorities, but since 
he believed this to be unrealistic, he accepted market prices as a second best solution:
627
  
‘Es wäre der beste und sicherste Weg, wenn die weltliche Obrigkeit hierfür vernünftige, redliche Leute 
einsetzte und sie beauftragte, die verschiedenen Waren mit ihren Kosten zu überschlagen und danach 
Maßstäbe aufzustellen dafür, wie teuer sie sein sollten, damit der Kaufmann zurechtkommen kann und 
sein geziemtes Auskommen davon hat, so wie man an einigen Orten Wein, Fisch, Brot und dergleichen 
[preislich] festgesetzt hat. Aber wir Deutschen haben mehr zu tun. Wir haben zu trinken und zu tanzen, 
als daß wir uns um eine solche Regierung und Ordnung kümmern könnten. Und weil eine solche Ordnung 
nicht zu erhoffen ist, ist das der nächstliegende und beste Rat, den Wert einer Ware danach zu bestimmen, 
wie der allgemeine Markt sie gibt und nimmt oder wie es die Gewohnheit des Landes ist, [sie] zu geben 
und zu nehmen.’628 
                                                 
621
  Cf. Schinzinger, p. 28, and cf. Sewall, p. 25, and cf. Hecker, p. 55. 
622
  Cf. Hecker, pp. 54-5. 
623
  Cf. B. Schefold, ‘Leonhard Lessius: Von der praktischen Tugend der Gerechtigkeit zur Wirtschafts-
theorie’, in B. Schefold, Beiträge zur ökonomischen Dogmengeschichte, ed. by V. Caspari, Wirtschaft 
und Finanzen, Düsseldorf, 2004, pp. 127-8. In the history of economic thought, in particular in Scho-
lasticism, the ban on usury – that is to say: the injustice of usury – was a much disputed subject. Since 
this is a very specific problem and would require a whole dissertation on its own, I simply refer to two 
introductions on the topic: Schinzinger, pp. 15-35, and Spiegel. 
624
  Cf. Schefold, ‘Leonhard Lessius’, p. 138. 
625
  Cf. ibid., p. 147. ‘communi hominum aestimatione’. 
626
  Cf. W. Kerber, C. Westermann & B. Spörlein, p. 40. 
627
  Cf. Hecker, pp. 59-61. 
628
  M. Luther, ‘Über Handel und Zinswirtschaft’, in H. Beintker, H. Junghans & H. Kirchner (ed.), Christ 
und Gesellschaft, Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, Berlin, 1982, p. 243, insertion by the editors.  
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Even though he generally disapproved of the scholastic tradition, in the matter of the 
just price he did not distance himself very much from it and did not develop an elabo-
rate system of ethics in the economy on his own.
629
 
In the 16
th
 and 17
 th
 century, a new class of writers emerged: the empiricists. Whereas 
the ancient philosophers and the theologians of the Middle Ages mainly argued from a 
moral point of view and were thus interested in justification, this new group of writers 
was interested in explanation of value.
630
 ‘The problem is no longer what value should 
be, but what it is.’631 Standing in this tradition, Hugo Grotius and Samuel von 
Puffendorf were the first to perceive value as a phenomenon of nature.
632
 Grotius saw 
the ‘most natural Measure of the Value of a Thing i[n] the Want of it’ 633. Determinants 
of value according to von Puffendorf are utility and scarcity.
634
 He made a distinction 
between the ‘legal price’ as a price fixed by order of the magistrate and the ‘natural 
price’, as the result of common judgement and estimation. The legal price is usually 
perceived to be just. It is fixed at a certain point and admits no latitude. The natural 
price, however, can vary in a certain range. The lowest degree is the favourable, the 
middle the reasonable and the highest the rigorous price. Von Puffendorf added that in 
regulating the natural price, the labour input and other costs of production need to be 
taken into consideration, otherwise production would be discouraged.
635
 
                                                 
Cf. Hecker, pp. 60-1. ‘But in order not to leave this question entirely unanswered, the best and safest 
way would be for the temporal authorities to appoint over this matter wise and honest men who would 
appraise the cost of all sorts of wares and fix accordingly the outside price at which the merchant 
would get his due and have an honest living, just as at certain places they fix the price of wine, fish, 
bread and the like. But we Germans are so busy with drinking and dancing that we cannot tolerate any 
such regulation. Since, then, we cannot hope for such a law, the next best thing is to hold our wares at 
the price which they bring in the common market or which is customary in the neighborhood.’  
(M. Luther, ‘On trading and usury’, translation C. M. Jacobs, in Works of Martin Luther, vol. 4, Castle 
Press, Philadelphia, 2007, p. 16). 
629
  Cf. Hecker, p. 135. 
630
  Cf. Sewall, p. 32. 
631
  Ibid., p. 32. 
632
  Cf. ibid., p. 43. 
633
  H. Grotius, The rights of war and peace, in three books. Wherein are explained, the law of nature and 
nations, and the principal points relating to government, Thomson Gale, London, 1738, original: ‘de 
jure belli et pacis’, Amsterdam, 1625, p. 301, book II ch. 12 no. 14. Cf. Sewall, p. 38. 
634
  Cf. S. Puffendorf, Of the law of nature and nations, translation B. Kennet, 3
rd
 ed., R. Sare, London, 
1717, originally: De iure naturae et gentium, Lund, 1672, pp. 222-4. 
635
  Cf. ibid., pp. 227-8. 
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Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) formulated an alternative to the normative approach of the 
scholastics.
636
 He attempted to draft an empirical idea of men who mainly follow self-
interested motives. Therefore, his theory of justice concentrates on the liberties of the 
individual rather than concentrating on society as a whole.
637
 The aim is to create per-
fectly just institutions that restrain and channel the actions of free and self-interested 
individuals.
638
 In the war of all against all, justice is not a problem. Since everyone has 
the right to do everything, there can be no unjust actions. In this original state every 
individual is completely independent of all others. Justice can only be relevant in a soci-
ety of mutually dependent individuals. Also if individuals enter into mutual contracts, 
breaking these contracts would be unjust. Everything that is not unjust is just and as 
long as there are no binding contracts, nothing can be unjust. Furthermore, the validity 
of contracts requires an authority that enforces them. Therefore justice becomes relevant 
only when firstly, there exists a society, secondly, there are contracts, and thirdly, there 
is a state to enforce these contracts.
639
 The justness of a transaction lies in the voluntary 
agreement of all parties involved, not in certain characteristics of the price. Rather, 
whatever price the exchange partners voluntarily agree upon, can be characterised as 
just.
640
 
The ancient Greeks and the scholastics used to say that justice requires that no partner in 
exchange is better or worse off after a transaction. According to Étienne Bonnot de 
Condillac (1714-1780) this is an illusion, caused by the use of money in transactions. 
Money makes people believe that they exchange equal value for equal value. Actually, 
Condillac said, individuals agree on a transaction only, if they expect to realise an ad-
vantage. The value of a good and its price must consequently be different.
641
 
                                                 
636
  Cf. Hecker, p. 32. 
637
  Cf. ibid., pp. 168-70. 
638
  Cf. A. Sen, The idea of justice, Penguin, London, 2010, pp. 5-6. 
639
  Cf. T. Hobbes, Leviathan oder Stoff, Form und Gewalt eines bürgerlichen und kirchlichen Staates,  
ed. by I. Fetscher, Luchterhand, Neuwied et al., 1966, pp. 98-134. 
640
  Cf. G. Senft, ‘Auf der Suche nach der “Natürlichen Ordnung“: Der Gerechtigkeitsgehalt im wirt-
schaftlichen Leitbild Silvio Gesells’, in H. G. Nutzinger (ed.), Gerechtigkeit in der Wirtschaft: Quad-
ratur des Kreises?, Metropolis, Marburg, 2006, pp. 57-8. 
641
  Cf. Sewall, p. 111. 
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Later, David Hume (1711-1776) traced the concept of justice back to the scarcity postu-
late. If we lived in a state of absolute abundance, the problem of justice would not arise:  
‘Let us suppose, that nature has bestowed on the human race such profuse abundance of all external 
conveniencies, that, without any uncertainty in the event, without any care or industry on our part, every 
individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites can want, or luxurious 
imagination wish or desire. . . . It seems evident, that, in such a happy state, every other social virtue 
would flourish, and receive tenfold encrease; but the cautious, jealous virtue of justice would never once 
have been dreamed of. For what purpose make a partition of goods, where everyone has already more 
than enough? Why give rise to property, where there cannot possibly be any injury? Why call this object 
mine, when, upon the seizing of it by another, I need but stretch out my hand to possess myself of what is 
equally valuable? Justice, in that case, being totally USELESS, would be an idle ceremonial, and could 
never possibly have place in the catalogue of virtues. [sic]’642 
5.4.1 Mercantilism 
In contrast to the Ancient Greeks and the scholastics, mercantilism understood econom-
ics as an independent field of inquiry.
643
 The perspective was no longer a purely ethical 
one, concentrated on the justification of economic actions; mercantilists were rather 
interested in the analysis of aspects of the economic sphere.
644
 A characteristic example 
for this new development is the work of William Petty (1623-1687). ‘[I]nstead of using 
only comparative and superlative Words, and intellectual Arguments’, his aim was ‘to 
express [him]self in Terms of Number, Weight or Measure; to use only Arguments of 
Sense, and to consider only such Causes, as have visible Foundations in Nature; leaving 
those that depend upon the mutual Minds, Opinions, Appetites, and Passions of particu-
lar Men, to the Consideration of others [sic]’645. Petty shifted the attention from ethics to 
empiricism. Mercantilism in general changed the focus of economic inquiry away from 
matters of the just price, usury and monopolies to the development of the economy.
646
 
The static mindset of the middle ages was substituted by a dynamic one.
647
 Mercantil-
                                                 
642
  D. Hume, An enquiry concerning the principles of morals, ed. by T. L. Beauchamp, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1998, first published 1751, p. 83, emphasis in the original. 
643
  Cf. B. Schefold, ‘Grundzüge und Hauptautoren merkantilistischer Theorie’, in Zeitschrift für Agrarge-
schichte und Agrarsoziologie, vol. 45, no. 2, 1997, p. 165. 
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  Cf. Salin, Politische Ökonomie, p. 43. 
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  W. Petty, ‘Preface to first essay on political arithmetic’, in C. H. Hull (ed.), The economic writings of 
Sir William Petty, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1899, p. 244, emphasis in the 
original. 
646
  Cf. Schefold, Leonhard Lessius, p. 129. 
647
  Cf. W. Lachmann, Entwicklungspolitik Band 1: Grundlagen, 2
nd
 ed., Oldenbourg, Munich et al., 2004, 
p. 67. 
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ism distanced itself from scholasticism by turning away from the ethical approach and it 
also distanced itself from liberalism by approving of a strong government.
648
 The pur-
pose of favourable economic policies became to increase the wealth of the prince or 
ruler.
649
 Since mercantilism identified this wealth with the precious metals, and since 
these existed in a relatively fixed amount, mercantilism concluded that one nation could 
only prosper at the expense of another.
650
 
5.4.2 Cameralism 
Cameralists, mostly public servants, attempted to apply mercantilist thought to the 
German states.
651
 As in mercantilism, the study of the economy became ‘political’ in the 
sense of being occupied with augmenting the power of the state.
652
 In contrast with lib-
eralism, camerlists were in favour of a strong government as an active mover. Accord-
ing to them markets do not necessarily tend to an equilibrium but require regulation.
653
 
The aim of economic policies was thus an ordering of society that made optimal produc-
tion possible.
654
 This is particularly important since the power of the state depends on its 
financial resources.
655
 If tradition stood in the way of such an efficient organisa-
tion, it had to be overcome.
656
 
One important question concerning justice was the practice of taxation. Since justice 
ought to prevail in taxation, individuals with a high income were in a position to give 
more than poor individuals.
657
 The underlying motive, however, was less ethical than 
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  Cf. Lachmann, Entwicklungspolitik, p. 65. 
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  Cf. W. Lachmann, Volkswirtschaftslehre 1, Springer, Berlin, 2006, p. 49. 
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  Cf. L. L. Pasinetti, Lectures on the theory of production, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977, 
p. 2. 
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  Cf. Lachmann, Volkswirtschaftslehre, p. 49. 
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  Cf. T. Simon, Gute Policey: Ordnungsleitbilder und Zielvorstellungen politischen Handelns in der 
Frühen Neuzeit, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2004, pp. 382-3. 
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  Cf. H. Peukert, ‘Justi’s concept of moral economics and the good society’, in J. H. G. von Justi, The 
beginnings of political economy, ed. by J. G. Backhaus, Springer, Boston, 2009, p. 117. 
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  Cf. Simon, Gute Policey, p. 383. 
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  Cf. ibid., p. 388. 
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  Cf. ibid., p. 541. 
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  Cf. ibid., p. 474. E.g.: ‘Wer viel einnimmt, kan viel wieder ausgeben, wer aber wenig einnimmt, dem 
würde unrecht geschehen, wenn man einen reichen und ihn in ausgaben gleich setzen wolte [sic].’,  
C. F. Pescherino, ‘Politische Gedanken über die bisher zwar ungebräuchlichen aber doch dem Lande 
und Fürsten höchstersprieslichen Generalzehenden, worinn derselben Vollkommenheit erwiesen, die 
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one might at first assume. The guiding principle of cameralistic taxation was not simply 
to absorb wealth from the population but rather to create absorbable wealth and in par-
ticular not to destroy the basis of production. A certain threshold should not be exceeded 
in taxation, otherwise it would be harmful to the accumulation of wealth.
658
 
In order to promote the accumulation of wealth and to strengthen the basis for wealth 
creation, Cameralism had three principles of economic policy: firstly, the stimulation of 
population growth, secondly, augmenting wealth of the individual households, and fi-
nally, an efficiency-oriented ordering of the economic and social system.
659
 The focus 
on growth and development implied a dynamic view of society. Whereas Antiquity had 
been striving after a ‘good order’, a ‘final state’ of contentment, cameralism did not 
perceive such a logical end of accumulation, since there can always be more of material 
wealth.
660
 
The best known author of cameralism is probably Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi 
(1717-1771). According to him, benevolence, liberty, justice, and equitableness lead to 
ethically correct behaviour. In the long run, they are even the key to inner worldly suc-
cess and personal fulfilment.
661
 Justi was opposed to the idea of Bernhard Mandeville 
that private vices ultimately lead to public benefits. Quite on the contrary, Justi stated 
that ‘private vices are the major enemy for public benefit’662. He illustrated this in a 
                                                 
Beschaffenheit der Anlagen und Unzulänglichkeit derjenigen, so bisher gebrauchet worden, gezeiget, 
auch worauf die Glückseligkeit eines Staats beruhe, demonstriret wird. Alles mit politischen Reflexio-
nen und historischen Exempeln erläutert’, in W. von Schröder (ed.), Fürstliche Schatz- und Renten-
kammer nebst seinem Tractat vom Goldmachen, Topos, Vaduz, 1978, first published Leipzig 1752,  
p. 537. ‘Whoever earns a lot, can spend a lot. He who, however, earns little, would be treated unjustly 
if one treated him and a rich person alike in terms of tax payments.’ (translation: author). 
658
  Cf. Simon, Gute Policey, pp. 398, 474, and B. Schefold, ‘Justis “Grundsätze der Policey-
Wissenschaft“: Glückseligkeit und Wirtschaftspolitik’, in B. Schefold, Beiträge zur ökonomischen 
Dogmengeschichte, ed. by V. Caspari, Wirtschaft und Finanzen, Düsseldorf, 2004, p. 253: ‘Der recht-
schaffene Cameralist bemühet sich zwar die Einkünfte des Staats zu vermehren; allein auf eine der 
Wohlfahrt des gemeinen Wesens unnachtheilige Art ohne Bedrückung der Unterthanen [sic].’  
J. H. G. von Justi, ‘Abhandlung, von dem so genannten Plusmachen, oder der schädlichen Art, die 
Einkünfte des Staats zu vermehren’, in Gesammelte politische und Finanz-Schriften, vol. 3, Scientia, 
Aalen, 1970, first published 1764, pp. 410-1. ‘It is true that the righteous cameralist strives towards 
the augmentation of the state’s revenue, but he does this in a way that is not disadvantageous for the 
general welfare and without depression of the subjects.’ (translation: author). 
659
  Cf. Simon, Gute Policey, p. 456. 
660
  Cf. ibid., p. 540. 
661
  Cf. Peukert, ‘Justi’s concept’, p. 119. 
662
  Ibid., p. 122. 
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story about two fathers and their families. One father is very strict, the other incorpo-
rates the virtues of benevolence, liberty, justice and equitableness. At first it seems as if 
the former with his short-sighted behaviour would be more successful but ultimately the 
ethically correct approach of the latter leads to success.
663
 
‘O! Daß doch meine Erzählung bei allen Vätern und Obern einigen Eindruck machen möchte! Wenn sie 
doch einsehen wollten, daß die Grundsätze der Gütigkeit, der Freiheit, der Gerechtigkeit und Billigkeit, 
die ihren Kindern und Untergebenen die angenehmsten und nützlichsten sind, auch vor sie selbst allemal 
die ersprießlichsten und heilsamsten sind.’664 
5.4.3 Physiocracy 
Physiocracy was a counter movement to mercantilism. Previously, restrictive trading 
regulations and the preferential treatment of the manufacturing sector and industry had 
led to a neglect of agriculture.
665
 The physiocrats demanded a radical change based on 
three principles: free trade, taxation of agriculture only, and the conviction that neither 
money, acquisition, manufactory, nor industry can create wealth.
666
 
The central figure of physiocracy was François Quesnay (1694-1774). Being trained in 
the medical profession, he substituted the traditional view of a naturally evolved, God-
given order with a world view, based on the assumption of natural laws that can be dis-
covered and investigated in the process of science.
667
 Accordingly, mercantilists saw 
such laws at work in the context of economics, too. For example they distinguished a 
‘natural price’ from the ‘current price’; the natural price being equal to the cost of pro-
duction. For products of the sterile class, this means production costs, for agricultural 
products in addition a surplus value. 
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  Cf. J. H. G. von Justi, ‘Die gütigen und strengen Väter’, in Fabeln und Erzählungen von Thieren und 
sehr alten längst verrosteten zeiten, bey deren Lesung man ganz sanft und süß wird einschlafen kön-
nen, Cologne, 1759. 
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  Justi, ‘Die gütigen und strengen Väter’, p. 24. ‘O! I wished my tale would have an impact on all fa-
thers and powerful! I wish they would come to see that the principles of benevolence, liberty, justice, 
and equitableness, which are the most agreeable and useful principles for their children and subordi-
nates, are also the most fruitful and beneficial principles for themselves.’ (translation: author). 
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  Cf. Lachmann, Volkswirtschaftslehre, p. 50. 
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  Cf. G. A. Will, Versuch über die Physiokratie, deren Geschichte, Literatur, Inhalt und Wert, Raspe, 
Nuremberg, 1782, p. xi. 
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5.  The Concept of Justice in the History of Economic Thought 129 
 
 
Wages, the prices for labour, are at a subsistence level, since workers compete on the 
market. Moreover, labour is unproductive and value is thus added by land, not by la-
bour.
668
 One can observe a significant shift from the discussion of ‘just prices’ in scho-
lasticism to ‘natural prices’ in physiocracy. 
The physiocratic principles of justice refer to the the general principles of physiocracy. 
Georg Andreas Will summarised this: 
‘Und dieser Hauptgrundsätze, die eine absolute und ewige Gerechtigkeit machen, sind nur drei: I. Eine 
ganz uneingeschränkte Freiheit des Bürgers, alle seine Fähigkeiten, Kräfte und Güter nach seinem Gefal-
len zu gebrauchen, damit zu thun, zu handeln, zu kaufen, zu verkaufen, was, wenn, und wohin ein jeder 
will; II. Eine Unverletzlichkeit der zur Fortsetzung der Benutzung der Grundstücke erforderlichen Ausla-
gen; III. Eine absolute Einheit der Auslage auf den reinen Ertrag der Grundstücke.’669 
5.5 Modern Era 
What authors of the Early Modern Period began, namely the formalisation of economic 
theory and a shift from a normative approach to the subject matter to an attempt of a 
positivistic approach, was more fully realised in the Modern Era. Economics was per-
ceived as a distinct field of inquiry,
670
 legitimate for its own sake, not just serving as a 
means to a distinct political end, as strengthening the power of the government. 
5.5.1 Classical Theory 
This chapter presents Adam Smith’s approach to justice. His works are often seen as a 
turning point in the thought about justice in economics. Therefore he stands exemplarily 
for the classical theory in this chapter. Other classical authors will be discussed in dif-
ferent contexts, John Stuart Mill in the chapter ‘Utilitarianism and the Marginal School’ 
and Karl Marx in ‘Socialism’. 
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  Cf. K.-H. Schmidt, ‘Merkantilismus, Kameralismus, Physiokratie’, in O. Issing (ed.), Geschichte der 
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 ed., Vahlen, Munich, 2002, p. 58. 
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  Will, pp. 51-2. ‘Merely three principles constitute absolute and eternal justice: I. An unrestricted lib-
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Adam Smith is particularly known for his assertion that the individual pursuit of self-
interest tends to be beneficial to the whole of society. 
‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, 
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.’671 
However, in contrast to many modern economists, Smith did not see self-interest as the 
exclusive motivation for human behaviour. There are aspects of the human nature 
‘which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.’672 Self-interest, on 
the other hand, is specifically the motivation underlying exchange.
673
 The starting point 
of Smith’ considerations in this regard is the concept of ‘sympathy’.674 An individual 
perceives somebody else’s experiences through the light of his own: ‘I judge of your 
sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your resent-
ment by my resentment, of your love by my love.’675 Such sympathy applies to experi-
ences of the body
676
 as well as to those of the ‘imagination’: ‘A disappointment in love, 
or ambition, will . . . call forth more sympathy than the greatest bodily evil.’677 Smith is 
opposed to the idea that sympathy is just another form of self-interest ‘in disguise’.678 
He puts forward several examples. One is that of a soldier at war: The advantage he 
would have from a marginal increase of his sovereign’s territory would be much less 
than the disadvantage he has from putting his own life in danger. The most logical thing 
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to do according to his self-interest would be to desert at first chance. Nevertheless, he 
chooses to fight.
679
 
Justice is necessary for the functioning of the economic and legal system and is a means 
to fostering economic prosperity.
680
 Without justice a society is in danger of falling 
apart: ‘Justice . . . is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the 
great, the immense fabric of human society . . . must in a moment crumble into at-
oms.’681 
Whereas Aristotle and the scholastics thought that a just transaction involves neither 
gain nor loss of both exchange partners, Smith – like Hume – was convinced that trans-
actions take place only if they promise a mutual advantage for all parties involved.
682
 
On the other hand he was opposed to the idea that voluntariness is a sufficient condition 
for the justness of a transaction.
683
 Smith introduced the concept of an ‘impartial specta-
tor’684 as a supra-individual judge over the justness of a transaction.685 
Besides preventing foreign invasions and the supply of public goods, the establishment 
of an ‘administration of justice’ is part of the duties of the sovereign.686 It is even in the 
own interest of the government to guarantee a just order, since it is a precondition for a 
flourishing economy.
687
 Furthermore, the government should not do anything to feed the 
natural tendency of trades to form cartels
688
 and it should take measures for equal op-
portunities of all members of society.
689
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Sometimes, Adam Smith is seen as the end of inquiry into the concept of justice in eco-
nomics
690
 and although we have shown that this is not exactly true, there has indeed 
been a certain shift of interest. Instead of conflict-laden static questions as the justness 
of a distribution of a given income, Smith and the classical economists concentrated on 
dynamic aspects of economics such as the creation and the increase of wealth.
691
 If is-
sues of justice were addressed, then they were more likely to be concerned with justice 
in exchange rather than distributive justice, since justice in exchange is more exactly 
definable.
692
 Generally, Smith’s approach to justice can be said to be ‘comparative’.693 
Perfect and absolute justice is an unattainable ideal, the justness of a situation can be 
measured by its proximity or distance from this ideal.
694
 
Smith distinguished market- and natural prices. The market price is the price a ‘com-
modity is commonly sold’ for. ‘It may be above, or below, or exactly the same with its 
natural price’695 which covers all costs of production. If a commodity is sold for the 
natural price, then it is ‘sold precisely for what it is worth, or for what it really costs the 
person who brings it to the market’696. Market prices gravitate around the natural 
price
697
 in accordance with short-term changes of supply and demand.
698
 One can inter-
pret Smith’s opposition to cartels, guilds and combined measures of employers to lower 
wages as an ethical postulate towards the equality of market- and natural prices.
699
 In-
deed the notion of a natural price implies the idea of a ‘right price’. Nevertheless, this 
does not lead Smith to develop a theory of just prices as in scholasticism; it rather serves 
as an argument for more competition.
700
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In ‘An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’, Smith developed 
four maxims of taxation: equality, certainty, convenience of payment, and economy in 
collection.
701
 He also mentioned that if public goods benefit only particular groups 
rather than the whole of society, it would be unjust if the general public had to pay for 
it.
702
 Often, Smith argues in favour of the poor. If, for example tolls upon carriages are 
in proportion to their weight, then the consumers of heavy, bulky commodities pay rela-
tively more than the consumers of light luxury goods. This would be fine if tolls were 
levied exclusively for the purpose of maintaining the roads. If, however, the revenues 
from the tolls finance other expenses of the state too, then those who are more able to 
contribute; that is, the rich, ought to pay more. It is reasonable to assume that poor 
households spend most of their income on heavy goods rather than light luxury 
goods.
703
 Also taxes on the number of windows are likely to be a higher burden for poor 
households than for rich ones, since a house of ten pounds rent in the country, may have 
more windows than an apartment or house of five hundred pounds rent in London.
704
 
Taxes that are not levied in proportion to the ability to contribute are against Smith’s 
first principle of taxation.
705
 
Besides the subject of taxation, Smith criticises the imbalance of power between em-
ployers and workers: ‘We have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the 
price of work; but many against combining to raise it.’706 Smith’s taking side with the 
poor becomes particularly obvious when he states: ‘When the regulation, therefore, is in 
favour of the workmen, it is always just and equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise 
when in favour of the masters.’707 
Far from assuming self-interested motivations in all areas of human behaviour, Smith 
repeatedly emphasises the importance of justice. In fact, the perfection of human nature 
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is to ‘feel much for others and little for ourselves . . . to restrain our selfish[ness], and to 
indulge our benevolent affections’708. 
5.5.2 Utilitarianism and the Marginal School 
‘[I]t is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and 
wrong . . .’709, is the basic principle of utilitarianism. In contrast to Kantian ethics of 
duties and convictions, utilitarian ethics are ethics of result. Actions can only be judged 
as good or bad by their consequences,
710
 ‘there are no good or bad actions per se’711. 
Moreover, social welfare is the sum total of all individual welfares. Therefore, an utili-
tarian social welfare function of the Benthamite type could be written as:
712
 
                         (5.1) 
           
 
   
 (5.2) 
One can see that every individual contributes to overall utility with the same weight. 
One unit of utility of household 1 increases overall utility by the same amount as one 
unit of utility of household 2. Because of that utilitarianism is indifferent about distribu-
tion
713
 and even about individual basic- and human rights
714
. If pursued consistently, 
utilitarianism is even compatible with redistribution from the poor to the rich if that 
should increase overall utility.
715
 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who is often referred to as a classical economist as well 
as a utilitarian, connected justice to the advancement of social well-being
716
. Thus, he 
had a utilitarian idea of justice.
717
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In the context of production, Mill saw actual laws of nature at work, laws that cannot be 
altered by men. The distribution of goods, however, is a matter of justice and morality. 
According to Mill, distributive justice means ‘redressing the inequalities and wrongs of 
nature.’718 
In his theory of prices, Mill departed from a strict labour theory of value. The output of 
production does not come about by the input of labour alone, also an additional input of 
capital goods is necessary. Capital goods in turn, are a result of labour in earlier periods 
and the capital owner can rightfully claim the product of the capital he owns.
719
 The 
input of land is treated differently. Land has not been created by men. Ideally it belongs 
to the whole of mankind. Private ownership of land can only be just, if it increases over-
all utility, if it does not, Mill called it unjust.
720
 
Neoclassical economics can be understood as an application of some form of utilitarian-
ism.
721
 Marginal values; that is, marginal utility or marginal productivity, play a decisive 
role in this context. The demand for goods is determined by marginal utility, factor re-
muneration by marginal productivity. Prices on markets based on the division of labour 
can be interpreted as just, since every factor of production receives its contribution to 
the output as remuneration.
722
 Hence, the answer of neoclassical economics to the prob-
lem of distributive justice is the theory of marginal productivity.
723
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Neoclassical authors are no longer concerned with ‘natural’ or ‘just’ prices, only with 
‘market’ prices, as a result of supply and demand. Instead of a labour theory of value, 
the new theory refers to marginal utility.
724
 Neoclassical theory focuses on given re-
sources, rather than dynamic processes. Its starting point, therefore, is scarcity.
725
 The 
function of prices is no longer perceived to be the reproduction of the economic system 
but rather the equalisation of supply and demand. Prices do no longer need to be ‘just’, 
they need to be ‘efficient’.726 
The marginal school reinterprets utilitarianism in an important way: The assumption of 
scarcity in combination with the hypothesis of decreasing marginal utility leads to a 
theoretical reduction of all human behaviour to a rational pursuit of utility maximisa-
tion.
727
 
Léon Walras (1834-1910), as one of the main figures of early neoclassical theory, dis-
tinguished three branches of economics: ‘Science’ as pure theory, ‘Art’ as applied theory 
and ‘Ethics’ or social economics.728 Thus, he acknowledged the problem of justice as a 
legitimate field of inquiry in economics, but as pure mechanics precedes applied me-
chanics in physics, pure economic theory must precede applications of ethical consid-
erations. He himself was only concerned with matters of pure economic theory.
729
 Be-
sides, as ‘justice consists in rendering to each that which is properly his . . . any science 
has for its object to render to each what is properly his, if, therefore any science es-
pouses justice as its guiding principle, surely it must be the science of the distribution of 
                                                 
724
  Cf. Blaug, Systematische Theoriegeschichte, p. 11. 
725
  Cf. Screpanti & Zamagni, p. 147. 
726
  Cf. Fehl, p. 264. 
727
  Cf. Screpanti & Zamagni, p. 148. 
728
  Cf. L. Walras, Elements of pure economics or the theory of social wealth, translation W. Jaffé, A. M. 
Kelley, New Jersey, 1977, first published 1874, p. 63. 
729
  Cf. ibid., p. 71. Carl Menger (1840-1921) even goes one step further than Walras. According to him, 
the ethical branch of economics goes wrong in assuming that the dignity of a science lies in its subject 
matter rather than the significance of its results. Therefore, Menger sees a misconception of the nature 
of economics in its ethical branch. Cf. C. Menger, ‘Über die sogenannte ethische Richtung der Politi-
schen Ökonomie’, in F. A. von Hayek (ed.), Carl Menger – Gesammelte Werke, 2nd ed., Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen, 1969, p. 291. 
5.  The Concept of Justice in the History of Economic Thought 137 
 
 
social wealth, or, as we shall designate it, social economics.’730 The concept of justice 
has been banned from pure (mainstream) economic theory. 
5.5.3 Historical Schools 
Representing the many authors of diverse historical schools, this chapter discusses only 
the contributions of Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917) to the issue of justice in economics. 
He regretted that many of his contemporary economists were not interested in the ques-
tion of justice. Schmoller found this particularly misfortunate and surprising since peo-
ple of all times have posed the question of justice and even the founders of economics 
postulated reforms aiming at justice.
731
 His own work, in contrast, focused on the reali-
sation of justice rather than efficiency.
732
 
‘The Just per se, anything absolutely just, is found in reality as little and as seldom as 
anything absolutely good. The Just is always an ideal conception, to which reality may 
approach, but which it will never attain. [sic]’733 Nevertheless, justice serves as a correc-
tive for historically evolved institutions and therefore as a guideline for social re-
forms.
734
 Schmoller compared the formation of an idea of justice with the formation of 
prices on the market. The absolute values of supply and demand do not perpetually de-
termine new prices, but already prevailing prices are adapted to changes in supply and 
demand. Like this, there is a process of continuing refinement of the sum total of tradi-
tional ideas of justice. Actual ideas of justice have historically evolved. It follows that 
there is no exact idea or definition of justice that is equally valid for all cultures and all 
periods of history.
735
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Schmoller was not convinced by the liberal, utilitarian ideas about justice. Whereas 
strict utilitarianism is only interested in the sum of social utility and not in the well-
being of single individuals, Schmoller stated that 
‘wie für die Gesundheit des ganzen Organismus die Gesundheit jedes einzelnen Gliedes nothwendig 
ist, . . . so ist es auch mit dem Organismus der menschlichen Zwecke. Keiner steht für sich allein, sondern 
ist mitbedingt durch die anderen und wird selbst am Besten gedeihen, wenn er das richtige Verhältnis zu 
den anderen Zwecken einnimmt. Ist das ganze Kulturleben von einem Zwecke zu sehr beherrscht oder 
will ein Glied des Organismus, eine Klasse der Gesellschaft unrichtig oder ungesund sich ausbilden, so 
entstehen die gesellschaftlichen Krankheiten und mit ihr die socialen Gegentendenzen. [sic]’736  
The well-being of all members of society is interdependent. Justice cannot be advanced 
by an increased utility of one individual at the expense of another even if overall utility 
should be greater than before. In the context of justice in exchanges, Schmoller accepted 
the liberal idea that voluntarily agreed contracts can be called just. However, he de-
manded furthermore the formation of just institutions.
737
 It becomes evident at this point 
that Schmoller was particularly interested in distributive justice.
738
 In this regard one 
has to differentiate between causes for an unequal distribution that depend on human 
actions and those that do not. Whereas the distribution is often explained by supply and 
demand as forces of nature, Schmoller interpreted supply and demand as the outcome of 
deliberate human actions. An unequal distribution on the level of individuals can be 
ascribed to chance; the distribution of income between different classes, however, is 
determined by the institutional framework.
739
 Institutions in turn are culture specific, 
can be changed and do change over time.
740
 In this context, Schmoller criticised the 
scholastic authors. He said they tried to legally enforce what only a higher development 
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of custom and civilisation could bring about.
741
 Schmoller himself was optimistic that 
such a development would occur and society’s institutions would become more and 
more just over time.
742
 
The teacher of John R. Commons (1862-1945), Richard T. Ely, got to know the German 
Historical School, when studying in Heidelberg.
743
 In this sense, Commons stood in the 
tradition of the Historical School, although he himself had been one of the outstanding 
representatives of American Institutionalism, which avoided establishing a dualism of 
ethics and economics.
744
 Institutions are not merely functional, they do not only exist to 
deal with scarcity in the most efficient way, but they have been intentionally created. 
The members of society are essentially free to form whatever institutions they want. 
Institutional reform does not necessarily aim at abstract ideas as efficiency or justice  
(cf. Schmoller), but only concrete action can reveal the interests and normative concep-
tions of the members of society. Commons called this ‘will-in-action’. Again, individu-
als are essentially free to create the institutions they desire but they do not necessarily 
aim at justice or efficiency.
745
 
Commons, like Hume, sees the origin of both justice and economics in the fact of scar-
city. Whereas ‘[e]conomics is the proportioning of factors, . . . ethics is the proportion-
ing of human factors in order to obtain the largest desired result from all.’746 If one ac-
cepts this, then justice is merely a specific form of efficiency. 
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5.5.4 Socialism 
According to Karl Marx (1881-1883), concepts of justice are always specific to the eco-
nomic system and its method of production.
747
 Seen from the inside, an economic sys-
tem is never unjust, but its ideals of justice might be based on mistaken perceptions of 
the system itself.
748
 
With this in mind, Marx presented an external and an internal critique of capitalism. 
Firstly the external critique: As Hume, Marx saw the origin for the problem of justice in 
scarcity. Communism, however, would bring about such an improvement of the system 
of production that scarcity and therefore justice would not play an important role in 
communism.
749
 Even decision making about what and how to produce would no longer 
be subject to considerations of justice. The most efficient way of satisfying needs would 
be scientifically chosen, without the need for opportunities to democratically participate 
in the decision making process.
750
 
Marx’s internal critique focused on why capitalism, seen from the inside of the system 
itself, appears to be just, even though it is not. Socialism, based on a strict labour theory 
of value, formulated the right to the full product of labour. Capitalistic market prices 
that grant part of the full product to each of the factors of production – labour, land and 
capital – must therefore be unjust.751 Furthermore, the capitalistic labour contract is un-
just. Liberalism would ascribe justice to such a contract as being a voluntary agreement 
of two equal parties. According to Marx this is a deception. The worker is ‘free’ in a 
twofold sense: He is free from his feudal obligations but at the same time he is also 
‘free’ of any means of production and is therefore compelled to sell himself; that is, his 
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labour power. The labour contract appears to be a free agreement, in fact it is not free at 
all.
752
 
In addition to the question of the just price, Marx discussed whether it would be possi-
ble to speak of a just rate of interest. In his ‘Capital’ Marx examined the statement that 
the rate of interest would be a matter of natural justice as being a part of profit. Ortho-
dox economics argued as follows: If A lends money to B and B makes a profit with this 
money, then B has to pay a part of his profits to A as remuneration for lending the 
money. Both parties agree to this contract since it is mutually beneficial. Marx criticised 
the notion of ‘natural justice’ in this context. Such an agreement can only be just in 
terms of the inner logic of the economic (i.e. capitalistic) system, not in a ‘natural’ 
sense.
 753
 Marx agrees with the other classical economists that natural prices are equal to 
the cost of production in the long run.
754
 Consequently, one could interpret the natural 
prices as being just. However, there is no ‘natural’ rate of interest. The actual rate of 
interest is an outcome of competition.
755
 One can conclude that since there are no natu-
ral rates of interest, there cannot be a ‘just’ rate of interest. This, however, is not explicit 
in Marx’ works. 
5.6 Contemporary Approaches 
Contemporary approaches to justice in economics are diverse and a meaningful structur-
ing of the individual concepts is difficult. This chapter confines itself to presenting some 
authors from German ordoliberalism, the ‘Theory of Justice’, by John Rawls, Amartya 
Sen’s work on the subject and some contributions from economic ethics. 
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5.6.1 Ordoliberalism 
Like most ordoliberal authors, Walter Eucken (1891-1950) did not formulate a system-
atic concept of justice. He referred loosely to Aristotle and concentrated primarily on 
general justice; that is, ensuring the individual’s freedom to self dependent action.756 
Only competitive market transactions fulfil the requirements of justice in exchange.
757
 
Eucken mentioned several examples of infringements of justice in exchange: expropriat-
ing savers by depreciation of money, excluding individuals from the participation on 
markets by market entry- or exit-barriers, abuse of the freedom of contract or shifting 
risk to other market parties by limitations of liability.
758
 With regard to distributive jus-
tice, Eucken gave priority to the distribution according to the market forces. This should 
result in a distribution in accordance with relative scarcity. If the distribution of the 
market, however, is based on market power, the government should intervene and redis-
tribute income.
759
 
Eucken used three terms relatively interchangeably: social justice, institutional justice, 
and formal justice. All three aim at a functioning order of the economy, or of the society 
respectively. Economic freedom of the individual agents should be ensured by creating 
an order based on competition and liability.
760
 
Wilhelm Röpke (1899-1966) frequently used the term social justice as well. He meant 
by this a certain kind of social equality: firstly, equal opportunities; that is, commutative 
justice, and secondly, the postulate that unequal activities or achievements should be 
remunerated differently; that is, distributive justice.
761
 Regarding the problem of the just 
price, wage or interest rate, Röpke identified them with the respective market price un-
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der competition and free market entry and exit. He considered other ways to determine 
the just price as arbitrary and subjective.
762
 
Alfred Müller-Armack (1901-1978) remains to be mentioned. He too emphasised the 
importance of justice for society: ‘Zwei großen Zielen fühlen wir uns verpflichtet, der 
Freiheit und der sozialen Gerechtigkeit’763. In a competitive market economy justice 
cannot mean rendering to each the same, but it must mean rendering to each his rightful 
due.
764
 
In summary, ordoliberalism tried to include justice and ethical aspects into the economic 
order. This, however, meant separating considerations of justice from the economic pro-
cess itself.
765
 
Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992) was rather an ‘evolutionary liberal’ than an 
ordoliberal.
766
 Nevertheless I present his liberal approach to justice at this point of this 
chapter, slightly distanced from the ideas of Eucken, Röpke and Müller-Armack. Ac-
cording to Hayek, justice can first of all only refer to human actions; it does not make 
sense to speak of just or unjust social states, and therefore the term ‘social justice’ is 
devoid of meaning.
767
 Secondly, rules of justice are negative rules, inhibiting certain 
actions. Positive rules ought to be exceptional (e.g. an obligation to help in emergen-
cies).
768
 It would thirdly be unjust to infringe upon somebody’s protected personal 
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sphere, and fourthly, rules of justice ought not to violate other already existing and more 
general rules.
769
 
Hayek’s concept of justice was only concerned with justice of an initial state and justice 
in the process, not with justness of outcomes. For this reason, Hayek is opposed to dis-
cussions about justness of prices or distributions.
770
 Justice rather demands the ac-
ceptance of the outcome of free markets.
771
 
Hayek understood the framework of institutions as an outcome of and as subject to evo-
lutionary change. This process of evolution does not lead to an ideal end-state; it is at 
work at all times. Evolution cannot be altered by human actions, it is necessarily undi-
rected and will inevitably lead to a lot of suffering and undesired outcomes. Hayek con-
cluded that evolution cannot be just. Hence, to demand justice in all evolutionary 
changes would mean to demand an end to the evolutionary process altogether – a stand-
still that Hayek rejects.
772
 
5.6.2 John Rawls 
The leitmotif of John Rawls’ (1921-2002) ‘A Theory of Justice’ is fairness773 which can 
be interpreted as the demand for impartiality
774
. Rawls stood in the tradition of Plato 
and Aristotle and rated justice as the highest of all virtues: The ‘right’ has priority over 
the ‘good’.775 Justice requires that men are not treated as means but as ends in them-
selves.
776
 Rawls accepted that other concepts, as for example efficiency or stability, are 
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central for a functioning society, but the most important one is justice and institutions 
are first of all to be judged in relation to their justness.
777
 
According to Rawls, a ‘conception of justice is a set of principles for choosing between 
the social arrangements which determine this division [of primary goods] and for un-
derwriting a consensus as to the proper distributive shares.’778 He defines primary goods 
as ‘things that every rational man is presumed to want. These goods normally have a use 
whatever a person’s rational plan of life.’779 Rawls lists the following: ‘(1) the basic 
liberties (freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, etc.), (2) freedom of movement 
and the choice of occupation, (3) powers and prerogatives of office and positions of 
responsibility, (4) income and wealth, (5) and the social bases of self-respect.’780 
There are a number of criteria according to which the distribution of primary goods 
could be carried out. First of all there would be the utilitarian principle of utility. This 
criterion considers all distributions as just as long as they go along with the greatest sum 
of satisfactions. How this sum of satisfactions and its distribution come about does not 
matter. Rawls criticised that the modalities of the formation of a certain distribution af-
fect the sum of satisfactions that results. Therefore, these modalities cannot be neglect-
ed.
781
 Also, ‘each member of society has an inviolability founded on justice which even 
the welfare of everyone else cannot override, and . . . a loss of freedom for some is not 
made right by a greater of satisfactions enjoyed by many’782. 
Secondly, one could try to achieve a Pareto-efficient distribution. Pareto-efficiency, 
however, yields a range of possible, that is to say Pareto-optimal solutions. The Pareto-
criterion cannot determine the best possible solution and can for that reason only count 
as an incomplete criterion.
783
 Besides, since you can only maximise one variable, it is 
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impossible to maximise the outcome of the distribution for all groups of society at the 
same time. You need to choose from which point of view you want to maximise. In a 
democratic society, it seems natural to select the perspective of the least advantaged 
group and thus it follows that the aim of the distribution process is to maximise the 
long-term prospects of the least advantaged in society.
784
 
To construct such a society, Rawls conducted a thought experiment with four premises: 
(1) in an original position, individuals have a consistent system of preferences regarding 
their future life in the society that is to come. (2) These individuals are mutually disin-
terested; that is, they pursue only their self-interest. (3) Also they have general knowl-
edge about society and (4) have a certain sense of justice. There are two main restric-
tions: (a) everyone is completely ignorant about his or her position in the future society. 
Rawls calls this the ‘veil of ignorance’. (b) Coalitions are not permitted.785 The veil of 
ignorance constitutes a situation of uncertainty. Whereas there are straight-forward deci-
sion making rules for situations under certainty; that is, maximise utility, for decisions 
under risk; that is, maximise expected utility, decisions under actual uncertainty are less 
well-defined. If you do not know the probabilities of future events you can for example 
either choose to maximise the best possible situation (maximax) or you can maximise 
the worst possible situation (maximin). Rawls decided to use the risk-averse maximin-
criterion.
786
 
Rawls’ approach led him to two principles: firstly, the liberty principle aiming at great-
est possible liberty, secondly, the difference principle: ‘Social and economic inequalities 
are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advan-
taged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.’787 The difference principle 
implies that a fair equality of opportunity has priority over productivity and utility 
maximisation.
788
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Analytically, the following equation describes Rawls’ theory of justice in a nutshell:789 
                               (5.3) 
The social welfare function yields the best possible solution for the least advantaged 
group of society. 
Figure 16: Maximin-Principle 
 
Source: Cf. H. Ribhegge, Sozialpolitik, Vahlen, Munich, 2004, p. 33. 
Figure 16 depicts the same relationship graphically. Line NN’ represents all possible 
distributions between the most favoured and the least favoured group of society. An 
equal distribution prevails in E. Starting from point E, both groups can be made better 
off. From M onwards, only the most favoured group can be made better off; at the ex-
pense of the least favoured. In U the sum of what both groups receive is maximised. 
Moving from N to M, Pareto-improvements are possible. A more unequal distribution 
would increase overall well-being but at the expense of the least favoured group. The 
maximin-criterion that Rawls used, yields M. 
Having established the principles of distribution, the veil of ignorance can be lifted in 
three further steps: Firstly, the members of society convene in a constitution-making 
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assembly, secondly, they codify the legislation, and finally, the veil of ignorance is 
wholly removed and the rules are applied.
790
 
Although being a philosopher, Rawls and his theory of justice had an enormous impact 
on economics; maybe also because he made intensive use of rational choice theory. 
Usually one would see rational choice theory rather as the opposite of a theory of jus-
tice, since it focuses completely on self-interested motivations. However, Rawls’ con-
struction of the original position is an attempt to achieve an impartial decision of the 
members of society.
791
 
It should at least be mentioned that contemporary to Rawls, Robert Nozick (1938-2002) 
and James Buchanan (*1919) formulated alternative approaches. Nozick argued in fa-
vour of a minimal state. Whoever acquires a thing in a just manner can rightfully claim 
this possession. A transfer of a thing by someone who has a rightful claim to it to some-
one else, establishes a rightful claim of the latter to the thing. Claims to anything can 
only result from such just acquisitions or just transfers.
792
 ‘A distribution is [therefore] 
just if it arises from another just distribution by legitimate means’793, he rejected redis-
tribution by the state.
794
 Nozick’s theory is consequently historical in nature rather than 
structural.
795
 Also his theory is one of procedural justice in contrast to Rawls’ end-state 
theory of justice.
796
 
Buchanan on the other hand started like Hobbes from a state of war of all against all. 
Since individuals are better off in a state with an established legal system, they will be 
able to agree on a constitutional contract to a minimal state that ensures adherence to the 
law. In so far as it is mutually beneficial; that is, Pareto-efficient, the members of soci-
ety will agree beyond that on functions of the state that include the supply of public 
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goods. Here, the constitutional contract is simply a result of self-interested behaviour, 
rather than of actual considerations about justice.
797
 
5.6.3 Amartya Sen 
Like Aristotle, Amartya Sen (*1933) has an ethics-related view of economics. He agrees 
with Aristotle that ‘though it is worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is 
finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states’798, hence economics 
cannot be content with achieving individual efficiency.
799
 An ethics-related approach 
can complement pure theory and enrich economics.
800
 
In his ‘The Idea of Justice’, Sen refers to two concepts from Sanskrit literature on ethics 
and jurisprudence: niti and nyaya. The term niti refers to ‘organizational propriety’ and 
‘behavioural correctness’, thus it stands for the idea of a perfectly just world.801 In mod-
ern terms niti corresponds to what Sen calls transcendental institutionalism, the attempt 
to answer the question, what perfectly just institutions would look like. As representa-
tive authors of this line of thought Sen mentions for example Thomas Hobbes, John 
Rawls, and Robert Nozick.
802
 
Sen sees two significant problems of the transcendental approach to the problem of jus-
tice: Firstly, it might be impossible to reach an agreement on what would be ultimately 
just.
803
 He tries to clarify his point by an exemplary story. There are three children – 
Anna, Bob and Carla – and one flute. All three children claim the flute on different 
grounds. Anna argues that she is the only one who is able to play the flute, Bob is the 
poorest of all three and owns no other toys, and finally Carla demands the flute, since 
she is the one who made it by her own hands’ work.804 One can easily see that there are 
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good reasons to render the flute to each of the children and if asked to decide, three dif-
ferent individuals might come to three different solutions: 
‘Bob, the poorest, would tend to get fairly straightforward support from the economic egalitarian if he is 
committed to reducing gaps in the economic means of people. On the other hand, Carla, the maker of the 
flute, would receive immediate sympathy from the libertarian. The utilitarian hedonist may face the hard-
est challenge, but he would certainly tend to give weight, more than the libertarian or the economic egali-
tarian, to the fact that Anne’s pleasure is likely to be stronger because she is the only one who can play the 
flute’805. 
Besides the difficulty of arriving at an agreement about principles of ultimate justice, 
possible solutions might be irrelevant. Rather than discussing possibly unavailable per-
fect solutions, one should concentrate on choosing among feasible alternatives.
806
 
Again, Sen has an example at hand: 
‘ . . . if we are trying to choose between a Picasso and a Dali, it is of no help to invoke a diagnosis (even if 
such a transcendental diagnosis could be made) that the ideal picture in the world is the Mona Lisa.’807 
Sen contrasts niti with the term nyaya, which stands for the realisation-focused com-
parisons of justice.
808
 The central question is not, ‘what would perfectly just institutions 
look like?’, but ‘how would justice be advanced?’809. Sen sees himself in a tradition of 
thinkers such as Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Karl Marx or John Stuart Mill,
810
 by 
stating that what moves him ‘is not the realization that the world falls short of being 
completely just, which few of us expect, but that there are clearly remediable injustices 
around us which we want to eliminate.’811 
For his own idea of justice, Sen mainly draws from three sources: John Rawls, Adam 
Smith, and social choice theory. Whereas Rawls concentrated on the distribution of pri-
mary goods, Sen uses the capability approach. This approach contrasts fixation on pos-
session of resources (Rawls) and individual satisfaction (utilitarianism),
812
 by asking 
                                                 
805
  Sen, The idea of justice, p. 13. 
806
  Cf. ibid., p. 9. 
807
  Ibid., p. 16. 
808
  Cf. ibid., pp. 20-1. 
809
  Ibid., p. 9. 
810
  Cf. ibid., p. 7. 
811
  Ibid., p. vii. 
812
  Cf. Mathis, p. 139. 
5.  The Concept of Justice in the History of Economic Thought 151 
 
 
what actual opportunities an individual has to use his freedom and his possessions.
813
 
Rather than focussing on the means to living, the capabilities approach is interested in 
the end of a good life.
814
 The ability to convert resources and primary goods into actual 
freedoms is considerably different from individual to individual. Thus, an equal distri-
bution of primary goods can go along with inequalities in actual freedom enjoyed. Sen 
mentions the example of a wheelchair user, who might have the same resources of pri-
mary goods as a non-disabled person, but is still endowed with fewer capabilities.
815
 
Sen surmises that economists are usually preoccupied with homogenous parameters 
such as income or utility because of their fondness of maximising and minimising. Ca-
pabilities, however, are diverse and such mathematical operations are therefore not ap-
plicable to them.
816
 They require ‘judgement’ rather than ‘counting’.817 Justice, for Sen, 
is ‘the elimination of unambiguous inequalities in capabilities’818. What is more, it re-
quires equal access to basic capabilitites, such as health care.
819
 
In order to bring objectivity into the discussion of justice, Rawls constructed the veil of 
ignorance, Habermas postulated public discourse, and Adam Smith used the concept of 
the impartial spectator:
820
  
‘The insolence and brutality of anger, in the same manner when we indulge its fury without check or 
restraint, is, of all objects, the most detestable. But we admire that noble and generous resentment which 
governs its pursuit of the greatest injuries, not by the rage which they are apt to excite in the breast of the 
sufferer, but by the indignation which they naturally call forth in that of the impartial spectator; which 
allows no word, no gesture, to escape it beyond what this more equitable sentiment would dictate; which 
never, even in thought, attempts any greater vengeance, nor desires to inflict any greater punishment, than 
what every indifferent person would rejoice to see executed.’821 
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Sen refers to the impartial spectator as a means to achieve objectivity in public discus-
sions. The solutions this construction leads to allow for a certain degree of incomplete-
ness, they do not need to be ultimately just, ‘plausibly just’ might be sufficient.822 
Besides the Rawlsian theory of justice and the Smithian impartial spectator, Sen finds 
that important insights can be gained from social choice theory as well. Instead of 
searching for perfectly just institutions, social choice theory focuses on the social states 
that actually emerge. Such approaches are apt to contemplate on actual social states and 
to assess them according to their justness, instead of being preoccupied with possibly 
unattainable perfectly just states.
823
 The comparative method of social choice theory and 
its recognition of an inescapable plurality of principles are in accordance with Sen’s 
own idea of justice. Furthermore, Sen acknowledges favourably its openness to partial 
solutions and to diverse interpretations and inputs (e.g. the impartial spectator) and fi-
nally its emphasis on public reasoning.
824
 
5.6.4 Economic Ethics 
Before coming to an end, the ideas of justice of the three main authors of the (mainly 
German) discussion about economic ethics – Karl Homann, Peter Ulrich, and Peter 
Koslowski – shall be briefly discussed. 
After initially being mainly concerned with the justice of actions – for example the just 
price – later, economics also contemplated on the justice of systems – the question of 
social justice.
825
 Karl Homann (*1943) explicitly states that a price is just, if it is a result 
of the market process. Particularly high prices serve the function of allocating resources 
efficiently and in fulfilling this function can be considered to be just.
826
 In the context of 
social justice, Homann refers to Buchanan. The original position is a state without nor-
mativity. Society only agrees on a constitution and further norms and rules, if these rules 
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are a Pareto-improvement.
827
 There cannot be any external criteria or meta-laws that can 
determine the justness of these rules. Their justness lies in the voluntary agreement of 
the society.
828
 Justice is not a matter of individual action, rather, it refers to the institu-
tional framework. Ethical or just actions mean firstly, to act according to the rules of the 
institutional framework, and secondly, to conform to the system, in a market economy 
that is to follow your self-interest and to maximise your profit or utility.
829
 
Peter Ulrich (*1948) develops an integrative form of economic ethics, as an intermedi-
ate between economic ethics as ‘applied ethics’ and as ‘normative economics’. What he 
calls applied ethics sees the economy as an ethics-free sphere. Ethical considerations 
need to be brought into the subject matter externally. Normative economics tries to get 
rid of ethical categories altogether and thereby transforms the economic principle itself 
into a norm.
830
 Contrary to Homann, Ulrich does not accept the outcome of competitive 
markets with a given institutional framework as automatically just. In fact, the pursu-
ance of self-interest
831
 and the initial status quo (before Pareto-improvements) are sub-
ject to ethical-political reason, thus to ethical considerations in the true sense of the 
word
832
. In the philosophical justification of his position, Ulrich speaks in favour of a 
‘republican liberalism’, which he places between economic liberalism and communi-
tarianism. Economic liberalism reduces all actions to self-interested motivations and 
also defines justice in connection to Pareto-efficiency and therefore to self-interested 
behaviour. Then, communitarianism sees the individual as inseparable from society and 
fails to see the individual as also an autonomous and morally self-committed identity.
833
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einer Verhältnisbestimmung’, in Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik, vol. 2, 2001,  
p. 44. 
828
  Cf. Homann, Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik, pp. 66-7. 
829
  Cf. K. Homann, ‘Marktwirtschaft und Unternehmensethik’, in Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg 
(ed.), Markt und Moral: Die Diskussion um die Unternehmensethik, Haupt, Bern et al., 1994,  
pp. 112-4. 
830
  Cf. P. Ulrich, Integrative Wirtschaftsethik: Grundlagen einer lebensdienlichen Ökonomie, 4
th
 ed., 
Haupt, Bern et al., 2008, pp. 101-2. 
831
  Cf. P. Ulrich, Der entzauberte Markt, Herder, Freiburg, 2002, pp. 37-9. 
832
  Cf. Ulrich, Integrative Wirtschaftsethik, pp. 205-6. 
833
  Cf. ibid., pp. 321-2. 
5.  The Concept of Justice in the History of Economic Thought 154 
 
 
Republican liberalism on the other hand, positions itself in a dialectical relationship of 
individual ethics and a liberal and just institutional framework; that is, institutional eth-
ics. In this context, it emphasises ethical-political reason in contrast to purely self-
interested motivation. Hence, the ideal society is neither based solely on a common per-
ception of values and desirable goods, nor on the market principle (i.e. Pareto-
efficiency) only.
834
 
According to Peter Koslowski (*1952), justice as a mindset based on reason aims at 
continuously and deliberately rendering to each what is properly his.
835
 As for Hume 
and many others, the problem of justice emerges for Koslowski as a consequence of 
scarcity. He claims that in a society without the phenomenon of scarcity, justice would 
not be relevant.
836
 
To answer the question what exactly it is, that ought to be rendered to everyone, 
Koslowski, formulated four criteria for justice in exchange: Firstly, the actual individual 
price should correspond to the prevailing price. In market economies that is usually the 
market price, which has the advantage of reflecting the subjective evaluations of all 
market participants. However, Koslowski notes, since the purchasing power of indi-
viduals differs, influence on the market price is unevenly distributed.
837
 Furthermore, he 
adds, the pure criteria of mutual advantages and efficiency can lead to prices that per-
manently discriminate certain interests, individuals or groups in a society. The reproduc-
tive function of a price is therefore neither to simply maximise individual advantages 
nor to reproduce static circumstances but to help fulfil the purpose of the economic sys-
tem; that is, to facilitate demand satisfaction and self-fulfilment of individuals.
 
It fol-
lows that in addition to reflecting subjective utility evaluations, a just price system 
serves the fulfilment of the material purpose of the economic system.
838 
                                                 
834
  Cf Ulrich, Integrative Wirtschaftsethik, pp. 326-9. 
835
  Cf. P. Koslowski, Prinzipien der ethischen Ökonomie: Grundlegung der Wirtschaftsethik und der auf 
die Ökonomie bezogenen Ethik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1988, p. 227. ‘Gerechtigkeit ist die bestän-
dige, vom Willen mitgetragene und von der Vernunft gelenkte Haltung, jedem das Seine, vor allem 
sein Recht, zu geben.’ 
836
  Cf. ibid., pp. 251-2. 
837
  Cf. ibid., pp. 276-9. 
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  Cf. ibid., pp. 269-74. 
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Secondly, the good exchanged ought to be a real good, as opposed to a pseudo-good. 
This condition is not fulfilled whenever the income of an exchange is not accompanied 
by a respective value added, for instance if the buyer exploits an exigency of 
the seller.
839
 
Thirdly, the exchange ought to be mutually advantageous, and finally, the exchange 
should bring about a true balance of interests.
840
 
5.7 Summary and Outlook 
This chapter has given an overview over the concept of justice in the history of eco-
nomic thought. Most importantly it has shown how perception of – and systematic con-
templation on – justice have changed and developed over time. As has been stated, 
Schmoller compared this to the formation of prices on markets: It is not the case that 
prices form again and again according to the absolute values of supply and demand, but 
the change of prices is the outcome of changes of the absolute values of supply and de-
mand. Similarly, new ideas of justice are not creations ex nihilo, but develop from the 
entirety of traditional thought on that matter.
841
 This tells us first of all why it is so im-
portant to be conscious of earlier discourses on justice and secondly it makes us aware 
of the historicity of the concept itself. Thought about justice is always context spe-
cific
842
 and ideas change due to new circumstances. It also follows that contemplation 
on justice can never become superfluous. For instance, as a consequence of living in a 
changing ecological environment
843
 and in a society deeply affected by demographic 
change, completely new problems need to be addressed in the light of an idea of justice. 
In the next chapter it remains to be shown how different ideas of justice correspond to 
certain problems and developments in society. Moreover, it needs to be addressed how a 
changing society and theory-inherent aspects of economics have contributed to the al-
                                                 
839
  Cf. Koslowski, Prinzipien, p. 238. 
840
  Cf. ibid., p. 229. 
841
  Cf. Schmoller, The idea of justice, pp. 710-1. 
842
  Cf. ibid., pp. 712-3. 
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  Cf. Höffe, Gerechtigkeit, p. 89. 
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most complete disappearance of the concept of justice from modern mainstream eco-
nomics. 
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6 Remembrance of Concepts Past: 
Why Justice no longer seems to be relevant  
in Mainstream Economics 
6.1 Introduction 
For most of the history of economic thought, the contemplation on economic issues was 
centred on the concept of justice. Thinkers from Aristotle
844
 to Gustav Schmoller
845
 
were largely concerned with justice. Modern economists, however, seem to have forgot-
ten about this, justice does no longer play a significant role, neither in economic theory 
and research nor in economics textbooks or introductory courses to economics.
846
 
Rather, economists speak of their own subject as the ‘science of efficiency’847. The 
question arises, what happened to the concept of justice in the sphere of economic rea-
soning? 
This chapter identifies several developments that led to this shift in the history of eco-
nomic thought. The individual aspects can be subsumed into three categories: Firstly, 
aspects of a changing culture and society, which in turn led to a changed perception of 
justice and a shift of emphasis in economic thought (chapter 6.2). Secondly, develop-
ments in economic theory itself; for example the introduction of basic assumptions that 
exclude the problem of justice in economic models from the start (chapter 6.3). Thirdly, 
I address a change in the self-perception of the economic science. The concept of justice 
got lost somewhere on the way from being a branch of ethics to nowadays understand-
                                                 
844
  Cf. Aristotle, book V. 
845
  Cf. Schmoller, The idea of justice. 
846
  Cf. chapter 5. 
847
  M. Allais, ‘Economics as a science’, in Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto, vol. 6, no. 16-17, 1968, p. 5, or  
S. Dalton, Economics, New Delhi, 2005, p. 1, or J. Dahl Rendtorff, Power and principle in the market 
place: On ethics and economics, Ashgate, Farnham et al., 2010, p. 89. 
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ing itself as ‘social physics’848 (chapter 6.4). Chapter 6.5 will conclude with some final 
remarks. 
6.2 Culture and Society 
The perception of the concept of justice goes along with changes in culture and the 
structure of society. In the following chapter, three such factors will be discussed: firstly, 
the shift from a hierarchical to an egalitarian society with a focus on the individual 
rather than collective actors, secondly, the emergence of dynamic societies, and thirdly, 
the evolution of modern competitive markets. 
6.2.1 Liberal and Egalitarian Societies 
Medieval societies were not egalitarian. The hierarchical structure was seen as part of a 
divine plan and therefore as immune to critical inquiry.
849
 Correspondingly, just prices 
were supposed to reflect social relations
850
 in the sense of Aristotelian proportionality
851
. 
This, in turn, was supposed to strengthen the cohesion of society in its natural order.
852
 
If the skills of members of society were not exchanged according to their standing in 
society, the social order would be in danger of falling apart.
853
 As for Plato,
854
 justice in 
medieval societies served the purpose of guaranteeing the cohesion of society. 
In the course of history, the structure of society changed. Particularly the French revolu-
tion initiated a trend towards an egalitarian society, aiming at eliminating all privileges 
and class distinctions. What was somebody’s ‘due’ could no longer be determined by 
being born into a certain social class. Rather, anybody’s ‘due’ was a matter of individual 
achievement and one’s contributions to society. Hence, justice referred to protecting the 
sphere of individual liberties, in which a member of society could lead a life free from 
                                                 
848
  Clark, Economic theory, p. 30. 
849
  Cf. Senft, p. 54. 
850
  Cf. Mirowski, More heat than light, p. 110. 
851
  Cf. Aristotle, p. 117, book V 1132b. 
852
  Cf. Polanyi, ‘Aristotle discovers the economy’. 
853
  Cf. ibid., p. 88. 
854
  Cf. Schefold, Wirtschaftsstile, p. 123. 
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arbitrary intrusion.
855
 The ancient concept of justice as a matter of proportionality 
seemed to be at odds with an egalitarian society. 
This development involved a shift from a focus on collective agents (e.g. classes, etc.) 
to a focus on individuals.
856
 Otherwise utilitarian thought would not have been able to 
flourish. Social well-being was then seen as the sum total of individual well-being and 
was thus sufficiently defined by adding up individual utility values.
857
 Consequently, 
ideas of something that could be ‘good or bad without being good or bad for some-
one’858 were alien to this mindset. 
6.2.2 Dynamic Societies 
The world in which Aristotle and Aquinas lived was static. The gain of one party neces-
sarily involved the loss of another.
859
 To prevent society from falling apart, the function 
of the just price was to guarantee a transaction in which neither party gained nor lost.
860
 
Consequently, the price should cover the costs and thereby reproduce society;
861
 in an-
cient Greece, this aimed at ensuring the functioning of society,
862
 in the Middle Ages, at 
reproducing the social order as part of God’s plan.863 As the economy became increas-
ingly dynamic, the exact determination of the just price became more and more difficult 
and consequently many authors accepted a whole range of prices as just.
864
 
The functioning of a price system in a modern, dynamic society differs significantly 
from the medieval ideas formulated with the idea of a static society in mind. First of all, 
it is usually assumed that contracts are voluntarily agreed upon. No party would enter 
                                                 
855
  Cf. Kerber, Westermann & Spörlein, pp. 47-8. 
856
  Cf. Screpanti & Zamagni, pp. 148-9. 
857
  Cf. Bentham, A fragment on government, p. ii. 
858
  Helgesson, p. 190. 
859
  Cf. G. W. Wilson, ‘The economics of the just price’, in History of Political Economy, vol. 7, no. 1, 
1975, pp. 62-3. 
860
  Cf. W. S. Vickrey, ‘An exchange of questions between economics and philosophy’, in E. Phelps (ed.) 
Economic justice, Penguine, New York, 1973, p. 57. 
861
  Cf. Spiegel, pp. 62-3. 
862
  Cf. Fehl, p. 251. 
863
  Cf. Senft, p. 54. 
864
  Cf. Salin, Politische Ökonomie, p. 37. Saint Antonin for example accepts three degrees of a just price. 
Additionally cf. Nutzinger & Hecker, p. 548. 
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into a contract if it would not expect to gain from such a transaction.
865
 If both parties 
can gain, since the value of a good is not inherent in the thing itself, a price below the 
costs of production does not need to be afflicted with negative connotations. Further-
more, it is the function of a price to allocate resources efficiently. Means of production 
should always be employed in the most profitable sector. In order to achieve that, prices 
serve as indicators for relative scarcity. Therefore, a price that does not cover the cost of 
production is not ethically problematic; it can in fact be beneficial for society.
866
 The 
function of the price system has shifted from the reproduction of society to an efficient 
allocation of resources. It follows that the idea of a just price that serves reproduction 
seems to have lost its meaning. 
In accordance with the changing society, the focus of economic inquiry also shifted in 
the 16
th
 to 18
th
 century from mainly static issues (e.g. distribution) to dynamic topics 
(e.g. growth). Here, the idea was that overall economic growth particularly benefits the 
least well-off in society. As a result the problem of a just distribution would become less 
relevant over time.
867
 
6.2.3 Modern Competitive Markets 
Besides the emergence of an egalitarian and dynamic society, there is a third factor that 
illustrates how a changing society influenced the perception of the concept of justice: 
the development of modern competitive markets. 
To clarify this point I will first recollect the scholastic doctrine of the just price. Albert 
the Great noted two conditions for the justness of a price: firstly, the price had to be vol-
untarily agreed upon, and secondly, the transaction must have been free from deceit. He 
stated that the estimation of the market would yield such a price.
868
 
                                                 
865
  Cf. Vickrey, p. 57. 
866
  Cf. Spiegel, pp. 62-3. 
867
  Cf. Sewall, p. 32, and cf. Nutzinger & Hecker, p. 555. 
868
  Cf. Schinzinger, pp. 23-4. 
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According to Thomas Aquinas, the just price must cover the cost of bringing a product 
to the market.
869
 The just price cannot be arbitrarily set but corresponds to the true, in-
herent value of a good.
870
 Here again, the market price was seen as a good indicator for 
the just price.
871
 Also St. Bernard argued in these lines: ‘Just price . . . is what conforms 
to the valuation of the place, that is, to what the subject of a sale is commonly thought to 
be worth at such a time and at such a place.’872 If the just price is equal to the market 
price at a particular time and place, how can someone violate the principle of a just 
price? 
A well defined market price is the result of the collective actions of many buyers and 
sellers,
873
 which has the advantage of representing an ‘objective’, common valuation.874 
In the Middle Ages such a situation of perfectly competitive markets was rare.
875
 Often 
market conditions in transactions tended to a bilateral monopoly in which the common 
estimation of society was absent and the price was mainly a result of opposing market 
powers.
876
 Infringements upon the principle of the just price were therefore mainly two-
fold: firstly, prevailing market power, and secondly, discrimination for example by tak-
ing advantage of individual exigencies or by deceiving the exchange partner.
877
 
One can see how the scholastic debate on just prices was specific to a world of particu-
larly imperfect markets. With the development of modern competitive markets it did not 
become completely irrelevant but it certainly lost importance. 
  
                                                 
869
  Cf. Schinzinger, pp. 25-6. 
870
  Cf. Baldwin, pp. 69, 72. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II.II. qu. 77 a. 1. 
871
  Cf. de Roover, p. 21, and cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II.II., qu. 77 a. 3. 
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  Sewall, p. 25. Sewall refered to: A. Graziani, Storia critica della teoria del valore in italia, U. Hoepli, 
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  Cf. D. D. Friedman, ‘In defense of Thomas Aquinas and the just price’, in History of Political Econ-
omy, vol. 12, no. 2, 1980, pp. 235-6. 
874
  Cf. Fehl, p. 260. 
875
  Cf. Nutzinger & Hecker, p. 545. 
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  Cf. Friedman, ‘In defense of Thomas Aquinas’, pp. 235-6, and cf. Fehl, pp. 260-1. 
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  Cf. Baldwin, pp. 79-80. 
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6.3 Economic Theory 
We have seen how some of the scholastic demands for justice became more and more 
realised in developing economic institutions. Similarly, many of these demands are by 
definition fulfilled in modern economic theory – i.e. neoclassical economics in particu-
lar – being implicit in the assumptions. 
6.3.1 Neoclassical Assumptions 
In neoclassical economics, the two major possible violations of price justice that have 
been discussed in the previous chapter are excluded by assumption. 
First of all there is no discrimination. Economic agents are assumed to be perfectly in-
formed,
878
 there are no threats, no coercion or fraud and each party is free to refuse or 
agree on a contract.
879
 Furthermore, justice might require constraints of the market 
forces. Only if two equal partners, in the full meaning of the word, meet in the market, 
can freely operating market forces be in accordance with the principle of justice.
880
 In 
reality situations like this might be rare. In theory, however, all economic agents are 
equal, since all parties of the transaction have only a negligible influence on the market 
price.
881
 
Secondly, modern economic theory usually assumes perfect competition.
882
 Conse-
quently, market power as a threat to justice
883
 is not relevant in the world of economic 
models. 
A further requirement for justice is also assumed to be fulfilled according to neoclassi-
cal theory. Whereas Aquinas demanded that a price should cover the costs of produc-
tion, the price in the neoclassical sphere of perfect competition is equal to marginal cost 
and equal to the marginal willingness to pay. It follows that the neoclassical market 
                                                 
878
  In consistence with the scholastic tradition: Cf. Nutzinger & Hecker, p. 545. 
879
  Cf. J. Johnson, Economic theory and social justice, MPRA Paper no. 1243, Munich, 2007, p. 21, and 
cf. Katz & Rosen, pp. 352-7. 
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  Cf. Schmoller, The idea of justice, p. 730. 
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  Cf. Friedman, ‘In defense of Thomas Aquinas’, pp. 235-6. 
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price covers the expenses of bringing a good to the market and hence fulfils the scholas-
tic requirement for justice.
884
 
Likewise, some considerations about distributive justice are inherent in the assumptions 
of economic models. Consider for example the general equilibrium model in its formu-
lation by Gérard Debreu. Each agent is assumed to command over some arbitrary 
amount of initial endowments.
885
 The issue of distributive justice is irrelevant since the 
initial endowments are treated as given. Furthermore, one could refer to the second fun-
damental theorem of welfare economics and state that every desired distribution of in-
come could be attained by lump-sum transfers,
886
 an issue I will discuss in more detail 
later on. 
6.3.2 Subjective Price Theory 
Aristotle and the Scholastics demanded the equality of price and what was rendered in 
return. Neither exchange party should gain or lose.
887
 This corresponds to an objective 
theory of value which states that value is an inherent attribute of the thing itself.
888
 Clas-
sical economists argued in a similar way: The value of goods was objectively deter-
mined by the labour embodied and factors of production received their natural remu-
neration.
889
 
Doubts about this objective idea of value arose rather early. Even some scholastics 
themselves, like Antonin, and later Ferdinando Coelestinus Galiani and Anne Robert 
Jacuqes Turgot were the first to hint at a subjective theory of value.
890
 Doubting the la-
bour theory of value, Richard Whately in 1832 famously said ‘It is not that pearls fetch 
a high price because men have dived for them; but on the contrary, men dive for them 
                                                 
884
  Cf. Hecker, p. 311. 
885
  Cf. G. Debreu, Theory of value: An axiomatic analysis of economic equilibrium, Wiley, New York, 
1959, pp. 74-5. 
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  Cf. Nutzinger, pp. 392-3. Cf. also Debreu, pp. 90-97, and cf. E. Sohmen, Allokationstheorie und Wirt-
schaftspolitik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1976, pp. 94-99. 
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  Cf. Mathis, p. 192. 
888
  Cf. Sewall, p. 76. 
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  Cf. Blaug, Systematische Theoriegeschichte, pp. 11, 17. 
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  Cf. Salin, Politische Ökonomie, p. 39. 
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because they fetch a high price.’891 Eventually Carl Menger initiated the breakthrough 
of a subjective theory of value:  
‘Value is thus nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an independent thing existing by itself. 
It is a judgment economizing men make about the importance of the goods at their disposal for the 
maintenance of their lives and well-being. Hence value does not exist outside the consciousness of 
men.’892 
Thus, according to a subjective theory of value, value arises from the mind rather than 
being a property of the thing itself.
893
 
With an objective theory of value in mind, the problem of a just price is obvious: If a 
good is worth one hour of your labour, but the seller charges you the equivalent of two 
hours, you will feel unfairly treated. If, however, you act under the assumption that the 
good in question has no inherent worth but value arises from your subjective valuation, 
then being charged two hours of labour would not appear to be ethically problematic, as 
long as you are willing to pay that price. Thus, a subjective theory of value makes the 
question of the justness of a price appear to be out of place. 
6.3.3 The Invisible Hand and Marginal Productivity Theory 
In the second half of the 18
th
 century, Adam Smith revolutionised the perception of the 
interplay of ethics and economics: 
‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, 
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.’894 
By pursuing one’s self-interest, one can be ‘led by an invisible hand to promote an end 
which was no part of [the original] intention.’895 In contrast, acting with the intention of 
promoting the public good is likely to cause more harm than good.
896
 After Adam 
                                                 
891
  R. Whately, Introduction to political economy, lecture IX: delivered at Oxford, B. Fellows, London, 
1832, p. 253. 
892
  C. Menger, Principles of economics, translation J. Dingwall & B. F. Hoselitz, Ludwig von Mises Insti-
tute, Auburn, 2007, first published in German 1871, pp. 120-1. 
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  Cf. Sewall, p. 76. 
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  Smith, An inquiry, p. 15. 
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  Ibid., p. 485. 
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6.  Remembrance of Concepts Past 165 
 
 
Smith, this ‘private-vices-public-good-doctrine’ was radicalised. John Stuart Mill wrote 
for instance:  
‘In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you 
would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian 
morality’897. 
‘As yourself’: Therefore, one needs to begin by loving oneself, before one can love 
one’s neighbour.898 Economic motives – i.e. pursuing one’s self-interest – receive a met-
aphysical justification and as a result, economics itself becomes ethics.
899
 
The marginal theory of productivity explains the functional income distribution by the 
marginal products of the individual factors of production. With this in mind, if it is true 
in the market sphere that it is one’s responsibility to pursue one’s self-interest (Das 
Seinige tun) and the market mechanism in turn distributes to every factor of production 
its due (Das Seinige erhalten), then the Aristotelian requirements for justice are fulfilled 
(‘Gerechtigkeit besteht, wenn jeder der das Seinige tut, auch das Seinige erhält’900). 
This theoretical construction reflects also the perception of many neoclassical econo-
mists. According to Hermann Heinrich Gossen, remuneration according to marginal 
productivity means that ‘not only is a maximum of value created in the end but also 
each individual receives from this total exactly that part for which he can make a fair 
claim.’901 And John Bates Clark wrote in the preface to ‘The Distribution of Wealth’: ‘It 
is the purpose of this work to show that the distribution of the income of society is con-
trolled by a natural law, and that this law, if it worked without friction, would give to 
every agent of production the amount of wealth which that agent creates.’902 In addition, 
                                                 
897
  Mill, Utilitarianism, 1863, pp. 27-8. As cited by Salin, Politische Ökonomie, pp. 90-1. 
898
  Cf. Salin, Politische Ökonomie, pp. 90-1, referring to Mill. According to Salin, this idea is what made 
Nietzsche refer to that ‘blockhead’ (Flachkopf) John Stuart Mill. F. Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht: 
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  Cf. Salin, Politische Ökonomie, pp. 90-1. 
900
  Schefold, Wirtschaftsstile, p. 148. 
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  Gossen, The laws, p. 105. ‘nicht bloß, daß durch Erfüllung jener Bedingungen in Summa ein Größtes 
von Werth geschaffen wird, jeder Einzelne erhält dann genau den Antheil von dieser Summe, auf wel-
chen er billiger Weise Anspruch machen kann. [sic]’ Gossen, Entwickelung der Gesetze, p. 90. 
902
  J. B. Clark, The distribution of wealth: A theory of wages, interest and profits, Macmillan, New York, 
1899, p. v. It has to be noted that actually the distribution according to marginal products reflects rela-
tive scarcity rather than the particular productivity of the factor concerned. 
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Clark extends this idea to the theory of wages: Free competition – as a matter of ‘natural 
law’ – ‘tends to give to labor what labor creates, to capitalists what capital creates, and 
to entrepreneurs what the coördinating [sic] function creates.’903 Clark is opposed to the 
idea that labour is exploited in capitalistic economies; in fact he sees a certain idea of 
justice incorporated in the capitalist system.
904
 
6.3.4 Utilitarianism, Utility Theory, and Welfare Economics 
From a utilitarian point of view, there is also a second aspect of marginal productivity 
theory that gives the market economy the impression of being naturally just. If market 
forces can operate freely and factors of production receive their marginal product, this 
leads to an optimal allocation of resources;
905
 that is, overall welfare is maximised.
906
 In 
addition to the requirements of ancient greek philosophy, marginal productivity there-
fore fulfills the utilitarian requirements for justice.
907
 
As a consequence of the change of utility theory from a cardinal to an ordinal approach, 
distributive justice got further out of the focus of economists. In contrast to cardinal 
utility theory, in an ordinal approach no quantitative measuring and no interpersonal 
comparisons of utility are possible.
908
 This makes a difference to the perception of dis-
tributive justice, since a cardinal utility theory combined with utilitarian philosophy 
justifies a tendency towards an equal distribution.
909
 From a utilitarian point of view, 
circumstances are just if they bring about the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people. Under the assumption of decreasing marginal utility, identical individual utility 
curves yield a maximum of utility at an equal distribution. 
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Press, Cambridge MA, 1991, p. 188. 
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906
  Cf. Katz & Rosen, pp. 426-9. 
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Figure 17: Utilitarianism and Decreasing Marginal Utility 
 
Source: P. Koslowski, Prinzipien der ethischen Ökonomie: Grundlegung der 
Wirtschaftsethik und der auf die Ökonomie bezogenen Ethik, Mohr Siebeck, Tü-
bingen, 1988, p. 287. Based on B. Külp & E. Knappe, Wohlfahrtsökonomik I: 
Die Wohlfahrtskriterien, 2
nd
 ed., Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1984, p. 80. 
As figure 17 shows, if the marginal utility curves of individuals one and two are identi-
cal and one assumes a negative slope, only an equal distribution (E
*
) maximises overall 
utility. If instead, we would find ourselves in situation E
**
, the shaded area indicates a 
deadweight loss and we could increase overall utility by moving from E
**
 to E
*
; that is, 
by realising a more equal distribution. The analysis holds only for identical marginal 
utility curves, otherwise utility maximisation would require an unequal distribution. 
Nevertheless, one can see that under certain circumstances the utilitarian concept of 
justice can require redistribution of income. 
An ordinal utility theory, however, leads to different conclusions: Strictly speaking it is 
impossible to determine whether one euro has greater marginal utility to a beggar or to a 
millionaire.
910
 Thus, ordinal utility theory restrains itself to a distribution according to 
marginal productivity and therefore to the contribution of the individual factor of pro-
duction rather than to individual need. Whereas the old welfare economics
911
 took dis-
                                                 
910
  Cf. R. F. Harrod, ‘Scope and method of economics’, in The Economic Journal, vol. 48, no. 191, 1938,  
p. 396. 
911
  Cf. e.g. A. C. Pigou, The economics of welfare, 4
th
 ed., Macmillan, London, 1960, first published 
1920. 
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tributional aspect into consideration, the new welfare economics
912
 is concerned with 
the efficiency of exchange and production only.
913
 
The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics states that every competitive equi-
librium is Pareto-efficient; that is, free competition leads to the greatest possible satis-
faction of needs. According to the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics, it 
is possible to separate the problem of allocation from the problem of distribution. By 
means of lump-sum transfers, every Pareto-efficient state can be attained as a competi-
tive equilibrium. Economists therefore do not need to be concerned with the problem of 
distributional justice. 
This distinction was initiated by Vilfredo Pareto: 
‘1. We have a problem of distribution: how should the goods which the society possesses or produces be 
divided among the members? It is necessary to bring in different kinds of ethical and social considera-
tions, comparisons of ophelimity of different individuals, etc. We do not have to deal with that here. 
Therefore we will assume this problem solved. 
2. We have a problem of production: how to produce the economic goods in such a way that, distributing 
them according to the rules obtained by the solution of the first problem, the members of the society ob-
tain maximum ophelimity.’914 
There can be no doubt about the importance of distinguishing between allocation and 
distribution. Yet, after Pareto, this reasonable distinction lead to an exclusive contempla-
tion of problems of allocative efficiency, whereas the issue of distributive justice has 
been outsourced to other disciplines such as Philosophy and the Political Sciences.
915
 
  
                                                 
912
  Cf. e.g. J. Hicks, ‘Wealth and welfare’, in Collected essays on economic theory, vol. 1, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1981, pp. 5-7, or cf. V. Pareto, Manual of political economy, translation A. S. Schwier, Mac-
millan, London et al., 1971, originally published in French 1909, pp. 110-3. 
913
  Cf. Hagel, p. 18. 
914
  Pareto, Manual of political economy, p. 267. In the original French: ‘1. Nous avons un problème de 
distribution: comment doivent être répartis entre ses members les biens que possède ou que produit la 
société? . . . Il faut faire intervenir des considérations éthiques, sociales de différent genre, des compa-
raisons d’ophélimité de différents invidus, etc. Nous n’avons pas à nous en occupier ici. Nous sup-
poserons donc ce problem résolu.  
2. Nous avons un problème de production: comment produire les biens économiques de façon que, en 
les distribuant ensuite suivant les règles obtenues par la solution du premier problème, les members de 
la société obtiennent le maximum d’ophélimité?’, V. Pareto, Manuel d’économie politique, Giard, 
Paris, 1909, p. 362. 
915
  Cf. Hagel, pp. 18-9. 
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6.4 Self-Conception 
The concept of justice has increasingly been outsourced from economics to neighbour-
ing disciplines.
916
 Partly this is a consequence of the changing self-conception of eco-
nomic science. Thus the indifference or even the aversion of economists to questions of 
justice can be explained to a certain degree by the contemporary tendency
917
 to perceive 
economics as a form of ‘social physics’918 which goes along with enormous efforts to 
formalise economic research. Justice, however, is hardly quantifiable.
919
 
The modern emphasis on empirical analysis, in particular since William Petty
920
, is in 
stark contrast to a normative, justice-based approach. Whereas Aristotle
921
 and the 
Scholastics
922
 asked the question, which price should prevail, economists since the six-
teenth century are rather interested in what the current price is and how it came about. 
Thus, the focus has shifted from justification to explanation.
923
 Léon Walras, as a repre-
sentative of neoclassical economics, perceived justice as a legitimate field of inquiry, 
however, it should not be in the focus of pure theory. As pure mechanics has priority 
over applied mechanics, Walras argued, pure economic theory should have priority over 
applied and ethical considerations. As the virtue of justice means rendering to each what 
is properly his, this should also apply to scientific inquiry and therefore, reflections on 
justice should be the matter of ‘social economics’ rather than pure economics.924 
Particularly since Max Weber, the social sciences work under the postulate of value neu-
trality. Weber established the fundamental principle that every social scientist ought to 
distinguish clearly between statements of fact and value judgements.
925
 Others elabo-
                                                 
916
  Cf. Hagel, pp. 18-9. 
917
  Cf. Screpanti & Zamagni, pp. 148-9. 
918
  Clark, Economic theory, p. 30. 
919
  Cf. Petersen, p. 264. 
920
  Cf. Petty, p. 244. 
921
  Cf. Polanyi, ‘Aristotle discovers the economy’. 
922
  Cf. Salin, Politische Ökonomie, p. 43. 
923
  Cf. Sewall, p. 32. 
924
  Cf. Walras, Elements, pp. 63-79. 
925
  Cf. M. Weber, ‘Der Sinn der “Wertfreiheit“ der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften’, in 
M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1985, first 
published 1917, p. 462. 
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rated on this. Karl Popper for instance made it clear that it is impossible to separate a 
scientist from his individual world view and his value judgements without destroying 
his personal identity. He stressed, however, the importance of explicitly pointing out 
combinations of objective statements and value judgements in one’s work.926 Standing 
in this line of thought, many modern economists understood economics as a value-free 
science:
927
 John Neville Keynes stated the proposition that it is possible to study ‘eco-
nomic laws or uniformities without passing ethical judgements’928, Lionel Robbins saw 
‘economic analysis [a]s wertfrei in the Weber sense’929 and according to Milton Fried-
man ‘positive economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical position of 
normative judgments’, it is ‘an “objective” science, in precisely the same sense as any 
of the physical sciences.’930 Friedman went on to say that differences about economic 
policy were merely a result about different ‘predictions about the economic conse-
quences of taking action – differences that in principle can be eliminated by the progress 
of positive economics’931. Consequently, ideal economic policy can be attained by im-
proving economic theory without referring to considerations of justice at all. In a value 
free economic science, it appears to be the case that there simply is no space for the 
concept of justice. In contrast to the issue of efficiency, which can be addressed ‘rela-
tively wert-frei’932 the problem of justice is inseparably connected to value judgements. 
  
                                                 
926
  Cf. K. R. Popper, ‘Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften’, in Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozi-
al-Psychologie, vol. 14, 1962, pp. 40-2. 
927
  Of course there are exceptions. E.g. ‘[t]here can be no view except from a viewpoint. In the question 
raised valuations are implied’ (G. Myrdal, ‘Institutional economics’, in Journal of Economic Issues, 
vol. 12, no. 4, 1978, p. 779), or ‘value judgments end up by playing a role in our assessment of pa-
rameters and the evidence we consider’ (F. Modigliani, ‘The monetarist controversy or, should we for-
sake stabilization policies?’, American Economic Review, vol. 67, no. 2, 1977, p. 10). 
928
  J. N. Keynes, The scope and method of political economy, Batoche, Kitchener, 1999, first published in 
1890, p. 22. 
929
  Robbins, An essay, p. 91, emphasis in the original. 
930
  M. Friedman, Essays in positive economics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953, p. 4. 
931
  Ibid., p. 5. 
932
  P. A. Samuelson, ‘Evaluation of real national income’, in Oxford Economic Papers, new series, vol. 2, 
no. 1, 1950, p. 11. ‘Relatively value-free’. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
Since David Hume,
933
 many authors have traced the problem of justice – like the con-
cept of efficiency – back to the phenomenon of scarcity.934 One might be surprised 
about this development if one perceives justice as limiting and correcting the pure striv-
ing for efficiency. Resulting from understanding both concepts as arising from the same 
problem, in neoclassical theory, justice and efficiency are sometimes even treated syn-
onymously. Walras for instance formulated three conditions for justice in exchange with 
perfect competition: Firstly, all market participants ought to pay the same price. Sec-
ondly, the economic costs of production – i.e. marginal costs plus internalised external 
effects – ought to be covered. Thirdly, firms minimise their costs. Compare the condi-
tions for efficiency: Firstly, there is a uniform market price (efficient exchange). Sec-
ondly, the price is equal to marginal costs (efficient bundle of goods). Thirdly, firms 
minimise their costs (technical efficiency). Understood in this way, the conditions for 
justice in exchange and those for allocative efficiency are equivalent.
935
 
Possibly, the tendency of economists to outsource the question of justice to neighbour-
ing disciplines might also be due to an existential anxiety
936
. According to existential 
philosophy, men respond to the experience of freedom and responsibility for one’s 
deeds by taking ‘refuge in habit and diversion’ and by being  
‘predisposed to complacency, conformity to convention, and self-deception. We will argue that there are 
inescapable patterns imbedded in the nature of things (determinism) and take cover under any universal 
rule – a slogan, a compact formula, anything that might apply if only it will save us from the task of 
choosing for ourselves and thereby assuming the hard responsibility of confronting the consequences of 
our own choices.’937 
                                                 
933
  Cf. Commons, Institutional economics, pp. 140-1. Cf. Hume, An enquiry, pp. 83-9. 
934
  Cf. Panther, p. 22, and cf. Koslowski, Prinzipien, pp. 251-2. 
935
  Cf. Hagel, pp. 21-2. Cf. also chapter 4: Aspects of Efficiency. 
936
  Cf. e.g. S. Kierkegaard, ‘The concept of anxiety: A simple psychologically orienting deliberation on 
the dogmatic issues of hereditary sin’, in Kierkegaard’s writings, vol. 8, ed. and translated by  
R. Thomte, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981, originally published in Danish 1844. 
937
  Y. Ramstad, ‘Institutional existentialism: More on why John R. Commons has so few followers’, in 
Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 21, no. 2, 1987, p. 665. 
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Contemplation on just economic institutions and processes eludes quantitative analysis 
and cannot be bypassed by referring to ‘economic laws’. Thus it seems that economists 
are particularly anxious people in the existentialist sense: 
‘Since it is in the very nature of working rules to expand the opportunities available to one class of indi-
viduals by placing limits on the activities of another, every recommendation has implicit in it a personal 
choice regarding whose interests should be advanced at the expense of another’s. . . . Instead of accepting 
personal responsibility for making a choice, economists are perceived from this perspective as likely to 
search for simple formulas, or a “knowledge” for whose content they themselves will not be held directly 
responsible, to guide them. Hence, in a desperate attempt to shift responsibility, the economist will search 
for, and rely upon, formal models and econometric results, that is, “objective” knowledge, and embrace as 
“inescapable (or natural) forces” such formulas as “supply and demand”, “wage equals marginal prod-
uct”, and “price equals marginal cost”.’938 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
938
  Ramstad, ‘Institutional existentialism’, p. 669. 
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7 Results, Discussion, and Outlook 
After justifying a relativistic approach to economics in chapter 2, I indeed found the 
assumed development in the history of economic thought: from contemplation on jus-
tice to a focus on efficiency. Furthermore, in chapter 3, I identified several influences 
and developments that have been important in bringing about the shift of focus. One 
could mention many more influences, I presented only a selection of relevant factors, 
such as most importantly, the emergence of neoclassical theory and therefore the imita-
tion of the natural sciences, and also the separation of production for the household and 
production for the market
939
. I then argued that the concept of efficiency is more than 
simply a law of nature or a positivistic method of economics, but is an inherently nor-
mative concept. 
Scrutinising the concept of efficiency in chapter 4, I found that the individual aspects of 
efficiency can be subsumed under three factors: technical efficiency, distributive effi-
ciency, and the efficiency of the output mix. These aspects of efficiency correspond to 
the functions of an economic system: what to produce, how to produce, and for whom to 
produce. 
In chapter 5, I examined the long history of thought about justice. It became apparent 
that concepts of justice always build on the sum total of the previous thought on the 
matter, and thus are no creations ex nihilo. Contemplation about justice is always em-
bedded in the respective society and its culture. Whenever the societal environment 
changes, concepts of justice need to adapt to new circumstances. Consequently, new and 
original ideas concerning the concept of justice can never become superfluous. 
It is all the more regrettable that contemplation on justice seems to have disappeared 
from the economic mainstream. In chapter 6 I presented a number of reasons for its dis-
appearance. The individual factors can again be subsumed under three groups: factors 
regarding a changing culture and society, elements of the economic theory, and the self-
conception of economics as a science. 
                                                 
939
  Trennung von Haushalt und Betrieb. 
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This dissertation identifies one major shift in the history of economic thought in the 
postulation of pervading scarcity. Since David Hume the necessity of both efficiency 
and justice are understood as a result of scarcity.
940
 The efficient and just economisation 
of scarce resources therefore both aim at an optimal solution. The mathematical search 
for an optimum induces the concentration on one maximand, which should preferably 
be exactly measurable.
941
 
Hume seems to be partly right that even with regard to justice many problems arise out 
of the scarcity of resources. Nevertheless many problems of justice are not scarcity-
induced. For instance, equality before the law, impartiality of justice and administration, 
human rights, separation of powers, and the struggle for recognition are not an outcome 
of the scarcity of resources. Similarly, Cain did not kill his brother Abel, because of a 
lack of resources, but because God honoured Abel’s sacrifice, and not Cain’s.942 A con-
cept of justice that is solely based on the scarcity postulate, misses the core of the issue: 
namely, that justice is a relational; that is, social phenomenon.
943
 
If, however, the contemplation on justice is based on scarcity, as is the logic of effi-
ciency, then the calculating method of economics becomes also the logic of ethics.
944
 
The resulting search for an optimal state in the context of justice then means that ethics 
is simply a particular form of efficiency.
945
 Then economists as moral philosophers can 
limit themselves to (seemingly) value-free calculations, and thus quantitative analyses, 
rather than facing the challenge of formulating qualitative judgements.
946
 
This thesis opens up a lot of questions for future research: In order to deal with the vast 
material on the initial question, I had to limit my analysis to a selection of historical 
                                                 
940
  Cf. Commons, Institutional economics, pp. 140-1. Cf. Hume, An enquiry, pp. 83-9. 
941
  Cf. Sen, The idea of justice, pp. 239-40, 395. 
942
  Genesis 4: 4-5. Cf. Höffe, Gerechtigkeit, pp. 26-7, and cf. A. Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur 
moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2003, first ed. 1992. 
943
  Cf. R. Forst, ‘Die erste Frage der Gerechtigkeit‘, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, vol. 37, 2005,  
p. 25. 
944
  Cf. Salin, Politische Ökonomie, pp. 90-1. 
945
  Cf. Schellschmidt, pp. 366-7. 
946
  Cf. Sen, The idea of justice, p. 395. 
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influences. Many more could also be taken into consideration.
947
 Furthermore, impor-
tant issues as the relationship between law and justice
948
, or the examination of possible 
trade-offs between justice and efficiency, could not be undertaken in the context of this 
dissertation. Finally, the application of theoretical concepts of justice in economic pol-
icy, offer an immense range of fascinating research questions. 
                                                 
947
  E.g. the invention of writing and rational book-keeping, climatic conditions (seasonality requires the 
creation of inventories and foresighted planning), the neolithic revolution, etc. 
948
  Recht und Gerechtigkeit. 
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